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论文编号：	6216
作者编号：	2120122600
上传时间：	2014/6/6 0:04:45
中文题目：	风险资本对创业企业代理成本的影响研究——基于创业板上市公司的数据
英文题目：	Study on the Impact of Venture Capital on the Entrepreneurial Firms’ Agency Cost--Based on GEM Listed Enterprises Data
指导老师：	黄福广
中文关键字：	风险资本；创业企业；代理成本
英文关键字：	Venture Capital; Entrepreneur Firms; Agency Cost
中文摘要：	创业企业对经济发展和新的经济形式创造起着越来越重要的作用。然而，由于“新进入缺陷”的存在，创业企业失败的概率很高。风险资本是创业企业最重要的资本来源，促进了创业企业的发展与内部公司治理的完善；但是风险资本又会与创业企业家产生冲突，尤其在我国的环境下更是如此。因此，风险资本是否会使创业企业的代理成本降低并不清楚。本研究有助于解决这一问题，丰富相关理论，并为我国风险资本和创业企业的发展提供借鉴。 风险资本由于在专业知识、社会网络和融资资源上的优势在进入企业后通过对公司进行的服务、管理与监督改善创业企业的公司治理；另一方面，风险资本与创业企业家也会在利益、文化、战略等诸多方面存在利益冲突。对这种由于代理关系产生的冲突处理不当，便可能会增加企业的代理成本，影响企业的健康发展。风险资本对创业企业代理成本的作用受到风险资本的特征及投资策略的影响。通过手工搜集确认2009-2012年在我国创业板上市的355家企业样本的1655个风险资本投资数据，并使用面板数据对研究问题进行了检验。研究发现，我国风险资本发展还不成熟，投资时具有典型的中晚期投资和“突击入股”的现象；从整体上来看，有风险资本投资的公司的代理成本高于没有风险资本投资的公司，但这种差异的绝对值并不大。进一步地，风险资本及其投资的不同特征对这种影响的作用不同。国有性质风险资本、非本地风险资本以及经验较短的风险资本投资的企业的代理成本更高；风险资本的投资强度（投资后持股比例）越高，所投资公司的代理成本越高，而风险资本投资后参与公司治理比不参与公司治理更有利于减少代理成本；但是风险资本的投资阶段选择和投资方式对于代理成本没有显著性影响。 本文研究是风险资本对创业企业代理成本的影响的探索性的工作。研究中发现风险资本从两个途径影响投资企业的代理成本，并将研究与风险资本自身特性和投资的特性相结合，丰富了风险资本影响代理成本的相关理论。
英文摘要：	Entrepreneur firms have more and more significant effect on economy developing and creating new economies. However, because of the liability of newness, it is more possible that entrepreneurs will fail. Venture Capital (VC below) is the main capital resource of entrepreneur firms, and while VC investment takes many active effect like improving corporate governance, on emerging firms, it also has interest divergence at many aspects like operating, strategic and this may lead to conflicts, and this is specially the case in China. Thus whether VC investment can reduce agency cost of startups or not is not clear in theory. This work has positive meaning to address the issue, enrich theoretical research, and provide guidance to developing of VC and entrepreneurs. Due to their advantage in expertise, social networks and financial resources, VC investment can have positive effect to firms through service, management and supervision and thus improving the corporate governance on one hand, on the other hand, however, there exists lots of conflict between VC and firms in interest, culture and strategy. If they cannot manage conflict with grace, it may accelerate the agency cost, and hamper the development of the firms. The characters of the VC itself and its investment strategies will change this effect. Using data- which confirm whether a firm received investment from VC, and the properties of these VCs and their invest strategies-of 355 firms listed on China GEM from 2009 to 2012, this paper test the hypothesis that VCs do have impact on entrepreneur firms’ agency cost, and the effectiveness varies in different VCs. And the result show that in China, VC industry is not yet maturing, and VCs tend to invest in late stage. Overall, agency cost of companies backed by VC are generally higher than those no VC invest, although the extent of difference is small. Moreover, different VCs and their distinct invest strategies do have different effect. To be specific, companies supported by VCs which is sponsored by government, located father and have short experience have higher agency costs. For invest strategies, higher shares related to higher agency cost, and taking part in corporate governance results in lower agency costs. However when and how to invest has no significant effect on agency costs. It is a pioneering work to study the impact on the agency cost of entrepreneur firms for VC. And this paper found that VC affects the agency cost in two ways, and the work takes the properties for account, enriching the theories of agency cost.
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