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论文编号：	6142
作者编号：	2120122647
上传时间：	2014/6/2 18:30:32
中文题目：	高管权力、薪酬激励与非效率投资
英文题目：	The Relationship of Executive Power，Salary Incentive and the Inefficient Investment
指导老师：	牛建波
中文关键字：	高管权力；非效率投资；薪酬激励；货币薪酬；股权薪酬；激励约束
英文关键字：	Executives’ Power；Inefficient Investment；Incentive Compensation； Monetary Remuneration and Equity Compensation；Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms
中文摘要：	当下，所有权和经营控制权的两权分离是现代公司最典型的特征之一。公司的所有权归全体股东所有，而公司实际的经营控制权却掌握在公司的高管手中。高管负责公司的经营和管理，制定公司的重要决策并负责决策的执行和实施，其决策行为对公司的生存和未来发展发挥着举足轻重的作用。然而，由于高管的利益和股东的利益并非天然的一致，高管为了获取私人收益可能实施非效率投资行为，这种行为将会严重损害企业的未来发展和所有者的利益。为了减轻委托代理问题，薪酬激励一直是公司激励约束机制的重要手段。 由于高管权力的难以量化，以及选择的相关衡量指标的不同，导致高管权力的研究结论大相径庭、难以令人信服。因此，为了更好的测度高管权力在上市公司投资决策中发挥的实际作用并细致的探寻薪酬激励对这种作用的影响，本文选取了2007-2012年我国A股上市公司为研究对象，来检验上市公司中高管权力如何影响公司的投资行为；同时本文针对薪酬激励的特征，区分了货币薪酬（以CEO年度报酬和前三名高管薪酬为衡量指标）和股权薪酬（以CEO持股比例和高管层持股比例为衡量指标）的两个维度，来验证高管的薪酬激励对其权力与所在公司非效率投资行为之间关系的影响。 文章通过实证分析和检验发现，从整体上来看，上市公司中高管权力与企业的非效率投资呈现显著的正相关关系，也即当高管的权力越大时，其对公司的影响力和控制力也就越强，企业投资行为的非效率发生几率也越高。然后，我们分别验证了薪酬激励对高管权力与企业非效率投资之间关系的调节作用，发现货币薪酬激励对两者之间关系的调节作用并不显著，而股权薪酬激励则能显著调节两者之间的关系，股权薪酬激励越高，高管利用其权力进行非效率投资的行为越低，也即股权激励对高管权力与企业的非效率投资有显著的治理效应。最后，根据实证的结论，本文认为高管权力对公司的投资决策影响很大，为了降低这种危害公司价值的行为，亟需建立完善的激励约束机制来加强对公司高管的监督，本文也据此提出了一些政策建议。
英文摘要：	At the moment, The separation of ownership and control is One of the most typical characteristic of modern corporation. Executives are responsible for the company's operation and management，their decision-making behavior plays a pivotal role on the company's survival and future development. However, due to the interests of executives are not consistent with shareholders’ interests, in order to obtain personal benefits, executives probably implement inefficient investment behavior which will seriously damage the interests of shareholders and affect the future development of enterprises. In order to reduce principal-agent problems, incentive pay has been one of the important incentive and restraint mechanisms. As the executive power is difficult to quantify and the selection of relevant metrics is different, the conclusions on the research of executive powers is different and unconvincing. Therefore, in order to better measure the actual role played by executive power in the company’s investment decision-making and more meticulously explore the impact of incentive pay on this action, we selected the 2007-2012 A-share listed companies as our research object to test how executives power affects the company's investment behavior. Meanwhile, We divided the pay into into monetary remuneration and equity compensation in connection with the characteristics of incentive pay. Through empirical analysis and testing, We discovered that on the whole, the executive power and inefficient investment showed a significant positive correlation . In other words, when the power of executives is greater, their influence and control over the company is stronger, and the probability of occurrence of the inefficient investment behavior is higher . Then we verified the incentive pay’s regulation of the relationship between executive power and inefficient investment. Contrary to the equity compensation’s regulation, We found that the monetary compensation’s regulation is not significant . When equity incentive is higher, the possibility of inefficient investment is lower. Last but not the least, according to the conclusions of empirical research, We argue that executive power have a great impact on the companies’ investment decisions.In order to reduce the those acts which will cut down the value of the company, there is an urgent need to establish a sound incentive and restraint mechanism to strengthen the oversight of the company executives
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