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论文编号：	6135
作者编号：	2120122650
上传时间：	2014/5/31 12:18:31
中文题目：	独立董事经济激励、声誉激励与高管非自愿变更
英文题目：	Independent Directors’ Economic Incentive， Reputation Incentive and Executive Involuntary Changes
指导老师：	牛建波
中文关键字：	独立董事；经济激励；声誉激励；董事会独立性；高管非自愿变更
英文关键字：	Independent Directors；Economic Incentive；Reputation Incentive； Board Independence；Executive Involuntary Changes
中文摘要：	独立董事制度作为现代公司制度的衍生物，目前已经成为了董事会治理中的一项重要安排，被视为降低上市公司内部代理问题的有效机制，在公司治理体系中占据着十分重要的地位，由于独立董事可以不依附于管理层，进而能够有力地对高管的经营管理行为进行监督，从而维护股东的利益，因而，独立董事在降低代理成本，维护股东利益方面一直被人们寄予厚望。随着《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度指导意见》的颁布，独立董事制度正式被引入中国。然而，一直以来，关于独立董事能够独立公正的维护股东利益，促进公司治理效率提高的争论从未停止。在实务界，大家通常将独立董事比作“花瓶”，对其“不独立”、“不懂事”、“不作为”的批判不绝于耳。与此同时在学术界，对独立董事是否发挥公司治理职能也争议不断，已有的研究成果也没有定论。本文从独立董事的履职动机出发，将独立董事激励机制对典型的公司治理事件—高管非自愿变更的影响有机结合，对独立董事的有效性进行了初步探究。本文以2013年间我国A股上市公司数据为研究对象，采用LOGISTIC回归分析方法，研究结果发现：（1）独立董事经济激励与声誉激励与高管非自愿变更可能性显著正相关；（2）独立董事经济激励降低了高管因业绩不佳而被非自愿变更的可能性，而声誉激励则提高了高管因业绩不佳而被非自愿变更的可能性；（3）董事会独立性的提高对独立董事经济激励与声誉激励对高管非自愿性变更-业绩敏感性的调节效应有不同的显著影响。本文的研究结果显示，首先，尽管自从独立董事制度引入我国之初至今就一直饱受诟病，人们对于独立董事是否发挥作用也一直争论不休，但至少从本文的研究结果来看，随着独立董事制度的发展与完善，在一定的激励水平下，独立董事在公司的重大决策中确实发挥了作用；其次，在提升独立董事监督动机，促进独立董事积极履行职责方面，不同的激励机制发挥着不同的作用，董事会独立性对此的影响作用也不尽相同，因此在制定独立董事政策时，要根据公司实际情况，综合考虑多方因素，才能制定出行之有效的方案。
英文摘要：	As a derivative of the modern company system，the independent director system has already become a significant arrangement in the governance of board of directors， and has been considered an effective means to reduce the internal agency problems of listed companies，and plays an important role In the corporate governance system。 In view of the independent directors can be independent of management and effectively supervise the behavior of the executive，people have always had high hopes with the independent directors in reducing agent cost and maintain shareholder interests。 With the issue of “The Instructional Advice on Establishing the Independent Director System of Listed Company”，the independent director system was introduced into China formally。However，for a long time， the debate about if the independent directors can independently and fairly maintain the interests of shareholders and promote the efficiency of corporate governance has never stopped。People usually compare the independent directors to “vase”，because they are not independent， not sensible and negative in practice。At the same time，whether independent directors played corporate governance function is also controversial。From the point of existing research，the research based on the number，ratio or the individual characteristics of independent directors，the relationship between the independent directors and the performance of the company and internal governance behavior still cannot draw a consistent conclusion。 This article embarks from the motivation of independent directors to perform their duties，combined the independent director incentive mechanism and typical corporate governance events -- executive involuntary changes，carrying on the preliminary exploration the effectiveness of independent directors。This paper takes 2013 a-share listed companies in our country as the research object，using LOGISTIC regression analysis method，the results showed that: (1) The economic incentive and reputation incentive to independent directors and executive involuntary changes possibility is significantly positively related to；(2) The economic incentives to independent directors plays a negative role to the executives involuntary changes for poor performance；The reputation incentives to independent directors plays a positive role to the executives involuntary changes for poor performance；(3)The increasing of board independence has an significant affect on the adjustment effect of independent directors economic incentive and reputation incentive to executives involuntary changes - performance sensitivity。 This paper proved that，first of all，though since the independent director system was introduced into our country，the debate on whether it is work has never stopped， at least from the point of the research results of this article，with the development of the independent director system，under the certain incentive levels，the independent directors do play a role in the company's major decisions。Second，in improving the motivation of independent directors to supervise executives and promoting the independent directors to perform its duties actively，different incentive mechanism plays different roles，he effect of board independence is also different，consequently， we should consider the actual situation of the company when make the policy about independent directors to ensure its effectiveness。
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