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论文编号：	6127
作者编号：	2120122643
上传时间：	2014/5/31 10:16:23
中文题目：	CEO权力、公司治理与股权激励强度
英文题目：	CEO Power, Corporate Governance and the Intensity of Equity Incentive
指导老师：	张国萍
中文关键字：	CEO权力；股权激励强度；公司治理
英文关键字：	CEO Power; Equity Incentive Intensity; Corporate Governance
中文摘要：	自上世纪50年代以来，股权激励在全世界范围内得到了广泛的推行与认可，然而随着公司治理实践的发展，CEO权力的滥用已经严重损害了股权激励有效性。在股权激励设计与运行过程中，内部人控制问题不断涌现，CEO权力在公司运作中肆意妄为。众多公司中产生的CEO财务造假、在职消费膨胀、侵占公司财产、吞噬股东利益等问题层出不穷。在学术研究方面，国内外学者对CEO权力研究主要集中在与CEO变更、薪酬激励设计和公司业绩等的关系研究，而对股权激励计划中的CEO权力行为研究的较少。因此，我们亟待研究的是CEO权力在公司治理中的道德风险是否会影响股权激励强度的设计，另外探究公司治理的内外部治理机制对这一代理风险是否存在调节作用。 本文选取2011-2013年期间宣告股权激励计划的上市公司作为样本，以CEO权力为研究核心，在综述国内外文献以及相关理论基础上，借鉴Finkelstein对于高管层权力的定义划分，将CEO权力指标界定为CEO的组织权力、所有者权力、专家权力与声誉权力的均值Power，探究CEO权力在股权激励强度设计中的道德风险问题，并进一步加入公司内外部治理的债权人治理、产品市场治理、董事会治理与大股东治理四种治理机制作为调节变量，检验公司治理对股权激励强度与CEO权力关系的调节作用。 本研究主要结论，一是CEO权力与股权激励强度呈显著正相关关系，CEO权力越大，越能够绑架董事会决策，增加自身的股权激励强度。二是内部治理机制在模型中起到了调节作用，削弱了股权激励计划中的CEO自利性行为，有助于降低代理风险与代理成本，而外部治理存在有效性缺失现象。
英文摘要：	Since the 1950s, equity incentive has been widely acknowledged on the global scale. However, seeing from the global corporate governance practices, the abuse of CEO power has already heavily damaged the effectiveness of equity incentive. In the process of equity incentive design and operation, there appears lots of insider control problems triggered by CEO, such as financial cheating, on-the-job consumption inflation, occupying the property of company, devouring shareholders' interests and so on. In CEO power related academic research, scholars mainly focus on the CEO changes, the salary incentive mechanism, the relation between CEO power and corporate performance. The research about how CEO power affects equity incentive is comparatively small. So we need to test whether CEO will abuse his power and control the equity incentive intensity. And we fartherly study how corporate governance moderates the relationship between CEO power and equity incentive. This article chooses listed companies which carried equity incentive plans from year 2011 to 2013 as samples with CEO power at the core. On the basis of domestic and international literature review, we refer Finkelstein’ definition of executive power, and design the CEO power as the average of organizing power, ownership power, reputation power and expert power. We explore the CEO ethical risk problems in equity incentive intensity, and fartherly study the moderating effect of internal and external governance on the relationship between CEO power and equity incentive intensity. The results show as below. On one hand, the relationship between CEO power and equity incentive intensity is significantly positive. The bigger CEO power is, the stronger equity incentive intensity is. On the other hand, there exists moderating effect of internal governance on the relationship between CEO power and equity incentive intensity. It moderates that relationship negatively, and helps to reduce the agency cost. While there exists a lack of effectiveness of the external governance.
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