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论文编号：	61
作者编号：	2120051908
上传时间：	2007/6/21 16:26:21
中文题目：	中国上市公司负债融资和公司价值
英文题目：	A study on Chinese listed comp
指导老师：	张晓农
中文关键字：	控制权和现金流权的偏离 负债融<
英文关键字：	Divergence between Control rig
中文摘要：	拉波特等人（La Porta，Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer，1999）的研究是关于终极控制权问题的非常重要的研究，并在“控制权和现金流权的偏离”方面取得了开创性的研究成果。他们发现，许多国家的上市公司都存在有唯一的终极控股股东。另外，他们还发现终极控股股东常常通过金字塔结构、交叉持股结构和二元股份结构来构建一个复杂的控制链，从而将其现金流权与控制权进行分离。他们的研究为其他学者拓展了关于“控制权和现金流权偏离”的相关研究领域。 当终极控股股东以较小的现金投资而获得较大的控制权时，控制权和现金流权就会发生偏离，当控制权大于现金流权时，说明终极控股股东用较小的现金流放大了控制权。这时，控股股东就容易产生利用控制地位获得超过现金流索取权的控制权私人利益的驱动，出现侵占公司资源，掠夺小股东的行为。 本文首先回顾了国内外学者对终极控股股东控制权和现金流权偏离的研究情况和相关研究成果，并在此基础上对本文中的研究概念进行了界定，明确了本文的主要研究目的，即通过实证研究的方法探讨中国上市公司终极控股股东控制权和现金流权的偏离对负债融资和公司价值的影响。 本文选择来自沪深两市的720家上市公司为研究样本，其中终极控股股东为国有的上市公司609家，终极控股股东为民营的上市公司111家，并整理和统计了其2001-2005年的相关财务数据作为研究对象。 通过对720家上市公司2001-2005年控制权、现金流权和两权偏离系数γ的分析，本文发现，中国上市公司普遍存在终极控股股东控制权和现金流权偏离的现状，而且实际两权偏离程度比两权偏离系数γ所揭示的名义两权偏离程度要更为严重。和其他22个国家两权偏离系数γ的对比结果表明，中国上市公司两权偏离的现状在国际上也是比较严重的。 最后，本文混合了这720家中国上市公司2001-2005年的横截面数据和时间序列数据，组成了一个混合数据样本，并设计了回归模型来研究两权偏离对负债融资和公司价值的影响，并得出实证研究结论。
英文摘要：	La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer’s research（1999）is a very important research of ultimate control right. They found that many listed companies of different countries have only one ultimate controlling shareholder. Besides, they also found that ultimate controlling shareholders construct complex controlling chain by means of Pyramidal Structure, Cross-holding, Dual-class Equity and so on, through these control mode, control right and cash flow right are separated from each other, in other words, there is divergence between control right and cash flow right. Their research have broaden the other researchers’ domain of control right and cash flow right’s divergence. When controlling shareholder acquires greater control right with smaller cash investment, control right and cash flow right diverge. Control right being greater than cash flow right means that controlling shareholder uses smaller cash flow to achieve the magnification of control right. At this time, controlling shareholder has the private benefit incentive to take advantage of controlling position in order to attain control right which exceeds cash flow right, it may also expropriate the company’s resources and spoliate minority shareholders. This dissertation reviews the theories and research achievement of control right and cash flow right’s divergence, defines the related variables, and makes sure the research objective. The research objective of this dissertation is to discuss the impact of control right and cash flow right’s divergence on Chinese listed companies’ debts and corporate value. The author selects 720 Chinese listed companies’ data, which cover 5 years from 2001 to 2005, to form a mixed data. According to the study of control right, cash flow right and γ of these 720 listed companies, the author finds that divergence between control right and cash flow right is very common in Chinese listed companies, and in fact, the real the divergence between control right and cash flow right is much worse than the divergence degree which is showed through the nominal γ. Besides, through the comparison with the other 22 countries’ companies, the divergence degree of Chinese listed companies’ is also more severe. At last, the author designs a regression model to discuss the impact of control right and cash flow right’s divergence on Chinese listed companies’ debts and corporate value, and gets some empirical conclusions.
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