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论文编号：	594
作者编号：	2120062618
上传时间：	2008/6/19 23:52:33
中文题目：	不确定环境下经理人股权激励的
英文题目：	Studies on The Function of The
指导老师：	黄福广 教授
中文关键字：	不确定环境 股权激励 经理人
英文关键字：	Uncertainty Equity Incentive
中文摘要：	随着我国改革的不断深化和现代制企业的发展，企业经理人的重要性日益增加。特别在我国经济转型和入世初期的阶段，整个大环境的变迁快速，企业面临的竞争加剧，更加凸显出经理人和股东之间信息不对称和目标不一致的问题。因此，透过有效的激励制度解决委托代理问题，成为企业关切的议题。在许多激励制度中，经理人股权激励制度是西方经验中最为普遍的，也是我国近年来尝试采用的办法。然而我国的外部环境明显不同于其他采用股权激励的国家，因此，本文在研究经理人股权激励的作用时，加上了不确定环境这一条件，以2001～2006年485家上市公司为研究对象，并按不确定程度分组，进行回归，研究了在不确定环境下，经理人持股比例及其与公司业绩的关系，和股权激励的作用。 研究结果表明，从总体来看，当不确定程度越高时，经理人持股比例越小，两者成负相关，然而这一结果并不显著。另外，经理人的持股比例与公司业绩成正相关，持股越多业绩越好。再将不确定程度细分为三组后，发现不确定程度低时，不确定性与经理人持股比例成正相关，随着不确定程度增加，在中和高不确定程度分组中，两者的关系成负相关，且三组的结果越来越不显著。而在这三个不确定程度的样本中，经理人持股比例与公司业绩都呈现正相关，表示在不确定环境中经理人持股能对公司经营结果有一定程度的提升。在针对不确定环境下股权激励作用的检验得到显著的结果，环境中的不确定程度越高时，股权激励起到的作用越差。因此，就持股比例与公司业绩的关系来说，经理人持股越多越好，然而这却受到环境不确定程度的限制，不确定程度增大时，经理人持股比例会减少，并且降低了股权激励的作用。
英文摘要：	With the further promotion of the reform of our country and making the development of modern enterprises, the significant of enterprises’ executive increases day by day. Especially, our country is at economic transition stage and enters the WTO on initial; the changes of the great whole environment are fast and the increased competition which enterprises face. In such an environment, show the question is information asymmetry and inconsistent with the goal between executive and shareholder more protruding. How to solve the problem of principal and agent through the effective incentive system, become the topic deeply concerned of enterprises. In a lot of incentive systems, equity incentive plan is the most general in the western experience, is the method that our country tries to be adopted in recent years too. However the external environment condition of our country is obviously different from the country where use equity incentive plan. So, this thesis has added this condition of the uncertain environment while studying the effect of executive’s equity incentive plan. We pick up the listed companies of the years of 2001-2006 and then divide into groups according to the uncertainty degree to research the correlation between the performance of the listed companies and the proportion that executive holds the stocks. The result shows that in whole sample when the uncertain degree is the greater, the executive is the smaller in shareholding ratio, but this result is not remarkable. The executive's shareholding ratio and company's performance is positive correlation. After dividing into groups, we finding when the uncertain degree is low, uncertainty and executive's shareholding ratio become positive correlation. As the uncertain degree increases, the relation between them becomes negative correlation and three groups of results are more and more unremarkable. Moreover executive's shareholding ratio and company's performance all present positive correlation. Finally, we test the efficacy of equity incentive plan at uncertain environment, and find that the result is negative correlation. In summary, the equity incentive plan is useless at more and more uncertain environment, and the shareholding ration will decrease with uncertainty.
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