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论文编号：	5918
作者编号：	2120112716
上传时间：	2013/12/6 14:46:40
中文题目：	董事会控制权争夺及其效应研究
英文题目：	The Study on the Contention About the Control of the Board of Directors
指导老师：	覃家琦
中文关键字：	董事会;控制权;争夺;公司业绩
英文关键字：	Board of directors; Control; Malicious contention; Corporate performance
中文摘要：	在现代公司治理结构中，董事会是股东大会的常设机构，其设立的目的是执行股东大会的决议，并在股东大会休会期间对公司重要的日常经营活动进行决策。从企业发展的角度看，在企业发展初期，股权较为集中，公司的控制权更多的体现为股权比例上的绝对控制。但随着企业的发展，融资需求不断增大，进行融资的一个重要途径就是股权融资。新投资者的加入改变了原来的股权结构，使任何一方投资者均不能从股权结构层面达到对公司的绝对控制。这使得股东对公司的控制权需要延伸到对董事会控制权层面上，延伸到对董事会决策进行影响的层面上。股东若想保持对公司的控制和影响，就需要在董事会派驻代表并表达自身的利益诉求，否则股东利益将出现无人代表的境况。在董事会中，这些代表了不同股东利益的董事们在面对公司发展战略等一系列生产经营决策问题时，出于自身利益的考量往往出现重大的分歧。当这些分歧不可协调时，最终解决的手段便是夺取对公司董事会的控制权。 本文的逻辑起点是，在股权分散，不存在绝对控制的情况下，董事会控制权的争夺最终取决于对企业价值创造过程的控制。在董事会不同利益主体中，那些控制了企业价值创造过程的一方将更容易获得公司董事会的控制权，并通过董事会的控制权来控制整个企业。 本文从管理学视角，对企业价值创造过程进行了分析研究。列举了企业价值创造过程中的五个维度，分析了五个维度和董事会控制权争夺的关系，以及五个维度在公司内部的传导三个阶段，并由此总结出了董事会控制权争夺的五维度模型。即对董事会控制权的争夺通过企业战略、管理结构、资源分配、契约安排、公司业绩五个层面展开，同时又受到此五个因素的制约。此五个因素之间又存在着逐级影响的传导机制。这些影响因素和董事会控制权相互作用，形成了循环往复，永不停歇的斗争过程。 在董事会控制权争夺的五维度模型框架下，本文分析了新浪和国美电器两个案例。通过对两家公司董事会控制权争夺在五个维度的分析，我们总结了新浪和国美控制权争夺的各自特点及其对业绩的影响。新浪控制权争夺结束后新浪坚定了发展门户网站的战略目标，管理结构和资源能够集中到公司总体战略之中，业绩实现了巨大的跨越式发展，公司成为国内三大门户网站之一。而国美的控制权之争结果是使企业在发展战略的摇摆中浪费了资源、错失了发展机遇，从而使公司业绩出现严重下滑。两个案例的对比分析。也使我们所提出的董事会控制权影响因素模型得到了实际案例的印证。文章最后对我国公司的董事会治理提出了政策建议。
英文摘要：	In the modern corporate governance structure, as a permanent organ of the shareholders’ meeting, the Board is established to make decisions about the daily business activities during the shareholders’ meeting adjured. From the perspective of enterprise development, in the early stages of enterprise development, ownership is more concentrated, controlling over the company means absolutely controlling the equity ratio of share. But with the development of enterprises, increasing financing was needed. And, one of the important way to meet this needs is equity financing. Then the new investors join the enterprises, and the original ownership structure changed. At this time, any equity investors are not able to reach the level of absolute control. the company's shareholders need to make control at the level of the board of directors, and impact the Board's decision.On the basis of separation of ownership and management rights，the company's shareholders have to resident representative in the Board to express their interests and aspirations, if they want to maintain control and influence. During the process of enterprise’s development, the enterprise requires continued investment. So that new investors are always introduced to the company, and their agent are sent to the board of directors. However, in the face of the making decisions of the company’s development strategy and other issues of great importance, It is always difficult for the directors to reach consensus, mainly because they represent different interests of investors. And ultimately, the way to resolve these differences is by means of controlling the company's Board of Directors. Dispersed ownership and the absence of absolute control, make the control of the ultimately depends on control to the process of enterprise value creation. And this is the logical starting point of this paper. During these directors backed on different stakeholders on the board, those who control the party's enterprise value creation process will be easier to gain control of the company's board of directors, and then, the control of the entire enterprise. This paper focuses on five dimensions of the causes and effects of competition for control of the board of directors, as well as its three stages conducted within the company. Then we summed up the “Five dimensional model” about the fight for control of the board of directors. These five dimensions are as follows: Corporate strategy, Organizational structure, Resource allocation, Contractual arrangements, Performance of the company. While affected by these five factors. These five factors also affect the process of the fight for control of the board of directors. These factors finally form a cycle, which is a never -ending process of struggle. Based on the analysis of the process of competing for the control of the Board, this paper constructs an analytical framework, within which we analysis two cases: Sina and Gome. Through analysis of the control of the board of directors of the two companies compete in five dimensions model, we summarize the characteristics of these two cases and their impact on performance. After the fight of control of the board, Sina defines its company strategy that operate the company as a portal site, management structures and resources can be concentrated in the company's overall strategy , and then the company achieved tremendous leaps and bounds , the company became one of the three major domestic portals in China. However, the outcome of struggling for the control of board of Gome seems bad. It enable enterprises in the development strategy swing wasted resources , missed opportunities for development , and making the performance of this company in severe decline . Comparative analysis of two cases, these two actual cases also confirm the correctness of the “five dimensional model” about the control over the board of directors. Finally, policy recommendations are made on the governance of the company's board of directors.
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