联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	59
作者编号：	2120051937
上传时间：	2007/6/21 13:09:52
中文题目：	中国上市公司自有现金流量假说的
英文题目：	An Empirical Test on Free Cash
指导老师：	王全喜
中文关键字：	自由现金流量假说;负债控制假说;
英文关键字：	Free cash flow hypothesis;Debt
中文摘要：	1986年，詹森(Jensen)提出的自由现金流量假说，也称为自由现金流量的代理成本理论，它关注公司在面对自由现金流量时出现的代理问题及其解决途径。自由现金流量假说认为，低成长性的公司，如果其管理层持股比例较低，但拥有大量闲置现金，那么管理层倾向于滥用现金资源，由此产生跟现金资源有关的代理问题，即“自由现金流量代理问题”；并提出“负债控制假设”，即可以利用外部负债，偿债压力可以抑制管理层滥用现金的动机，降低代理成本，解决这一代理问题。 Gul和Tsui(1998)的研究从审计费用视角检验了自由现金流量假说和债务控制假说。根据詹森的自由现金流量理论，拥有更多自由现金流量的公司，其管理者更多从事非价值最大化活动。人们预料这些公司的管理者往往会通过盈余操纵来掩饰非最优费用；人们预期审计人员将通过耗费更多审计精力和索取更高审计费用以应对更多可能性的会计误报或异常。詹森指出，通过发行债务可以减缓自由现金流量问题。这表明自由现金流量和审计费用之间的关系取决于公司债务水平。对于高自由现金流量/高债务的公司，审计人员可能做出更低实质性误报风险的评价，因此，比高自由现金流量/低债务的公司提供更少审计精力和索取更少审计费用。 对于Gul和Tsui(1998)的研究成果的一个重要进一步研究是引入管理层持股因素。以所有权和控制权分离为基础，詹森认为，管理层持股较低的公司，自由现金流量所引起的代理成本相应地可能较低，反之也成立。因为当管理层拥有公司较高比例的股份时，管理层的利益和股东的利益趋于一致。Ferdinand A. Gul 和Judy S.L.Tsui(2001)研究时用董事持股比例替代管理层持股比例，对澳大利亚公司进行了实证检验，其研究成果支持了自由现金流量假说。即在低成长性公司，管理层持股比例与自由现金流量造成的代理成本负相关，增加负债可以减弱这种相关性，验证了负债控制假说。中国存在特殊制度背景下，詹森所谓的自由现金流量假设在中国能否得到验证，债务控制效应能否在中国起到应有的作用，本文沿用这一思路，引入管理层持股这一因素，扩展现有研究成果，从审计费用视角检验自由现金流量假说和债务控制假说，试图回答这些问题。 本文内容主要围绕自由现金流量假说的两个推论展开，即低成长性的公司，如果管理层持股比例低，在面临大量闲置现金流时，会导致滥用现金流的代理成本问题。本文检验了如下假设，即管理层持股高（低）时，自由现金流量与审计费用具有强（弱）正相关关系。并且，本文也同样检验了第二个假设，即负债水平高低能够影响现金流量与管理层持股比例之间的关系。根据实证结果得出本文的研究结论，并据此提出对策建议。
英文摘要：	In 1986, Jensen found “Free cash flow hypothesis”, also called the agency cost of free cash flow. it focused on the agency cost and the solving ways on the free cash flow faced by corporations. The free cash flow hypothesis is that the corporations with low growth and high free cash flow, the low management ownership would lead to the abusing using of authority of managers. And this phenomenon was also called the agency cost of free cash flow. Based on this hypothesis, Jensen also found the debt monitoring hypothesis, which meant that the payment obligation could control the managers' behaviors to abuse free cash by using debt leverage. In the end, the debt can reduce the agency cost of free cash flow. Gul.&Tsui(1998) had done research to test free cash flow hypothesis and debt monitoring hypothesis. Based on the free cash flow held by Jensen(1986), in the corporations owned large free cash flow, the managers engaged in the activities which wouldn't aim at the value maximization of corporations. People expected that the managers would explain the non value-maximizing fees by controlling the profits and the auditors would put greater efforts and asked more audit fees because of the greater possibilities of accounting mistakes. Jensen pointed out that issuing debt could reduce the problems of free cash flow. From this, we can see that the relationship between free cash flow and audit fee is dependent on the debt ratio of corporations. For the corporations with high free cash flow and high debt, the auditors will give out advice below the natural level. So, compared with corporations with high free cash flow and low debt, the auditors put less effort and ask less audit fees. The further research was introducing management ownership based on the research of Gul&Tsui(1998). Based on the separation between ownership and control, Jensen held that in the corporations with lower management ownership, the agency cost of free cash flow would be lower accordingly. Because the interests of mangers and shareholders would come more closely when managers held more shares. Ferdinand A. Gul&Judy S.L.Tsui had done research with director ownership as a proxy for the management ownership for Austrian corporations. The empirical results approved the free cash flow hypothesis. In the corporations with low growth, the relationship between management ownership and free cash flow was negative and the increasing debt had influences on this relationship. The results also supported the debt monitoring hypothesis. So in the special background in China, whether the free cash flow hypothesis and the debt monitoring hypothesis could be approved were the focuses of this paper. This article tested the free cash flow hypothesis and debt monitoring hypothesis from the audit fees by introducing management ownership to extend the current research. This paper surrounded with the two deductions of free cash flow to test that the corporations with low growth would have higher agency cost while holding high free cash flow. We test the relationship between free cash flow and audit fees while controlling the variables of management ownership. Then, we also test the debt can influence this relationship. We get our conclusions at last and give suggestions accordingly.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)