联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	57
作者编号：	2120051901
上传时间：	2007/6/21 12:51:44
中文题目：	大股东掏空行为与投资者保护研究
英文题目：	Tunneling and Investor Protect
指导老师：	李姝
中文关键字：	掏空;投资者保护;市场反应tl
英文关键字：	tunneling;investor protection;
中文摘要：	投资者是证券市场的基石，要保证证券市场持续、健康发展，就要保护好投资者的利益。本文以投资者保护为着眼点，选取了不同的路径展开研究。 文章采用比较分析的方法，以LLSV的指标为衡量标准，对比我国和国际上主要几个具有代表性国家的投资者保护程度。比较结果表明，在立法方面我国的投资者保护水平已接近世界平均水平，特别是“两法”的修订，更是一个里程碑式的进步，体现了我国对投资者保护的重视。但在执法方面效率较低，成为我国投资者保护总体水平不高的“软肋”。另一方面，在对比了我国和美、日、德等国的股权结构以后，得出结论：我国股市股票发行种类过多，且同股不同权利；股权过度集中，而且是集中在国家手中；股权流通性差等，对此作者从制度层面进行了研究。 文章还采用实证分析的方法，以上市公司和大股东之间的重大资产收购关联交易为研究点，通过事件研究法，即对关联交易公告后的市场反应进行检验。由于市场获得了显著的负的非正常报酬率，从而证实大股东确实存在通过关联交易“掏空”上市公司的行为，进而损害了投资者利益。进一步，作者试图找出具备何种股权结构特征的上市公司易受到大股东的侵害，以对投资者的保护起到参考作用。通过实证检验，作者发现当上市公司大股东以较复杂的持股方式控制上市公司时，此时其控制权和现金流权的分离度大，“掏空”上市公司、侵害投资者利益的动机大大增强。同时作者将上市公司最终控制人类型作了详细的划分，分为国家或省级政府、省级以下政府、集团和个人四大类，并对其在模型中分别加以回归，结果表明由国家或省级政府控制的上市公司与其他三类比较，总体上较少受到大股东侵害，而省级以下政府控制的上市公司会比较容易被大股东“掏空”，集团和个人控制的上市公司也较易受到大股东侵害，但结果不是很显著。最后针对以上检验发现的问题，作者给出了相应的对策建议。
英文摘要：	To guarantee the sustaining development of securities market, the interest of investors must be well protected, because investors are the footstone of securities market. From the point of investor protection, the thesis conducts research in different ways. By comparing the degree of investor protection of China and other countries according to LLSV index, the result shows that as respect to legislation, we have been close to the average level of the world. Especially the revise of “Law of Company”& “Law of Securities”, which is a milestone, indicates that our government pays emphasis on investor protection. While as regards to the efficiency of enforcement, there is still a large gap between our country and others, which becomes the key to our low degree of investor protection. And then, we compare the share structure between our country and three other countries, to draw some conclusion that: there are so many kinds of stocks issued, but each share, no equal rights; shares are excessively concentrated, and most of which are state-owned; the liquidity of stock is weak. The thesis analyzes problems above against system background. The thesis also focuses on tunneling of the largest shareholder, studies on which characteristic of share structure of listed company subject to be tunneled. By examining the market response of related party transactions using event study method, the thesis confirms that the largest shareholder tunnels listed company in this way. Further, by conducting regression, the thesis finds that when the largest shareholder controls listed company in a complicated way, the control rights and cash flow rights separate deeper, which inspire the largest shareholder tunnel. Moreover ,the thesis divides the ultimate controller of listed company into four groups ,and finds that comparing to other three groups ,listed company controlled by government of country and province level are less likely be tunneled by the largest shareholder. Finally, the thesis makes valuable suggestion, in the hope of benefiting ordinary outside shareholders.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)