联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	5584
作者编号：	2120112477
上传时间：	2013/6/18 17:03:44
中文题目：	高管自利行为与股权激励业绩条件研究
英文题目：	Research on Self-interests of Top Managers and Performance Hurdles of Managerial Stock Incentives
指导老师：	吴德胜
中文关键字：	股权激励，业绩条件，自利行为，业绩型股票期权，行权难度
英文关键字：	Managerial stock incentive, Hurdles, Self-interests , Performance-vested equity incentive, Degree of difficulties in exercise
中文摘要：	股权激励计划自2006年股权分置改革后受到很多公司的青睐，成为激励高管的重要方式之一。但是，在业绩指标和业绩条件的选取方面各公司有足够的自由，假如股权激励计划的业绩条件设计不得当，可能会使激励变为“福利”，成为公司高管增加薪酬的手段。　 本文通过回顾以往的股权激励业绩条件和高管自利行为方面的文献，在分析我国新的股权激励法律制度背景的基础上，阐述了股权激励计划推出的必要性，以及由股权激励计划公布随之产生的高管自利问题。研究选取了2006-2012年间392家公布股权激励计划的上市公司计划为观察样本，并通过将业绩条件数据与股权激励计划发布前三年的历史业绩指标平均水平、行业平均水平做对比，来衡量业绩条件设置的行权难度。从业绩条件的角度判断股权激励计划的“门槛”高低，来分析这种门槛设置的高低难度给高管自利带来的影响。结果发现，有20%以上的公司净利润及净资产收益率指标同时低于历史平均水平，50%以上的公司至少有一个指标低于历史平均水平。说明高管在股权激励计划的设计中存在很强的自利动机，并讨论了行权难度的影响因素。最后，文章通过对两个指标设置较为繁琐的研究，具体地说明高管在股权激励计划设计当中自利的途径，发现高管主要通过以下四个途径来降低股权激励计划的实施难度：1.选取以同一年度为基年的净利润增长率为业绩考核指标；2.控制选取业绩指标的数量；3.将股权激励计划中业绩指标的数值设置低于历史水平；4.对每个指标赋予考核权重，并设置较低的及格分。 通过本文的研究分析发现，高管的自利行为不止出现在股权激励计划公告、授予和行权前后，在股权激励计划的设计中就存在较强的自利动机，且行权难度与激励方式有显著相关关系。这是未来公司设计股权激励计划时应避免的，也是董事会和有关监管部门在审核股权激励计划和考察企业治理状况时应当关注的。
英文摘要：	Managerial incentives have become very popular since reform of non-tradable shares in 2006, and is now an important way to motivate top managers. Companies have their own choices of indicators, however, it can also be a welfare to managers if not properly set. 　　 The thesis reviewed previous literatures about performance hurdles in self-interests and equity incentive. Based on the background of new legal policies and laws about equity incentive, we further analyses the need for managerial stock incentive plan. This study selected 392 listed companies which have announced equity incentive plan during 2006 and 2012 as the observation sample and measured the level of hurdle rate by comparing with the average level of history data and industry data in relevant performance conditions of equity incentive plans before the first three years of the announced day. The level of hurdle rate can measure the level of difficulty in exercise the incentive to determine whether a manager have the motivation of earnings management. It was found that more than 20% of the Company's net profit and ROE indicators were below the historical average level, and more than 50% companies have at least one indicator below historical level, which means that there were strong self-interest motives executives in these equity incentive plan designing. Finally, through an analysis of two special companies whose indictors was most complex, we found the way which executives made way for his own interest in the equity incentive plan designing. We finally think there are mainly four ways to reduce the difficulty of implementation of equity incentive plan: 1. to select the rate of net profit growth based on the same year as one of the indicators of performance evaluation. 2. to the number of selected performance indicators. 3 to set lower rates of the equity incentive plan than historical levels of relevant performance indicators.4.to give each assessment indictor a right and set a lower passing score. Through all these efforts, the study found that self-interested behaviors of executives appears earlier than the announcement and grant day of the equity incentive plan, and there was a strong motivation of self-interest in the plan design. Besides, we found a positive relationship between difficulties in exercise and stock option grants. This situation should be avoided in the future designing of the managerial stock incentive plans, and concerned about by the board of directors and the relative regulatory authorities.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)