联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	5579
作者编号：	2120112488
上传时间：	2013/6/17 20:32:00
中文题目：	高管权力强度、信息披露质量与过度投资
英文题目：	Intensity of Executive Power, Quality of Information Disclosure and Over-investment
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	高管权力，信息披露，过度投资
英文关键字：	Executive power, Information disclosure, Over-investment
中文摘要：	随着公司所有权和经营权分离，出现了涵盖股东、董事会、监事会、管理层等治理主体的制衡机制。董事会将经营权赋予管理层，负责公司日常经营。管理层的出现一方面促进了企业的高效发展，但也存在不足之处，美国安然事件以来世界上公司丑闻不断，管理层权力过大被认为是主要原因。委托代理理论、GHM的剩余控制权理论、关键资源进入权理论、寻租理论、管理者权力理论、行为金融理论均可以作为其理论基础。由于制度缺陷及信息不对称等原因，高管所掌握的权力过大，权力滥用，损害公司利益的现象比比皆是。股东必须寻找有效的机制来解决委托代理问题。新古典经济学认为，在完美的市场中，企业投资只与项目的净现值和投资机会有关。但在现实中，信息不对称和代理问题会影响市场的有效性，使得市场主体可能做出机会主义行为和道德风险，从而扭曲企业投资行为，使公司面临着投资不足和投资过度等行为的风险。中国企业的投资行为倾向于把资金用于不利于企业长期发展、破坏企业价值的新领域，盲目扩张企业的投资范围和规模。这种行为即为过度投资。针对这一问题，本文选取过度投资作为研究的切入点，分别考察高管权力和信息披露两种内外部治理机制及其交互作用对过度投资所产生的影响。本文选取2006-2010年数据从三个维度对高管权力进行主成分分析，进而借鉴Richardson的资本投资模型得到残差，将其作为过度投资，对高管权力强度、高管权力强度和信息披露质量的交叉项进行回归。通过实证研究发现，高管权力强度与过度投资水平显著正相关，而信息披露质量的提高对高管权力造成的过度投资问题抑制作用不明显。本文认为，现实中上市公司应该健全内部治理机制，对高管权力形成有效的制衡，从而防止因为高管权力滥用而引发的委托代理问题。本文对于高管权力理论基础和测量方法的探索继续完善了高管权力领域的理论成果，同时，对于高管权力和信息披露两种内外部治理机制及其交互作用对过度投资的影响的研究能够进一步完善公司治理机制。
英文摘要：	With the separation of corporation ownership and management, there have been checks and balances which include governance bodies like the shareholders, managers, etc. The board of directors gives the management to the managers who are in charge of the corporation's operations. On one hand, the emergence of management promotes the efficient development of the enterprise, but there are also deficiencies, scandals appearing constantly since the Enron company scandals. The powerful management is considered to be the main reason. Principal-agent theory, "residual control" of GHM theory, Rajan and Zingales key resources into the right theory, rent-seeking theory, management theory and behavioral finance theory can be regarded as its theoretical basis. Due to institutional defects and information asymmetry, there has been huge executive power and there are lots of examples of power abuse. Although corporate behavior caused by agency problem is different, it erodes the interest of shareholders. So shareholders must find an effective mechanism to solve the principal-agent problems. In the view of neoclassical economics, business investment only relates to the net present value of the project. But in reality, asymmetric information and troubles caused by the separation has influences on the utility of the market. Inappropriate investment behavior of enterprises makes the company faced with inadequate investment, the risk of over-investment and other low-efficient performances. We can say through the corporation’s experience in China for many years that, there are more over-investments than inadequate investments. They input the capital into areas where the yield is not ideal, or into new areas where there has nothing to do with the main business, blindly expanding investment scale of the enterprise. In order to solve this problem, this article selects overinvestment as the breakthrough point, having a research on executive power and information disclosure these two kinds of internal and external governance mechanisms and their interactions on the impact of over-investment. This article selects 2006-2010 data, and does principal component analysis to executive power from the three dimensions. And then based on capital investment model of Richardson, this article check the relationship between residual and executive power. The results show that intensity of executive power and overinvestment are related significantly, but the inhibitory effect of improvement of information disclosure quality on over-investment caused by executive power is not obvious. This paper argues that, in reality, the listed company should perfect internal governance mechanism, make effective checks and balances to executive power to prevent the abuse of executive power and principal-agent problems. In this paper, research on executive power theory foundation and the exploration of its measurement methods continues to improve the achievement of executive power theory. In the meanwhile, research on the executive power and information disclosure these two kinds of internal and external governance mechanisms and their interaction effect on over-investment research can further improve the corporate governance mechanism.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)