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论文编号：	5565
作者编号：	2120112485
上传时间：	2013/6/13 17:24:30
中文题目：	董事高管责任险、监事会与企业投资效率的关系研究
英文题目：	The Relationship of Directors and Officers Liability Insurance, Board of Supervisors and Investment Efficiency
指导老师：	牛建波 副教授
中文关键字：	董事高管责任险 监事会规模 经营活动现金流 投资效率 过度投资 投资不足 多元化经营
英文关键字：	Directors & Officers Liability Insurance, efficiency of investment, Over-investment, Under-investment, the scale of the Supervisory Board, Cash flow from operating activities
中文摘要：	董事高管责任险是公司董事、高管人员在履行职责的过程中因疏忽、过失行为导致第三方遭受损失时，由保险公司根据合同约定去承担相应的经济赔偿责任的一种保险。董事高管责任险承保的实际上是公司治理风险，反映的是股东和管理者之间的矛盾和冲突，董事高管责任险为研究被推定为理性人的公司董事和管理人员在风险、契约存在条件下的行为提供了很好的研究环境。 文章抛弃“完全理性假说”，将投保人与保险人的有限理性纳入到同一个研究框架之中，结合上市公司的内部监管机制、业务发展模式、现金流状况，通过理论分析和实证检验方法，深入探讨董事高管责任险影响企业投资行为的作用机理。论文首先从董事高管责任险的三大功能出发勾勒出董事高管责任险介入企业决策的演化路径，得出董事高管责任险因其具备风险转移功能、监督功能、保障功能，从而对上市公司的投资决策产生影响。其次通过梳理董事高管责任险、监事会、企业投资效率的研究现状和发展动态，结合中国上市公司的治理特征、业务发展模式、现金流状况，提出论文的研究假说并进行实证检验。最后结合论文的研究结果，指出论文存在的不足之处以及未来的研究方向。 本文研究发现，董事高管责任险对企业投资行为具有负面影响，具体表现在对上市公司的过度投资水平具有显著的“恶化效应”，但是购买董事高管责任险会加重企业的投资不足水平并没有得到有效验证。同时论文还加入了监事会规模、经营活动现金流对董事高管责任险、企业投资效率的调节效应，发现监事会监管可以有效缓解董事高管责任险对企业投资效率的“恶化效应”。此外，论文结果发现在多元化经营程度较高的公司，董事高管责任险对企业投资效率的“恶化效应”更加明显。这给我国上市公司以警示：从上市公司的角度来看，在没有完善内部监督机制，妥善解决代理问题的情况下，购买董事高管责任险将会导致公司资源配置的非效率；从保险人的角度来看，作为投保企业的利益相关者，保险人应该充分发挥自己在风险管理方面的优势，积极扮演好外部监督者角色，实现对投保企业的全过程、全方位监管。
英文摘要：	When directors and senior executives negligence in the performance of their duties lead to third parties suffer from the loss, Directors & Officers Liability Insurance protects directors and officers from the cost of lawsuits launched against them by third parties. Directors & Officers Liability Insurance underwrite corporate governance risk, reflecting the contradictions and conflicts between shareholders and managers, providing a good research environment to study company directors and officers behaviors in the presence of risk and contract. This dissertation thoroughly abandons the “perfectly rational hypothesis” and incorporates limited rational applicants and insurer into the same framework, combined with the internal supervision mechanism of listed companies, cash flow status, business development mode, theoretically and empirically explores the functioning mechanism of Directors & Officers Liability Insurance on corporate investment. Firstly, this dissertation is concerned about a literature review based on which the author portrays the evolution path along which Directors & Officers Liability Insurance affects decision-making from the perspectives of risk transfer function, the monitoring function, and security function. Secondly, the author also combed the status quo of and new development in research on Directors & Officers Liability Insurance, the board of supervisors, and corporate investment. Combined with the characteristics of the governance of list companies in China, business model, cash flow, the author puts forwards the thesis hypothesis and conducts a positive test and analysis of these hypotheses. Lastly, the author summarizes the major findings and point out the limitations and future research directions. This study finds that Directors & Officers Liability Insurance has a negative effect on corporate investment and Directors & Officers Liability Insurance has a significant “deterioration effect” on overinvestment of list companies, but the positive correlation between Directors & Officers Liability Insurance and underinvestment is not significant. At the same time, this paper also studies the scale of the supervisory board, cash flow from operating activities plays a moderating role in the relations of directors and officers liability insurance and corporate investment efficiency. The results illustrate that supervision of the board can effectively alleviate the Directors & Officers Liability Insurance “deterioration effect” on the efficiency of investment. In addition, the paper finds that the higher degree of diversification of the company, the Directors & Officers Liability Insurance “deterioration effect” on the efficiency of investment is more obvious. This is a warning to listed companies in china, in the case of no perfect internal oversight mechanisms and properly solve agency problems, purchasing Directors & Officers will lead to inefficient allocation of our resources. From the point of view of the insurer, as stakeholders of insured, insurers should give full play to their advantages in the aspect of risk management, actively play their role of external supervisors, fulfill the whole and comprehensive supervision to policy-holders.
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