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论文编号：	5563
作者编号：	1120090727
上传时间：	2013/6/13 15:23:46
中文题目：	资本约束、股权结构与商业银行融资行为
英文题目：	Capital constraints, Ownership structure and the financing behavior of commercial bank
指导老师：	童道弛、李维安
中文关键字：	资本约束 银行融资行为 资本监管 市场约束 股权结构
英文关键字：	capital constraints； bank financing； capital regulation； market constraints； ownership structure
中文摘要：	金融危机的爆发引起了大量金融机构无法承受过高的风险而最终破产，并导致一系列连锁反应和经济衰退。经过一段时间的改革和修整，虽然各国已逐渐从低谷中走出，但这场危机的影响并没有结束，由于危机表现出对现行的监管制度的极大挑战，因而引起了国际社会和各国政府对金融监管改革的不断探索。其中，2010年9月12日各国代表一致通过的《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》就是这场危机的直接产物。巴塞尔委员会针对金融危机期间银行业资本严重不足的情况，提出了更严格的资本金要求。 资本要求是监管部门监督银行稳健经营最重要的手段，由于资本要求是以资本充足率的形式进行规范的，资本充足率是从分子和分母（即资本和资产）两个角度对银行行为进行约束。然而已有大部分的研究却是从资产角度考虑，也就是银行的投资行为，即投资的规模、风险资产的比率、违约概率、违约损失等资产管理的角度进行分析的，忽视了对银行融资行为的相关研究。但银行融资过程不只是银行筹集资金进行贷款投资的过程，其更重要的是，资本是吸收和抵御银行风险的重要工具。如果缺乏银行自有资本的保护，是不可能吸收到存款以支持银行贷款发放的。因此，资本要求可以看作存款人通过监管机构的资本监管降低与银行委托代理成本的一种重要的治理机制。 根据对现有文献的检索，针对我国在资本监管和市场约束下的银行融资行为的研究并未受到应有的关注。本文针对这一领域进行探索性的研究，本文中要解决的主要问题包括：在多重委托代理关系下，银行如何调整其资本；资本监管和市场约束怎样影响银行的融资行为；作为主要外部治理机制的资本监管和市场约束，其作用的发挥是否会由于股权结构的差异，而呈现出不同的效果；如果同时考虑银行的投融资行为，那么银行的资本调整和风险状况又会出现怎样的差异。解决这些问题不仅能够为银行业资本监管和市场约束体制的改进提供经验支撑，促进我国银行业体制的完善，而且可以进一步充实金融监管理论与市场约束理论，促进银行外部治理机制的提升。 本文共分七章，接下来的第二章是相关文献综述，第三章是理论分析，第四章到第六章是论文的实证部分，最后一章是本文的结论。本文的主要结论包括以下几个方面： 1.银行面临的资本监管压力是银行进行对外融资的直接动因，当监管压力越大时，银行的资本增长越迅速。同时由于银行的利润增长和内部留存收益的积累并不能跟上存款和资产的扩张速度，因而银行必须通过频繁的对外融资进行资本的补充，以缓解监管部门资本要求对银行资本造成的压力。在对外融资形式的选择上，银行受到监管的影响，更多的使用股权融资，只有当银行面临的监管压力并不太大时，银行才更多的使用债券融资。此外，我们的结果还表明，缓冲资本越充裕的银行，其相应的股权融资数量也越少；但对于债券融资来说，还没有得到一致的结论。 2.资本监管对次级债券成本的影响较弱。评级机构作出的信用评级显著的影响了银行的债权资本成本，评级越高的银行获得的利率越优惠，债权融资成本越低。 股权结构对银行债权成本的影响并不显著。由于银监会要求发债银行必须具有良好的公司治理结构与机制，且大多数银行都是国有或地方政府控股，政府背景对于银行定时偿还次级债来说是一种保障，导致银行在还款能力方面差异不大。 3.银行股权结构会影响银行的资本政策，当股东持股比例越高时，为了保持其对银行的控制地位，股东会阻碍银行进行新的外部权益融资，导致资本增长速度降低，而第1大股东变更的银行则更容易吸收新的外部融资。 如果将资本和贷款行为同时考虑时，股权集中度与银行行为的关系不是简单的线性关系，而是较为复杂的二次相关。银行风险资产变化随着第1大股东持股比率的提高呈现出先增加后降低的趋势，资本充足率则在资本和风险的双重变化下随股权集中度的提高而先降低后上升，此外，股权集中度与权益资本增长并不存在二次相关关系。 4.对于市场约束的作用来说，贷款增长率越快，净资产收益率越高，盈利能力越强的银行，其下一期的资本增长越快；从贷款风险来看，银行风险与资本增长也存在较为明显的正相关关系，即风险较高的银行需要进一步加大资本投资以弥补风险所产生的损失。与此不同的是，股利政策并没有对银行资产存在明显影响，但资产规模越大的银行其资本增长相对缓慢。
英文摘要：	A large number of financial institutions can not withstand excessive risk and ultimately went bankruptcy during the financial crisis. After reforming, the countries have gradually recovered from the low ebb. But the impact of the crisis does not finish. The crisis showed the great challenges of the current regulatory regime, thus causing the international community and national governments exploring financial regulatory reform. Basel III unanimously adopted by the delegates in September 12, 2010 is a direct product of the crisis. As for serious shortage of capital during the financial crisis of the banking sector, the Basel Committee proposed more stringent capital requirements. Capital requirement is the most important means of banking regulatory authorities to supervise. Capital requirement is in the form of a capital adequacy ratio. Capital adequacy ratio constrains on bank behavior from both the numerator and denominator (ie capital and assets) angles. Most of the research is considered from an asset point of view, that is, the perspective of the scale of investment, risk assets ratio, probability of default, loss given default and asset management analysis, and neglect of the bank financing behavior. However, bank financing process is not only banks to raise funds for loans, but the capital is also an important tool to absorb and withstand banking risks. If banks lack the protection of their own capital, they can not absorb the deposits to support bank loans. Therefore, capital requirements can be seen as an important governance mechanism to reduce principal-agent costs. According to the existing literature, the study has not been for the financing behavior of bank. This dissertation explores research in this area. The main problems to be solved in this article include: how banks adjust their capital in the multi-agency relationship; the capital regulatory and market constraints affect bank financing behavior; governance as the main external capital regulation and market mechanisms bound play its role will be due to differences in the shareholding structure, and showing a different effect; what is the difference if taking into account the behavior of the bank's investment and financing capital adjustments. To solve these problems not only for the improvement of the banking capital regulation and market constraints institutional experience support and promote the improvement of China's banking system and financial regulatory theory, theory of constraints and the market, and promote the upgrading of the bank's external governance mechanisms can be further substantiated. This paper is divided into seven chapters. The next chapter is literature review. Chapter three is theoretical analysis. Chapter 4 to 6 is the empirical part of the paper, and the final chapter is the conclusion of this article. The main conclusions of this paper include: 1 Capital regulatory pressure that banks face is the direct cause of the bank's external financing, the greater the regulatory pressure, the more rapid growth of the bank's capital. At the same time, due to the accumulation of retained earnings of the bank's profit growth and internal and can not keep up the rate of expansion of the deposits and assets, which banks must supplement capital through frequent external financing to ease capital requirements of the regulatory authorities of the pressure caused by the bank's capital. The choice of the form of external financing, the bank regulatory impact, more use of equity financing, only when banks face regulatory pressure is not too great, the bank was more use of bond financing. In addition, our results also indicate that banks with more ample capital cushion, the corresponding number of equity financing is the less; for bond financing has not been the same conclusion. 2. Capital regulation has little effect on the cost of subordinated bonds. Credit rating agencies made a significant impact on the bank's claims and the cost of capital, the higher the rating, the lower the cost of debt financing is. Ownership structure did not significantly affect the cost of bank debt. Due the CBRC requires issuing bonds banks must have a good corporate governance structure and mechanisms, and most banks are state-owned or local governments Holdings, the government background for banks timing repay subordinated debt is a security, leading banks in the repayment ability aspects insignificant. 3. The bank shareholding structure will affect the bank's capital policy, the higher the proportion of shareholding, in order to maintain its control of the bank, the shareholders will hinder banks new external equity financing, capital growth rate decreased, while the first large shareholders to change banks more easily absorb new external financing. Capital and lending behavior taking into account the relationship between ownership concentration and bank behavior is not a simple linear relationship, but more complex secondary correlation. Changes in the bank's risk assets With the improvement of 1 shareholding ratio showing a decreasing trend after the first increase, the capital adequacy ratio is reduced with the improvement of equity concentration increased in the capital and the risk of a double change, in addition, equity The degree of concentration and the growth of equity capital does not exist secondary relationship. 4. As for the market constraints faster loan growth, the higher the rate of return on net assets, the profitability of the stronger banks, the faster capital growth in the next period; view from the loan risk, bank risk and capital The more significant positive correlation between growth, higher risk banks need to further increase capital investment to compensate for the risk of loss. Different dividend policy has not obvious impact on the bank's assets. But the larger the bank assets, the slow the growth is.
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