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论文编号：	5561
作者编号：	2120112481
上传时间：	2013/6/13 12:20:07
中文题目：	基于股东和潜在竞争者的信息披露策略研究
英文题目：	Research on Information Disclosure Strategy Based on the Stockholder and Entrant
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	信息披露，股东，潜在竞争者，实验
英文关键字：	Information disclosure，Shareholder，Entrant，Experiment
中文摘要：	现代公司有众多利益相关者，包括股东、债权人、潜在竞争者、政府等等。公司进行信息披露决策时，会考虑不同利益相关者的利益。本文旨在研究公司考虑到两种利益相关者（股东、潜在竞争者）时的信息披露策略选择问题。在位者公司基于股东的考虑，公司有着诚实披露改善股东消费决策的动机，基于潜在竞争者的考虑，公司有着虚假披露阻止潜在竞争者进入的动机。 之前的信息披露文献研究主要考虑一类信息接收者即股东，我们最大的创新之处在于考虑两类信息接收者，不仅考虑到股东，还考虑到潜在竞争者。我们意在考察在位者公司在考虑到股东和潜在竞争者的互动行为之下的信息披露策略。 本文构建了“在位者管理层—股东—潜在竞争者”三方博弈模型，在位者管理层拥有关于年终收益的私人信息，通过公开信息披露向股东和潜在竞争者传递关于在位者公司年终收益的信息，进而股东选择当期消费量，潜在竞争者做出是否进入在位者所在产品市场的决策。论文设计了信息披露博弈实验，实验中通过对潜在进入成本、不进入价值两种参数的设计，考察这两种参数对在位者管理层、潜在竞争者策略选择的影响。 实验研究结论如下： 1、在位者的年终收益与潜在竞争者的进入成本的关系、不进入价值能够显著影响在位者是否选择真实披露策略，潜在竞争者的进入成本本身并没有显著影响在位者是否选择真实披露策略。当在位者的年终收益小于潜在竞争者的进入成本、面临较小的不进入价值时在位者更倾向于选择真实披露策略；当在位者的收益大于潜在竞争者的进入成本时，在位者的收益与潜在竞争者的进入成本偏离越大，则在位者更加倾向于选择真实披露策略。 2、不进入价值、在位者的年终收益与潜在竞争者进入成本的关系能够显著影响在位者的虚假披露程度。不进入价值较大时，在位者会选择较高的虚假披露程度来阻止潜在竞争者的进入；在位者的收益与潜在竞争者的进入成本差值越大，在位者会选择更高的虚假披露程度来阻止潜在竞争者的进入。 3、在位者的披露收益与潜在竞争者的进入成本的关系能够显著影响潜在竞争者的策略选择，不进入价值和潜在竞争者的进入成本本身并没有显著影响潜在竞争者的策略选择。当披露收益大于进入成本时，潜在竞争者基本上都选择进入，当披露收益小于进入成本时，进入决策比较谨慎；披露收益小于进入成本时，披露收益与进入成本偏离越大，潜在竞争者越倾向于进入。
英文摘要：	Modern corporate has many kinds of stakeholder, including shareholder, creditor, entrant, government and so on. Corporate will consider about benefits of different kinds of stakeholders when making information disclosure decisions. This paper aims to find out what decisions will the corporate make when considering about two kinds of stakeholders, including shareholder and entrant. The incumbent has an honest disclosure incentive to disclose its future profits when thinking about the shareholder’s benefits, while a false disclosure incentive to pretend the entrant entering its product market when thinking about the entrant. Previous documents on information disclosure mainly think about only one kind information receiver, which is shareholder. Our biggest innovation is that we consider about two kinds stakeholders, not only shareholder but also entrant in our text. We aim to inspect how the incumbent will behave to disclose information considering about shareholder and entrant. This paper constructs the “incumbent-shareholder-entrant” trilateral game model, the incumbent has private information about the future earnings and transfers information to the shareholder and entrant, then the shareholder choose current consumption and the entrant make the entering decision. This paper designs information disclosure experiment, in the experiment, we design two kinds of parameters, potential cost and none entering value, aiming to inspect how these parameters influence the participants’ behavior. Experimental research conclusions are as follows: 1. The relationship between the entrants’ cost and the incumbent’s future earnings and none entering value can significantly influence whether the incumbent choose to tell the truth, while the entrant’s cost cannot significantly influence the incumbent telling the truth. The incumbent tend to tell the truth when the incumbent future earning is smaller than the entrant’s cost and none entering value is smaller. The bigger of the deviation between the incumbent future earnings and the entrant’s cost, the incumbent more inclined to choose real disclosure strategy. 2. None entering value and the relationship between the incumbent future earnings and the entrant’s cost can significantly affect the incumbent degree of false disclosure. The incumbent will choose the bigger degree of false disclosure when faced the larger none entering value and the bigger deviation between the incumbent earnings and the entrant’s cost. 3. The relationship between the incumbent disclosure of earnings and the entrant’s cost can significantly influence the entrant’s strategy. The entrant basically choose to enter when the disclosure of earnings is greater than the entrant’s cost; the entrant more tend to enter when the deviation between the incumbent disclosure of earnings and the entrant’s cost is bigger.
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