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论文编号：	5510
作者编号：	2120112392
上传时间：	2013/6/9 13:43:53
中文题目：	央企的货币薪酬体系合理吗？——基于公司绩效及融资的研究
英文题目：	Is Monetary Compensation System of Central Enterprises Reasonable?-Based on the study of Corporate Performance and Financing
指导老师：	姚颐
中文关键字：	高管薪酬，员工年人均工资，公司绩效，融资
英文关键字：	Executive Compensation, Annual per Capita Wage of Employees, Corporate Performnce, Financing
中文摘要：	近年来中央企业整体高薪酬高福利、社会工资收入水平差距过大等问题日益显现出来。甚至一些央企虽然亏损数额惊人但其职工薪酬却仍维持在高水平。另外由于很多央企掌控着垄断资源，并且有着国家的政策支持，因此很多人认为央企获得的利润与高管的努力和才能并不具有密切的关系。我国政府连续出台文件来调节央企高管薪酬。相对于央企高管的高薪酬，央企中整体员工薪酬的偏高更加受到了民众的关注，也是非常值得我们研究的地方。那么，我国央企目前的高薪酬是否起到了应有的激励作用，央企实现的绩效到底与其薪酬激励有多大的因果关系？另一方面近几年许多上市央企进行巨额融资，很多央企在大额亏损前，仍一如既往地给高管大派薪酬。一边是巨大的融资规模，另一边却是照发不误的高薪酬，这种现象难免不引起市场对央企利用融资来增加薪酬的质疑。那么央企一直居高不下的薪酬是否与融资有关？本文回顾了以往研究薪酬激励与公司绩效及融资关系的文献，发现以前的学者更关注的是高管薪酬与央企绩效数量上的相关关系，但是对两者之间是否具有因果关系并没有很深入的探讨。并且以往文献缺乏对央企员工年人均工资的激励效果的研究，而对于央企融资是否存在利用融资给职工增发薪酬的行为也缺乏实证研究。本文希望研究央企货币薪酬体系是否合理，分别研究高管薪酬和员工年人均工资激励对公司绩效的影响，探讨是否存在央企货币薪酬激励过度，并从融资的角度分析央企高薪是否与融资有关，最终提出改善央企货币薪酬体系的政策建议。在理论分析与文献回顾的基础上本文提出三个研究假设，分别从高管薪酬和员工年人均工资两个方面对薪酬与公司绩效、薪酬变化量与绩效变化量、融资与薪酬进行回归分析。本文选取的样本来自于我国沪深两市A股117家中央企业上市公司2009年到2011年的数据。本文对各个变量的数据进行描述性统计，对主要变量进行分位组比较，并利用列示分布情况、方差分析、均值检验等方式把央企样本组与地方国企样本组、非国有企业样本组进行比较分析。接着，对央企样本做了相关性和回归分析，并与非央企样本进行比较。最后本研究得到以下结论，我国中央企业中的高管薪酬与员工年人均工资都与公司绩效有明显的正相关关系。虽然央企职工薪酬收入与绩效显著正相关，但这并不能说明现行的央企货币薪酬激励制度是合理的。因为相对于一般企业而言，央企的高利润更依赖于政策支持、垄断优势等因素。本文研究证实高管薪酬业绩变化量对绩效变化量有显著影响，但员工年人均工资变化量对央企绩效变化量没有显著影响。可见央企对于整体员工的高工资激励强度并不能产生应有的激励效果，央企的货币薪酬体系存在一定程度的激励过度。另外我们分别研究了融资对之后高管薪酬和员工年人均工资的影响，认为央企的融资能引起高管薪酬和员工年人均工资的上涨。
英文摘要：	In recent years, high salary and high welfare in overall central enterprises and large social wage income gap is increasingly apparent. And even some central enterprises’s loss is amazing but the employees’ wages still remain high. In addition, as a lot of central enterprises control of monopolistic resources and enjoys the support of national policies, many people think that there are not a close relationship between enormous profits and the efforts of executives in central enterprises. Our government issued documents continuously to regulate executive compension of central enterprises. Relative to high executive compension in central enterprises , the high wages of all workers in central enterprises is also very worthy of our study. So, do the high salaries of the central enterprises in China have a proper incentive function? And how is the reation between performance and compension incentive in central enterprises? The other hand, in recent years, many listed central enterprises have high finance. A lot of central enterprises in a large loss still continue giving executives high compension. One side is the enormous size of the financing, the other side is the high salaries as usual. This phenomenon does not inevitably arise an question in the market that central enterprises take advantage of financing to increase salaries. Is high remuneration of central enterprises related to financing? This paper reviews previous studies about compensation incentive and corporate performance and financing, finds that previous scholars are more concerned about the quantitative relationship between executive compension and central enterprises’ performance, but whether there are causal relationship between the two lacks deep discussion. And previous literature not only lack the study on incentive effects of annual per capita wages of employees in central enterprises, but also lack the empirical research on whether central enterprises finance to increase salaries. This article hope study whether monetary compensation system in central enterprises is reasonable, researchs the impact that executive compensation and annual per capita wage of employees have on corporate performance respectively, to explore whether central enterprises monetary remuneration incentive is excessive, and analyses whether high salaries of central enterprises is relevant to financing, finally proposes policies and recommendations about improving monetary compensation system of central enterprises. This paper presents three hypotheses, analyzes compension and corporate performance, the change of compension and the change of corporate performance , financing and remuneration in the form of regression. The samples selected are from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share’s 117 listed central enterprises from 2009 to 2011. There are descriptive statistics and packet comparision on the main variables. And the paper compare the sample group of, local state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises sample group by the listed distribution, analysis of variance and mean test. Then, there are sample correlation and regression analysis of central enterprises ,compared to other samples. Finally, this paper reaches the conclusions that there are significant positive correlations between executive compensation, employees’ per capital wages and corporate performance in central enterprises. There is significantly positive correlation between income of workers and performance, but that does not explain the current central enterprises’ pay incentive system is reasonable. Because relative to other enterprises, the high profits of central enterprises more dependent on policy support, monopoly and so on. This study confirmed that the change of executive compensation has a significant effect on the performance change, but the change of annual per capita wage of employees has no significant effect on the performance change. So large incentive intensity of the employees in central enterprises can not produce proper incentive effect, and the monetary remuneration system’s incentive is excessive to some extent. In addition, we studied the impact of financing on executive compensation and the annual per capital wage of emplyees, finds that financing of central enterprises can lead to the rise of executive compensation and per capita wage of employees.
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