联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	5508
作者编号：	1120100747
上传时间：	2013/6/9 13:38:03
中文题目：	基于企业用户转移行为的SaaS提供商竞争策略研究
英文题目：	Research Of SaaS Competitive Strategy Based on Switching Behavior of Enterprise Customer
指导老师：	严建援
中文关键字：	传统套装软件；软件即服务；转移采纳行为；企业用户；博弈竞争
英文关键字：	SWS; SaaS;Switching and Adopting Behavior; Enterprise Customer;Competition Game
中文摘要：	随着互联网的迅猛发展，特别是Web2.0的兴起，软件产业正在发生着越来越大的变化，其中最突出的是SaaS模式的出现。SaaS模式作为软件技术与网络技术融合创新的结果，改变了传统SWS的交付模式。在SaaS模式下，企业用户无需进行大量的IT基础设施安装、整合来支持使用标准化软件产品，而是由软件提供商为企业用户搭建信息化平台，并负责所有前期安装、后期维护和升级等一系列服务，从而可以更快速的完成软件系统在客户端的部署。SaaS以这种突破传统SWS经营模式的全新运作方式受到了实践界和理论界的广泛关注。尽管有业内人士甚至专家学者一再强调SaaS可以给企业用户带来新的市场机遇，但也有部分对SaaS持怀疑态度的学者预测SaaS的展开可能会给企业用户带来不容忽视的风险隐患。鉴于SaaS在企业信息化的应用中并不广泛，特别是在中国大多数企业用户已经实施了传统信息化部署，新兴SaaS模式在渗透软件市场的过程中遇到巨大阻力的现实背景下，本文基于理性行为理论，构建了企业用户转移采纳SaaS的理论模型，通过案例研究方法从感知机遇和感知风险两个主题挖掘影响企业用户转移采纳意愿的因素。上述研究有助于揭示影响企业用户转移采纳决策过程的关键因素，并借此增加软件提供商对企业用户行为特征的认知，从而采取更有效的促进企业用户转移采纳SaaS的策略行动。本研究以企业用户转移采纳SaaS的影响因素为切入点，依据SaaS的网络经济特性、成本投入独特性和服务特性，分别将转移采纳SaaS影响因素可度量变量纳入到不同的软件提供商竞争模型中，从SWS提供商与SaaS提供商竞争的视角，运用产业组织理论、网络经济学理论、博弈论等研究了三种竞争策略，分别为基于网络效应考虑企业用户数据敏感性感知的SaaS提供商竞争策略、基于纵向质量差异考虑转移成本的SaaS提供商竞争策略和基于服务能力考虑个性化需求的SaaS提供商竞争策略。在基于网络效应考虑企业用户数据敏感性感知的SaaS提供商竞争策略中，主要针对SaaS特有的网络经济特性，创新性地提出按照企业用户对存储数据敏感度不同进行分类的方法，将企业用户划分为存储数据敏感型和存储数据不敏感型两类，并引入到具有不对称网络外部性的产品差异化模型中，从消费者效用角度入手，研究基于Stackelberg博弈价格竞争的SaaS提供商市场竞争策略问题。研究结论表明：SWS提供商不能盲目的采取提高软件交付模式实施成本差异或者降低自身网络外部性强度的策略，而应当考虑软件市场中企业用户存储数据的具体情况适当的调整策略。对SaaS提供商而言，存储数据敏感型企业用户比例越小对其越有利，因此，如何保证企业用户数据资料的安全性是SaaS能够快速获得市场认可的重要因素。企业用户从传统架构迁移到SaaS的行为并不是简单的转移行为，除了将部分传统SWS依附的IT基础设施进行折旧处理外，还涉及到业务数据兼容性和集成以及系统升级等问题，针对这一现实情况，本文提出了基于纵向质量差异考虑转移成本的SaaS提供商竞争策略问题研究。本部分首先考虑了作为软件领域先行者的SWS提供商由于企业用户前期IT投资所引发的客户转移成本，以及SaaS与SWS之间日益减小的质量成本差异问题，构建了基于序贯博弈的经济模型，探究了转移成本和质量成本差异系数对SaaS提供商竞争策略的影响。接下来，为了降低客户转移成本，确保企业用户实现从SWS模式到SaaS模式的平滑过渡，对上述模型进行了扩展，建立了基于企业用户补偿考虑转移成本的软件提供商竞争博弈模型，分析了SaaS提供商竞争策略的变化情况。最后，SaaS提供商为企业用户承诺的免费升级保障使得SWS与SaaS之间的竞争更加复杂，因此在扩展上述传统静态纵向差异化模型的基础上，进一步研究了竞争性升级问题，在转移成本存在的市场条件下，结合纵向差异化基础模型提出了SWS提供商与SaaS提供商软件产品的竞争性升级定价问题。研究结论表明：无论企业用户处在何种转移成本环境下，SaaS与SWS之间质量成本差异系数的减小总是不利于SWS提供商利润的提高，对SaaS提供商而言，质量成本差异系数的减小对其利润的影响始终会受到转移成本的反向制约。随着质量成本差异系数的减小，在较低的企业用户转移成本环境下，SaaS提供商应采取激进投资策略。研究还表明较低的转移成本环境下，SaaS提供商的补偿策略会收到良好效果。而在软件提供商进行产品质量升级的博弈竞争模型中，企业用户选择全部升级的市场结构下，转移成本成为SWS提供商进行价格歧视的根本原因。企业用户业务需求具有多样性和多变性的特点，要求软件提供商能够帮助其实现个性化应用系统的快速部署。而基于标准化的SaaS模式虽然能够快速满足企业用户通用的需求，但却与企业用户的个性化需求存在一定矛盾。因此本研究提出基于服务能力考虑个性化需求的SaaS提供商竞争策略问题。针对SWS实施周期长但能满足企业用户个性化需求，SaaS能快速上线却是通用模式的特点，构建了基于SWS定制化实施周期与SaaS标准化软件种类的博弈竞争模型。由于SaaS提供商存在有限服务能力的情况，有限的服务资源增加了服务延迟的概率，影响了企业用户对SaaS的转移采纳。因此，接下来本部分研究在SWS定制化软件实施周期与SaaS标准化软件种类数给定的情况下，构建了基于有限服务能力考虑企业用户个性化需求的软件提供商竞争博弈模型，研究双方的博弈定价问题及SaaS提供商的服务能力决策问题。研究结论表明：基于SWS定制化实施周期与SaaS标准化软件种类的价格竞争均衡中，SaaS提供商仅提供一种标准化软件。在SaaS提供商无服务能力限制的情况下，SWS二次开发可变成本、企业用户对SaaS标准化软件的不适程度系数、企业用户对SWS定制化软件实施周期敏感度系数对SaaS提供商利润的影响，会受到较低SWS二次开发可变成本的制约。而在SaaS提供商存在有限服务能力的情况下，以上参变量对SaaS提供商利润的影响会受到较高SaaS服务平台平均使用率的制约。本文研究结论一方面有利于SaaS提供商更好的进行客户关系管理，另一方面在与对手SWS提供商竞争过程中，SaaS提供商可以根据具体情境适时调整自身策略和行动，在竞争中获取相对优势，进而突破市场瓶颈，迈向良性循环轨道并实现快速发展。
英文摘要：	With the rapid development of the Internet, especially the popularity of Web 2.0, more and more changes are happening in the software industry, the most prominent of which is the emergence of the SaaS model. As the innovative integration of software technology and network technology, SaaS has changed the delivery mode of traditional Shrink-wrap software. In SaaS model, the software vendors build the information platform for enterprise customers and are responsible for a range of services, including all pre-installation, post-maintenance and upgrade, the application of the whole process can be available from SaaS quickly. Thus SaaS, as a new business operational model different from the traditional Shrink-wrap software business model, has attracted increasing interest in both the practice and academic area. Although insiders even experts and scholars have repeatedly emphasized that SaaS can bring new opportunities for enterprise customers, part of scholars with a skeptical attitude about SaaS predict that the expansion of SaaS might bring potential risks which can not be ignored for enterprise customers. Now SaaS is not widespread in the enterprise information application, especially in China. Due to most of enterprise customers had implemented the deployment of traditional information technology, the penetration of SaaS may encounter greater challenge. Considering this realistic context, this dissertation proposes a theoretical model for examining the switching and adopting SaaS of enterprise customers based on the theory of reasoned action. A positivist case study is conducted from perceived opportunities and perceived risk that affect the switching behavior of enterprise customers to validate and develop the theoretical model. The above study helps to reveal the key factors in the decision-making process of switching and adopting SaaS, which increases the congnition of software vendors about the behavior characteristics of enterprise customers, and then the SaaS vendors can take more effective strategies to promote the switching behaviors of enterprise customers to adopt SaaS. This dissertation uses the factors affecting the switching and adopting SaaS as an entry point, on the basis of the network economic characteristics, the particularity of the cost of inputs and the service characteristics of SaaS, then brings the measurable variables of the factors associated with the switching behaviors into different competitive model between SWS vendor and SaaS vendor respectively. This dissertation comprehensively applies the industrial organization theory, network economics theory and game theory to conduct three competitive models, including competitive strategies of SaaS vendors with network externality and the perception of stored data-sensitive of enterprise customers, competitive strategies of SaaS vendors with vertical differentiation and switching cost, and the competitive strategies of SaaS vendors with service capacity and considering the individual needs of enterprise customers. Considering the network economic characteristics about SaaS, we build the competitive game model between SaaS vendor and SWS vendor with network externality and the perception of stored data-sensitive of enterprise customers. In this part, we separate the consumer into stored data-sensitive enterprise customers and stored data-insensitive enterprise customers innovatively, and which is introduced into the model of product differentiation with asymmetric network externality, studying the competitive strategies between SaaS vendor and SWS vendor with Stackelberg game from the perspective of consumer utility. The results show that taking into account the role of customer’s implementation cost differentiation between SaaS and SWS and the intension of network externality of SWS on the profits of SWS will be subject to a cutoff value of proportion of the stored data-sensitive enterprise customers, which suggests the SWS vendor can not blindly decrease the implementation cost or increase the intension of network externality. The less the stored data-sensitive enterprise customers there are, the better for SaaS vendors, therefore, it is very important for SaaS to gain market acceptance quickly that how to ensure the security of enterprise customers’ data. The switching behavior from traditional system to SaaS is not only a simple moving behavior, in addition to the depreciation of part of the IT infrastructure attached by SWS, the compatibility and integration of business data and the system upgrade issues also can’t be ignored. Therefore, we propose the issue about competitive strategies of SaaS vendor with vertical differentiation and switching cost. Firstly, this part describes and analyzes an economic model in software industry, considering the switching cost resulting from the enterprise customer’s upfront IT investment related to the implementation of the software provided by the SWS vendor as the first-mover in software business and the quality cost differentiation between SaaS and SWS. Secondly, to ensure the enterprise customer’s smooth transition from SWS to SaaS, SaaS vendor may take an amount of compensation to motivate the switching behavior of enterprise customers. In this context, we establishes competitive game model between software vendors with compensation for enterprise customers resulting from switching cost, and analyses the change of competitive strategies of SaaS vendor. Moreover, SaaS vendors have the commitment of free upgrade for enterprise customers, which makes the competition between SWS and SaaS more complex. Under the condition of switching cost existing, we study the software upgrade competition with vertical differentiation model between SWS vendor and SaaS vendor, and focus on the impact of switching cost and software quality on the pricing and competitive strategy under various market structures. The results show that regardless of what kind of switching cost environment is, a decline in the quality cost differentiation between SaaS and SWS always hurts SWS vendors’ profit. Meanwhile, the impact of a decline in quality cost differentiation between SaaS and SWS on SaaS vendor’s profit depends on the switching cost environment, a higher switching cost will hurt SaaS vendors’ profit, and then SaaS vendor will assume an defensive investment strategy. Moreover, in low switching cost environment, the compensation strategy of SaaS vendor will achieve the desired results. In the competitive upgrade pricing model of SWS and SaaS with vertical differentiation, when all enterprise customers of SWS choose to upgrade, the equilibrium outcome proves that the switching cost is the main reason of price discrimination. Enterprise customers’ business needs present the characteristic of diversity and variability, which requires software vendors to help achieving the rapid deployment of individual applications. SaaS model can meet the common needs of the enterprise customers because of the standardized feature, but cannot meet individual needs of enterprise customers. Therefore, we propose the issue about competitive strategies of SaaS vendor with service capacity and considering the individual needs of enterprise customers. Considering SWS with long implementation period can meet the preferences of enterprise customers, while SaaS with shorter implementation period but is only a generic model, We develop a two-stage game model to analyze the competition between SWS and SaaS. On this basis, we further study the context of the limited service capacity of SaaS vendor, because limited service resources will increase the probability of service delay, which influences the adoption of SaaS. So given the implementation period of custom software and the number of types of standard software, we develop a competition game model considering the individual needs of enterprise customers and the limited service capacity of SaaS vendors, then analyze the pricing problem of both vendors and the service capacity decision-making problem of SaaS vendors. The results show that in price competition equilibrium considering implementation period of SWS and software variety of SaaS, SaaS vendors offer only one variety of standard software. If there is unlimited capacity of SaaS vendors, then the effect of those parameters, including enterprise customers’ sensitivity to standard software fit, enterprise customers’ sensitivity to implementation period, variable cost of secondary development of SWS, on the profit of SaaS vendor depends on the critical value of variable cost of secondary development of SWS. In case of limited capacity of SaaS vendors, the effect of the above parameters on the profit of SaaS vendor depends on the critical value of average usage of the SaaS platform. On one hand, the conclusions of this dissertation will help SaaS vendors carry on better customer relationship management, on the other hand, in the process of competition with SWS, SaaS vendors can adjust their own strategies according to the specific situations timely to get more advantages, So SaaS vendors can break bottlenecks in competitive strategic decisions and make progress in the development of SaaS.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)