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论文编号：	5495
作者编号：	2120112374
上传时间：	2013/6/8 23:15:30
中文题目：	SaaS服务供应链质量担保合同设计研究
英文题目：	Research on Contracts Design of Quality Warranty In SaaS Service Supply Chain
指导老师：	严建援
中文关键字：	SaaS;质量担保合同;供应链协调;道德风险
英文关键字：	SaaS;Quality Guarantee Contract;Supply Chain Coordination;Moral Hazard
中文摘要：	SaaS作为一种新兴的服务产品越来越受到人们的关注，其市场在迅速扩张的同时SaaS的特性给SaaS服务供应商带来了发展瓶颈。 SaaS服务供应链道德风险问题使成员在决策时都会偏离集中决策下的最优选择，最终导致SaaS服务供应链难以达到协调，SaaS服务供应商的期望收益也显著受损。 供应链协调始终是供应链研究的一个核心问题，而对供应链协调最优有效的解决方式就是成员间合同的建立。本文的目的是研究基于SaaS服务供应商的角度设计SaaS服务供应商与其上游云服务供应商之间的质量担保合同，用以规避道德风险导致的不理性决策，协调SaaS服务供应链，保障SaaS服务供应商的收益。本文首先回顾了SaaS、服务供应链以及供应链合同相关理论，在构建期望总收益模型后验证了在单道德和双道德风险情境下无质量担保合同时，SaaS服务供应链期望总收益以及SaaS服务供应商的期望收益严重受损，SaaS质量也明显降低，阐明了建立SaaS质量担保合同的必要性。之后结合SaaS服务供应链的特征设计SaaS质量担保合同，选择基于风险共担的理念按云服务供应商对质量担保责任的时间结点划分为两大类。第一类是始终对服务质量负有担保责任的情况，第二类是云服务供应商对服务质量的担保责任终止于SaaS服务供应商对其提供的服务产品进行内部检测之后，将该合同称为基于内部检测信息的SaaS质量担保合同。第一类合同又按照是否对服务故障进行责任判定而分为基于服务故障检测信息的SaaS质量担保合同，以及无需进行责任判定的基于双方质量风险共担的SaaS质量担保合同。 本文通过对不同道德风险情境下的模型构建、求解、分析了三种合同的适用性，只有基于服务故障检测信息的担保合同在双道德风险下需要特殊的外在条件才可以使SaaS服务供应链协调，而其他的担保合同在两种道德风险情境下都可以满足SaaS服务供应链协调。后文通过算例仿真进一步验证了三种合同的适用性并分析了影响SaaS服务供应商收益的参数，为SaaS服务供应商设计担保合同提供了理论依据。
英文摘要：	SaaS, as an emerging service product, is increasingly attracting attention. While its market is rapidly expanding, the comprehensive features of SaaS have brought the bottle-neck referring to development for service providers. Moral hazard problems involving in SaaS supply chain makes the members deviate from the optimal choice under centralized decisions in policymaking, which will ultimately lead to a situation where SaaS supply chain can hardly be coordinated so that the SaaS providers will suffer a conspicuous loss of the expected profits. Supply chain coordination is always considered as a core part amid the supply chain studies, for which the optimal and most effective solution is for members to enter into contract. This paper aims to study the design of quality guarantee contract between SaaS providers and their upper cloud service providers from the stance of SaaS providers, so as to avoid irrational decisions caused by moral hazard, coordinate SaaS supply chain and guarantee the benefits of SaaS providers. This paper first offers a review of the SaaS, service supply chain and the relative theories on the supply chain contracts. After constructing of the expected total profit model for SaaSs, it has verified the fact that the total expected profits of SaaS supply chain as well as the SaaS providers both suffered from a sever loss when lacking the quality guarantee contracts on Single and Double Moral Hazards, while the service quality is also decreasing nobly. Thus, the need for the SaaS quality guarantee contract is illustrated. Then in the light of features of SaaS supply chain, SaaS quality guarantee contracts are made, which, basing on the risk-sharing philosophy, is then divided into two broad categories according to the time nodes of the service providers' liability for guaranteeing the quality. The first category is the condition where the service providers take the responsibly from beginning to end, while the second is that the warranty liability of the cloud service providers will end after by SaaS providers' incoming inspection of the provided service products, and then the contract will be called SaaS quality guarantee contract based on information from incoming inspection. And the first category is then divided into two kinds according to whether to make liability judgment for service failure, which are SaaS quality guarantee contracts, one based on information from service failures and the other based on the quality risk sharing without responsibility judgement. This thesis intends to analyse and offer a solution to the feasibility of the three kinds of contracts by means of constructing models under various moral hazards. It is proved that only the guarantee contract under double moral hazard, based on information from service failures, requires special external conditions to coordinate SaaS supply chain, while others are able to meet the need for coordination under any moral hazard. The following part in this thesis makes a further test through example simulation to the application of the three contacts and analyzes the parameters affecting SaaS provider returns, which provides a theoretical basis for the SaaS providers making guarantee contracts.
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