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论文编号：	5482
作者编号：	1120080753
上传时间：	2013/6/8 20:27:22
中文题目：	成员异质性、内生流动性与团队绩效——基于公共产品博弈实验的研究
英文题目：	Member Heterogeneity，Endogenous Mobility and Team Performance:
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	成员异质性，外生流动性，内生流动性，团队绩效
英文关键字：	Member Heterogeneity; External fluidity; Internal fluidity; Team Performance
中文摘要：	团队设计与组成的科学性和有效性是保证团队生产效率的首要因素，尤其是考虑团队成员在具有显著异质性的情况下，不同偏好结构和不同信念特征的成员在一起工作难免会产生一些沟通和协调方面的问题。在团队成员存在异质性的情况下，保障团队成员的流动性是优化团队结构的一个有效手段，而实现团队成员的流动性有两种途径：一个是外生的流动性，另一个是内生的流动性。前者是指由团队的外部管理者根据其自身对团队成员的了解而刻意搭配、调整成员结构产生的流动性，后者是指团队成员根据他们之间长期产生的潜移默化的知识自发聚合、重组而产生的流动性。 两种流动性究竟孰优孰劣？如何利用流动性提高团队的绩效？这正是本文所要研究的问题。本文从行为经济学的视角出发，以实验经济学中的公共产品博弈实验为研究方法，重点考察了两个层次的内容：首先，在验证团队成员的偏好结构与信念特征存在异质性的基础上，实验考察由团队管理者外生设计组成的团队和团队参与者内生流动形成的团队谁具有更高的团队绩效，实验结果表明后者优于前者；其次，在确定内生流动性更优的情况下，实验检验哪些激励框架更加有利于内生流动性发挥作用。从而，在逻辑上建立起“成员异质性→内生流动性→团队绩效”这样一条传导机制，拓宽团队治理理论的研究进路。 本文的第一章和第二章分别是绪论和文献综述，第六章是结论，重点内容主要分布在第三、四、五章。在第三章中，为了检验个体在偏好结构和信念特征上的异质性以及得到设计团队所需要的“素材”，通过修正的独裁者博弈、最后通牒博弈、礼物交换博弈三个实验，检验出个体在社会偏好方面存在着显著差异，同时还筛选出了一些具有利他偏好、负互惠偏好和正互惠偏好的被试。在上述筛选出的互惠偏好被试的基础上，又通过三个简单的协调博弈实验，验证出个体在合作倾向上也存在着显著差异，同时分离出那些兼具互惠偏好和合作倾向的同质被试，将这些被试与利他偏好被试合并，共同构成了进行团队设计所需要的同质被试集。 在第四章，论文设计了三种流动性设置的实验，以两类被试考察流动性对团队绩效的影响，以及团队流动性和成员异质性对团队绩效的交叉作用。三个流动性设置分别是研究者设计团队、计算机重组团队和内生流动性设置，两类被试中的一类被试是上一章实验筛选出的同质被试集，另一类被试是随机招募的异质性被试集，三个设置和两类被试交叉组合产生了六个实验。实验结果表明，不论是同质性被试还是异质性被试，内生流动性设置下的团队效率都优于外生性设置，说明内生流动性更加有利于团队绩效的提升；另一方面，在外生流动性设置下，同质性被试的团队绩效优于异质性被试，而在内生流动性设置下，两种团队的绩效无差异，说明在内生流动性设置下，没必要再筛选出同质被试进行团队博弈，而是只要让他们自由组合就足够了。 在第五章，论文继续探索什么样的激励框架能够促进内生流动性更好地改善团队绩效，设计了三个激励设置：组间竞争、规模经济和连锁契约。组间竞争是指在允许被试内生分组的基础上，在各小组间引进一种激励制度，平均捐献值最高的小组每个成员都可以获得一笔奖励；规模经济设置是指被试可以内生建立的小组在规模上也是内生的，这个规模介于2到10之间；连锁契约设置是指，被试在内生分组完成之后、制定捐献量之前，可以自愿地签订一个契约，这个契约规定在其他小组成员都制定完捐献量之后，如果某被试的捐献水平低于其他被试捐献量的平均水平，那么该名被试的捐献量将会被提高到这个平均水平。随机招募的三组被试进行实验的结果显示，组间竞争设置效果最优，规模经济设置效果最差，连锁契约设置处于二者之间。 论文的实验结果及其解释对于现实中的团队设计和团队绩效改进具有重要的指导意义。
英文摘要：	Priority should be given to the validity and rationality when doing the team design and construction, and this is particularly true when team members have obvious heterogeneity in terms of preference and belief which may result in conflicts when such members work together. The effective way to optimize the team is to secure the fluidity which can be achieved by the following two ways: the first way lies in the external fluidity resulting from the external leader’s understanding of his team, and he usually allocates team members according to his own judgements. The second way is the internal one arising from the spontaneous resources reorganization due to team members’ affinity and mutual understanding. This dissertation is to answer the following two questions: Which kind of fluidity is more appealing? How do people can take advantage of fluidity to improve the team performance? With Behavioral Economics as its perspective and Game Theory of public goods in it as the research methodology, this dissertation attaches great importance on the following two factors: which kind of fluidity is more effective when there is heterogeneity in members’ preference and belief, and the finding favors the internal fluidity. Then based on the preferred internal fluidity, what kind of incentive methods can be more conductive to the team performance. It is in this logic that dissertation establishes the member heterogeneity-internal fluidity-team performance chain to broaden the research horizon of the team governance. Chapter One is the introduction part and Chapter Six is the conclusion part with literature review in Chapter Two, and the main body of this dissertation are in Chapter Three, Four, and Five. In Chapter Three, there are three experiments-modified Dictator Game, Ultimate Game and Gift Exchange Game- conducted to test the heterogeneity of preference structure and belief of individuals. Based on the three experiments in Chapter Three, this dissertation finds that individual heterogeneity does exit, and candidates being tested with altruistic preference, negative reciprocal preference and positive reciprocal preference are also identified. To further the research, the author selects the candidates with reciprocal preference to prove that heterogeneity also exists in cooperation inclination by way of three simple coordination game experiments. In addition, homogeneous candidates with both reciprocal preference and cooperative inclination are also selected. Together with the altruistic preference candidates, these selected candidates are the main homogeneous candidates being tested in this dissertation. Then in Chapter Four, this dissertation conducts three fluid experiments with two candidates’ team to observe the effect that fluidity has on team performance, and further the cross effect which fluidity and member heterogeneity have on team performance. Respectively the three fluid experiments are the team designed by researchers, the reshuffle team by computer and the internal fluidity team and the two candidates’ teams are above-mentioned homogeneous candidates and candidates chosen by random. There are six experiments if crossovers these three designs and two candidates’ teams. The finding suggests that internal fluidity is more appealing than the external one, regardless of the trait of candidates. However, things are different when comes to different fluidity. In the external fluidity, the homogeneous candidates achieve better than the heterogeneous ones, while in the internal fluidity treatment, no obvious difference occurs. That is to say, there is no need for us to identify candidates who are homogeneous in internal fluidity treatment. In Chapter Five, this dissertation continues to probe into the incentive methods to improve the team performance in internal fluidity by conducting three experiments: intra-team competition, economics of scale and chained contract. Intra-team competition refers to the competition in the designated candidates’ team, and each of the highest score sub-team can be rewarded with a mount of money. Economics of scale design means the scale is endogenous and the scope ranges from two to ten. Chained contract renders that members can sign the contract voluntarily before the donation, and the contracts regulates that if the candidate’s donation value is lower than those of all the rest candidates, then his donation value will be adjusted to the average level of his team. The finding of three candidates’ teams chosen by random suggests that intra-team competition is the most favorable while the economics of scale, the least. Chained contract lies between them. By reviewing all the experiments, the author believes that the findings and explanations can be very conductive to team design and construction.
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