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论文编号：	5404
作者编号：	2120112463
上传时间：	2013/6/7 13:53:50
中文题目：	上市公司隧道效应影响因素研究
英文题目：	Research On The Influence Factors Of Listed Companies Tunneling
指导老师：	李莉
中文关键字：	隧道效应，股权结构，关联担保
英文关键字：	Tunneling, Ownership Structure , Related Party Guarantee
中文摘要：	由于我国特殊的社会体制和经济体制，导致我国普遍存在一股独大的现象，造成了我国上市公司控股股东的管理权和现金流全的分离，这便带来了控股股东对上市公司进行利益输送，掏空上市公司的动机，使我国上市公司普遍存在公司资金占用、关联担保等行为。为了解决隧道效应问题，应从源头出发，研究我国隧道效应产生的主要原因，以及其主要影响因素，了解其发生的机理，从而为防范我国控股股东的掏空行为提供理论依据和现实指导依据，同时为我国存在大股东掏空现象提供实证证据。 首先，本文从隧道效应的产生原因、影响因素与危害及治理等方面对上市公司隧道效应相关文献进行梳理与评述。 其次，本文介绍了中国上市公司隧道效应的现状。从表现形式来看，隧道效应主要表现为关联交易、关联担保、资金占用、高价配股或增发等；从基本特征来看，隧道效应是由对上市公司有控制权的大股东实行的单方面的价值转移；从经济后果来看，隧道效应会损害中小股东利益、影响公司经营绩效，甚至不利于我国资本市场的长远发展。从本质上而言，隧道效应是基于大股东与中小股东之间利益异质性的上市公司“股东内部代理问题”。 再次，运用不完全信息下静态博弈模型进行纳什均衡分析，阐述隧道效应发生的根本原因在于大股东与中小股东之间的“利益异质性”。然后，基于股权结构的视角，本文对第一大股东持股比例、第一大股东股权性质、股权集中度以及股权制衡度等股权结构特征对隧道效应的影响进行理论分析。接着，通过实证分析对隧道效应的影响因素进行检验（实证分析选用关联担保规模来衡量隧道效应）。 结果表明：第一，大股东关联担保规模与第一大股东持股比例呈现先上升后下降的关系，说明当第一大股东持股比例较低时，“利益侵害效应”发生更强的作用；随着第一大股东持股比例上升，大股东资金占用的成本增加，此时，利益趋同效应发生更强的作用，表现为对隧道行为的抑制。第二，股权集中度与关联担保规模显著正相关。第三，第二大股东对第一大股东的制衡度与关联担保规模存在显著的关系。这一回归结果与中国上市公司现实情况基本相符。
英文摘要：	Due to the special social system and economic system in our country, caused our country universal existence of a dominant phenomenon, caused the controlling shareholders of listed companies in China and all cash flow management and the separation, this will bring the controlling shareholders of listed companies for the indemnification, emptied the motives of listed companies, the listed companies in China are widespread company capital takes up, associated guarantees, etc. In order to solve the problem of tunneling effect, should from the origin, research our country the main reasons that tunnel effect, and its main influencing factors, to understand the mechanism of it, to prevent the hollowed behavior of controlling shareholders in China to provide theoretical basis and practical guidance, at the same time for our country exists hollowed phenomenon provides empirical evidence on large shareholders. First of all, this article makes a review and summary of the related literatures about tunneling from the aspects of the causes, influencing factors, harm, governance and propping. Secondly, this paper introduces the current status of tunneling of listed companies in China. The mainly forms of tunneling are as follows: transactions between related parties, guarantee between related parties, occupation of funds, manipulation of stock price , malignant dividend, high-priced allotment or issuing of shares. The basic characteristics of tunneling are that tunneling is a unilateral transfer of value operated by the controlling shareholder and its manifestations are more and more covert. As for the economic consequences, tunneling will damage the interests of small shareholders, cause a bad impact on corporate performance, and even be terrible for the long-term development of China's capital market. Essentially, tunneling is an 'internal agency problem' based on the 'interest heterogeneity' between large shareholders and minority shareholders of the listed companies. Thirdly, by using the static game model and doing Nash equilibrium analysis, we learn that the fundamental cause of tunneling is the 'interest heterogeneity' between large shareholders and minority shareholders. Then we make a theoretic analysis from the perspective of ownership structure, we elaborate the effect of proportion of the first shareholder, the nature of first shareholder's equity, ownership concentration and ownership balance degree on tunneling. Then, we certificate theoretical analysis through the empirical analysis. The results are as follows: first, the amount of occupied funds firstly increases and then decreases with the proportion of the first shareholder increases, and the inflection point occurs around 65%. Second, the first major stockholder nature for state-owned shares and fund occupation presents positive correlation. Third, the ownership concentration degree and capital occupying have a significant positive correlation. In fourth, there is no the significant correlation between ownership balance degree and fund occupation. The regression result is in accordance with the reality in Chinese listed companies. Finally, this paper suggest we should ①strengthen related legislation and improve investor legal protection; ②cultivate institutional investors; ③improve internal and external monitoring mechanism of listed companies.
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