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论文编号：	5398
作者编号：	2120112475
上传时间：	2013/6/7 11:26:51
中文题目：	经营压力下高管团队与企业创新行为关系研究
英文题目：	The research of the relationship between senior manager team and innovation activity under pressure
指导老师：	武立东
中文关键字：	经营压力;研发投入;高管团队;高管持股;董事会监督
英文关键字：	operating pressure;R&D investment;top management team;senior executives hold share;board supervision
中文摘要：	创新是一个企业兴旺发达永不枯寂的源动力。近年来，国内以投资驱动为主的发展模式在面临逐年回报率降低的趋势。创新的作用越发凸显。然而也有部分调查结果显示，在本期收益情况不好的情况下，管理者会采取相应的措施以保证当期的收益。减少当期的研发投入正是保证本期收益的有效途径之一。 出现这样的情况主要是因为，企业的研发投入会冲减本期的利润。在以财务指标衡量企业业绩以及管理者能力的今天，企业有关盈利的指标不达标的话，对于管理者自身来说，会降低外界与股东对高管的评价，也会影响到相应的薪酬获得。因此，本文主要研究管理团队的经营压力与研发投入之间的关系。 在内容安排上，本文首先以现实为依据，通过客观的现实现象，提出有关研究问题。主要是从高层管理团队与研发投入，公司治理与研发投入两个方面对国内外相关研究文献进行回顾和梳理。再次为研究设计，在探究经营压力与研发投入的基础之上，又分别以高管持股，董事会监督为调节变量，进行了进一步的研究。最后一章为实证检验与分析，本文以2011年的国内389家上市公司为样本，并通过回归分析等方法验证假设。根据实证结果，本文进而得出如下主要结论：短期压力之下，高管团队倾向于降低当期研发投入；高管不持股时，高管更容易出现短期行为，即更多的减少当期研发投入；而高管变更研发投入时，董事会表现出的监督的作用并不明显。本文可能的创新点在于，相比较过往研究的滞后性处理，本文并不着眼于研发投入在未来对企业的影响，而是主要着眼于在经营压力下的管理者的短期行为，以高管团队持股与董事会的监督为影响条件，弥补了过往研究较为忽视研发投入对短期财务产生负面效应的这一不足。
英文摘要：	Innovation is the endless power of a enterprise. In recent years, the development way based on investment faces the trend of low return. The function of innovation becomes more important. However, there are still some surveys show that managers will take proper measure to ensure the current profit although under worse condition. Reduction of R&D investment is an effective way to keep the current profit. The main reason is that R&D investment will reduce current profit. Since we measure the manager’s ability according to his performance, if the expecting profit is under a certain standard, people will tend to lower the judgment of manager, which affects his payment. Therefore, the paper mainly studies the relationship between the pressure of executive team and R&D investment. From the arrangement of content, based on reality and through the phenomenon, the paper rise the related study. According to executive team and R&D investment, corporation governance and R&D investment, the paper reviews the correlation studies. based on operating pressure and R&D investment, according to the executive holding shares and board supervision, the article has further study. The last chapter is empirical test and analysis, the paper is based on 389 domestic listed companies in 2001, through analysis of regression to verify the assumption. According to the proved results, we reach the main conclusion: under short term pressure, top management team tends to lower the R&D investment; when the senior executives don’t hold shares, they likely choose the short term performance, which refers to reducing the current R&D investment; the function of board supervision is not very obvious when the executives change R&D investment. The innovation point of this paper is the study of management of hysteresis quality. The paper doesn’t focus on the effect of R&D investment on corporation but on short-term activity of executives, using long-term incentive and board supervision as affecting condition, make up for the R&D investment’s short period finance effect which used to be ignored by former researches.
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