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论文编号：	5396
作者编号：	2120112378
上传时间：	2013/6/7 11:13:04
中文题目：	我国上市公司股权激励公告效应及影响因素研究
英文题目：	The Empirical Study on the Announcement Effect and Influence Factors of Listed Companies Stock Equity Motivation in China
指导老师：	曾亚敏
中文关键字：	股权激励,市场反应,事件研究法
英文关键字：	equity incentives, the market reaction, event study
中文摘要：	作为趋同股东和经理人利益的工具，股权激励初衷是希望经理人通过努力工作，提高公司的业绩，缓解代理冲突。然而管理层有动机和能力影响自己的薪酬，理论上设计有效的减轻股东和经理人代理成本的股权激励机制不仅不能降低代理成本，反而会使股东蒙受损失。 目前，国内现有的文献大多从公司的会计业绩等方面分析，认为上市公司实施股权激励的效果是显著的。极少数研究股权激励公告效应以及影响因素。本文以2007年至2012年沪深两市实施股权激励的上市公司为研究对象，从市场反应和和影响因素两方面对股权激励进行实证研究。一方面从分析的是股权激励的市场反应，利用事件研究法，通过计算股权激励公告前后的平均异常收益率和平均累积异常收益率，考察了市场投资者对股权激励的反应。另一方面从大股东掏空和投资者关注两方面来分析和验证影响我国上市公司股权激励公告效应的具体因素。 本文的结论是：本文从全样本、股票期权激励和限制性股票激励角度考察股权激励的市场反应，实证研究结果表明，事件期内股权激励计划存在信息泄露，并且引起正向的市场反应，这表明股权激励在一定程度上解决了代理成本。同时，大股东掏空增强了上市公司股权激励的公告效应，投资者关注与股权激励的市场反应负相关。
英文摘要：	The equity incentive can help to align the managers’ and stockholders’ interest. It is designed as an efficient tool to encourage the management work hard, enhance the performance of the company, ease the conflict in agent. However management has the ability to impact their compensation. The equity incentive, which is designed to reduce the agent cost, not only fails to reduce agency cost, it will make cause losses to the shareholders. Most of the existing domestic literature published in recent years analyze the relationship between equity incentive mechanism and listed companies' outstanding achievement .Few of them analyze the announcement effect and the influence factors of listed companies equity incentive in China. This paper studies the listed companies of actualizing equity incentive between 2007 to 2012 from the aspects of announcement effect and the influence factors. On the one hand, this article analyses whether or not the announcement of equity incentive brought the abnormal returns to the investors by using the event study. On the other hand, this article analyses the factors that influence announcement effect of the equity incentive from the point of the large shareholders’ behavior of tunneling and the investors focus. We find evidence that :1) there’s information leakage about the equity incentive, and the announcement of equity incentive has positive impact on market reactions, which suggests that equity incentives solved the agency cost in a certain extent. 2)the large shareholders’ behavior of tunneling is positively related to the market reaction of equity incentives announcement, and the investors focus is negatively related to the market reaction of equity incentive.
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