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论文编号：	5368
作者编号：	2120112476
上传时间：	2013/6/6 22:21:02
中文题目：	基金股东、信息成本与高管变更
英文题目：	The Fund Shareholders、Information Cost and Managerial Turnover
指导老师：	牛建波
中文关键字：	基金，高管非自愿变更，信息成本，公司治理
英文关键字：	Fund, Managerial turnover, Information cost, Corporate governance
中文摘要：	一直以来，机构投资者被认为是具有投资管理专业化、投资结构组合化和投资行为规范化等特征的一类特殊股东。它集合小股东的分散资金，具备相对雄厚的资金实力，又在信息搜集分析、上市公司研究、投资决策等方面具备较强的专业性，因此其投资行为倾向于长期的价值投资，既有利于证券市场的稳定健康发展，又具备了参与上市公司治理和管理决策的动力和能力。然而，基金作为典型的机构投资者被引进我国后，却暴出种种违规操作的黑幕，引起了极大的争议。在理论界，现有研究对证券投资基金的市场角色和作用也未能形成一致意见，甚至产生了截然相反的结论。 由于机构投资者涵盖的种类众多，不同类型机构投资者在产品、资金来源、投资理念、运作方式等方面存在较大的差异。因此，本文选取了一类最重要的机构投资者——基金作为研究对象，使用2004-2011年开放式基金持股明细数据及沪、深两市上市公司数据，来检验上市公司中基金股东的整体持股比例如何影响高管变更对业绩的敏感度，即在业绩变差的情况下，基金股东持股份额的提高促进还是抑制了高管的变更；同时本文针对基金的特征，区分了其参与治理的能力和动力两个维度，来验证影响基金行为和作用的内部因素；考虑到信息的可得性、真实性以及信息处理中的偏误可能对基金参与公司治理时的决策产生的影响，我们引入了信息成本变量来分析基金发挥作用的外部条件。 文章通过实证分析和检验发现，从整体上来看，上市公司中基金股东的持股比例高会削弱了高管被迫离职对业绩的敏感度。当区分了基金参与上市公司治理的能力、动力因素之后，发现基金在上市公司中的话语权大小对基金作用的发挥有显著的影响。外部信息成本的加入证实了在信息成本较高的情况下，基金在信息获取和信息处理方面的专业优势得以体现，能够对公司高管变更的决策产生更为显著的影响。因此，本文认为基金本身具备参与治理的能力和信息优势，但是在实践中还需要合适的激励以引导其发挥积极的作用。
英文摘要：	All the time, institutional investors are considered to be a special class of shareholders with investment management professional, investment structure portfolio and investment behavior standardization. It is a collection of small shareholders diversifying the funding, with a relatively strong financial strength, and a strong professional on the aspects of information gathering, listed companies analyzing, and investment decisions. Therefore, its investment behavior tend to be long-term value investing, and it is also in favor of stable and healthy development of the stock market; at the same time its large-scale investment make it has the power and ability to participate in the corporate governance and management decisions. However, after the typical institutional investors in the fund market as the most important "healthy forces" and the mature western markets was introduced into our country hopefully in a wide range, it was exposed with a variety of “inside story” that caused by illegal operation, and led to a huge controversy. In theoretical circles, the existing research on the roles and functions of the securities investment fund market also failed to form a consensus, and even had a diametrically opposite conclusion. Due to institutional investors including funds, securities firms, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII), insurance companies and so on, and there is a big difference among different institutional investors in the product, sources of funding, investment philosophy, mode of operation and other aspects, so it is hard for the institutional investors to go deep into the mechanism of action and influencing factors, which may also lead to an important reason that the conclusion of the study of institutional investors is very different, unconvincing and very slow. Therefore, in order to better measure the actual role that played in institutional investors in listed companies and carefully explore the role of institutional investors mechanisms and the external factors which may affect its function and development, we selected the most important institutional investors, funds, as a research object, using an open fund holdings detail from the year 2004 to 2011, and Shanghai and Shenzhen listed company data to test the overall stake of the fund shareholders in listed companies executives to change how it affects the sensitivity of the results, namely, in the case of poor performance, the increase of the share of the fund shareholders to promote or suppress the change of the executives; in this paper, we used the characteristics of the fund, distinguished its participatory governance capacity and power, the two dimensions, to verify internal factors affecting the behavior and the role of the fund; taking into account the availability of information, the authenticity of the information, and the effects may be caused by decisions when combining fund with company managing, we have introduced information cost variables analysis of the role of the fund's external conditions. Through empirical analysis and testing on the whole, within the listed companies when there is a high holding rate of the fund shareholders, this on the contrary weakened the performance sensitivity that make executives forced to leave the company. After distinguished the ability of the fund's participation in the governance of listed companies, the dynamic factors, we found difficult to fund linked to the existing fund net profit model to generate the power of participatory governance, and the right to speak of the fund in listed companies has a significant impact on the development of fund functions. Inspection of the cost of external information confirmed in the case of higher information costs, fund professional advantages to be reflected in the access to information and information processing, and it has a more significant impact on company executives to change the decision-making. Finally, according to the conclusions of the empirical, the paper argues that the fund itself has the ability to take part in the government and information superiority, but this ability and advantage in practice also need the right incentives to guide in order to play an active role, and this paper also put forward a number of policy recommendations.
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