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论文编号：	5364
作者编号：	2120112486
上传时间：	2013/6/6 22:01:20
中文题目：	机构持股、独立董事与境外上市公司风险——基于中国在美上市公司的经验数据
英文题目：	Study on Institutional Shareholders, Independent Directors and Risk of Overseas-listed Companies——Evidence from Chinese Firms Listed in American Stock Exchanges
指导老师：	张国萍
中文关键字：	境外上市，机构持股，独立董事，企业风险
英文关键字：	Overseas Listing, Institutional Shareholders, Independent Directors, Enterprise Risk
中文摘要：	近年来，境外上市成为不少中小企业寻求快速发展探索出的新的融资渠道。对中国企业境外上市行为的研究普遍集中在两大类，一类主要是探讨境外上市后国内A股与境外H股或其他上市地的价格关系；另一类试图从某一个角度揭示公司境外上市的动因。此外，对境外上市效应的研究则主要在实现境外上市以后对公司绩效的影响方面；考察境外上市公司治理结构与企业风险关系的实证研究几乎没有，大多仅从理论分析的角度阐述境外上市的风险类别。本文在总结中国企业境外上市动因后，从防止“内部人控制”、“一股独大”等现象角度提出要加强企业外部治理机制的作用，而机构投资者作为控股股东和个人投资者之间的第三方力量，一方面能够抑制大股东控股，保护中小股东权益，另一方面能够克服个人投资者的搭便车问题，改善公司治理，降低企业风险。独立董事作为内部治理机制中具有独立性的一方，能够有效监督企业运营和保护投资者。所以本文对中国在美NYSE上市公司的机构投资者、独立董事特征与企业风险之间关系进行了实证研究。本文选择了美股NYSE上市公司为样本，从机构投资者和独立董事两个角度进行实证分析，引入了Z指数度量企业破产风险，又从现金流的角度选择相关财务指标考察了对企业现金流风险的影响。实证结果表明：（1）独立董事比例与现金负债比率、债务保障率和总资产现金流量率三个指标显著负相关；（2）独立董事平均报酬与上文提到的现金流动性风险三个指标显著正相关；（3）机构投资者持股比例与企业财务破产风险Z指数、现金流风险指标均显著正相关，尤其对Z指数作用更加明显；（4）机构投资者持股比例与第一大股东持股的比值越高，对控股股东的制衡作用越大，有利于减少代理成本，降低企业风险。（5）市场风险β系数几乎不与任何解释变量相关，但是与公司的总资产规模存在显著正相关。（6）上市公司的股权结构与机构投资者持股比例存在倒U型关系。
英文摘要：	In the recent years, going to the market abroad has become a new financing channel for small and medium-sized enterprises to seek rapid development. Generally, the study of the behavior of overseas listing of Chinese companies focuses on two broad categories. One mainly discusses the price relations of overseas listing between domestic A share and H share or others; the other kind tries to reveal the reasons of companies listing abroad from a certain angle. In addition, the study of the overseas listing effect mainly focuses on effects on corporate performance after listing abroad. Only a few articles study the relationship between company governance structure and the enterprise risk of overseas-listed companies, and most are theoretical analysis. Firstly, we summarize reasons of Chinese companies listed abroad in this paper, from perspectives of phenomenon such as prevention of "insider control", "a dominant phenomenon". Secondly, we also put forward strengthening the external governance mechanism. Institutional investors, as the third party strength between controlling shareholders and individual investors, on the one hand, can restrain large shareholders holding, on the other hand, can overcome the free-rider problem of individual investors, improve corporate governance and reduce corporate risk. Independent director, as another internal governance mechanism, can effectively supervise enterprise operation and protect investors. So this paper has been conducted empirical research of relationship between institutional investors, independent directors’ characteristics and enterprise risk in the NYSE listed company. This article chose the NYSE listed company as sample; in variable selection, we introduced independent directors and institutional investors. As for risk measurement, we introduced the Z score method of Altman to measure financial risk, also choose relevant financial indicators for the calculation of enterprise cash flow risk. The empirical results show that: (1) the proportion of independent directors and the security of cash debt ratio, debt coverage ratio and total assets cash flow rate , are significantly negative correlation; (2) the independent directors average remuneration is significantly positively related to the above three indexes of cash flow risk; (3) institutional investor shareholding proportion, corporate financial bankruptcy risk Z index, cash flow risk indicators are in significantly positive correlation, the effect for Z index is more obvious; (4) the higher the proportion of institutional investor shareholding to the biggest shareholder the ratio of holds, the greater the role of checks and balances is, which is beneficial to reduce agency costs and reduce business risk; (5) the risk of stock market coefficient, βcoefficient, associated with hardly any explanatory variables, but is in significant positive correlation with the company's total assets scale. (6) There exists inverted u-shaped relationship between the equity structure and institutional investor shareholding of listed companies.
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