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论文编号：	5354
作者编号：	2120112376
上传时间：	2013/6/6 20:18:51
中文题目：	对创业板企业高管激励的研究——基于高管薪酬的案例分析
英文题目：	The research of Incentives for GEM corporate executives - a case study based on executive pay
指导老师：	程新生
中文关键字：	创业板，高管薪酬，激励，案例分析
英文关键字：	Growth Enterprise Market (GEM)，Executive Compensation，Incentive，Case Study
中文摘要：	随着市场经济的日益发展和高管薪酬数据的披露，关于高管薪酬暴露出的问题越来越多地受到各界人士的关注。国外有关高管薪酬激励方面的研究起步较早，而我国的相关研究从本世纪初才刚刚开始，经过学术界对高管薪酬激励问题大量的理论和实证研究，确定经理人的激励和约束制度已成为公司治理研究的重要内容。基于委托代理理论，现代企业所有权和经营权的分离导致高管激励问题的产生，所有者和经理人存在信息不对称和目标不一致的问题，对高管的激励是为了避免由于股东与公司高管之间存在的分歧，使管理者和所有者的目标趋于一致。由于市场环境的多变以及经理人市场的激烈竞争，导致高管薪酬激励问题更加突出，值得我们进行深入研究，明确影响高管薪酬的因素以及高管薪酬波动的原因，从而设计更加合理的高管薪酬激励契约。近年来越来越多的学者开始对高管薪酬问题进行研究，但是大部分学者研究对象集中在主板上市的大型公司，却鲜有针对创业板上市公司高管薪酬的研究，并且研究成果零散、缺乏系统性。创业板市场是主板市场以外为中小企业、新兴企业提供融资渠道的平台，尽管创业板启动时间不长，发展模式还处于摸索阶段，但在高管薪酬方面暴露出的问题却很多。近年来的创业板曝出高管薪酬与公司绩效不匹配、创业板股东暴富以及高管恶意辞职套现等负面新闻，表明创业板上市公司薪酬激励机制的缺陷。为促进创业板市场的合理发展，引导创业板上市企业更加规范发展，调动高级管理人员的积极性，发挥人力资本优势，亟需建立一套有效的高管薪酬激励机制。因此如何有效的对经理人进行激励，来推动企业业绩的提升是企业公司治理制度建设中至关重要的问题。基于以上背景，本文选取了创业板上市公司作为研究对象，来研究创业板企业高管薪酬问题。　　本文以委托代理理论、人力资本理论、公司治理理论以及管理激励理论等作为理论基础，学习国内外相关研究成果，在借鉴前人研究方法和研究成果的基础上，对影响高管薪酬的因素进行了理论分析，以2009年以来创业板上市企业为样本，研究了创业板上市企业薪酬激励现状，并且以C公司为例，计算相关指标数值，对案例公司高管薪酬的影响因素进行了分析，并最后进行了相关的政策建议，以期为创业板上市公司今后制定薪酬政策提供一点启示。
英文摘要：	With the increasing development of the market economy and the disclosure of executive compensation data, issues relating to executive compensation exposed more and more by the concern of the people from all walks of life. Abroad on executive pay incentive started earlier, our research has only just begun from the beginning of this century, after the academic community on executive remuneration large number of theoretical and empirical research to determine the manager's incentive and restraint system has become corporate governance of the important content. Based on the principal-agent theory, lead to the generation of executive pay incentive problems due to the separation of corporate ownership and management rights, owners and managers, there is often the problem of information asymmetry and inconsistent goals, incentives for senior management in order to avoid the shareholders and differences between company executives, managers and owners of the target tends to be consistent. Due to the ever-changing market environment and market manager incentive competition, the high executive pay incentive problems are more prominent, worthy of our in-depth study, a clear impact factors as well as the reasons for fluctuations of executive compensation of executive compensation, in order to design more reasonable tube remuneration incentive contract. Executive pay more and more problems, more scholars began to conduct research on executive compensation issues, but most scholars study focused on large companies listed on the Main Board, but few companies listed on GEM executive compensation and research is fragmented and unsystematic. Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) to provide financing for small and medium-sized enterprises, emerging companies outside the motherboard market platform development model still in the exploratory stage GEM start-up time is not long, but has a lot of the problems exposed in executive pay. Entrepreneurship poster executive compensation and corporate performance does not match the GEM shareholders riches and malicious executives resign cash and other negative news in recent years, indicating that the defects of the companies listed on GEM pay incentives. An urgent need to establish an effective executive compensation incentives to promote the rational development of the GEM market guide GEM listed companies more standardized development, to mobilize the enthusiasm of the senior management, to play human capital advantage. How effective managers incentives to promote the enterprises to enhance the performance enterprise corporate governance system construction critical problem. Based on the above background, we selected companies listed on GEM as the research object, to study the GEM companies executive compensation issues. In this paper, the principal-agent theory, human capital theory, the theory of corporate governance and management incentive theory as a theoretical foundation, drawing on relevant research results at home and abroad on the basis of previous studies, mainly from the three aspects of corporate performance, scale and executives personal factors factors that affect executive compensation theoretical analysis, a sample of GEM listed companies since 2009, the status of GEM listed companies incentive pay, and take Company C for example, the calculated values of the indicators, the case company executives the remuneration of the factors, and finally the relevant policy recommendations to companies listed on GEM developing remuneration policies in the future to provide a little inspiration.
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