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论文编号：	5312
作者编号：	2120112452
上传时间：	2013/6/6 12:16:09
中文题目：	亲缘关系是否影响代理成本-基于中小板与创业板上市家族企业的研究
英文题目：	Does Kinship Affect Agency cost-An Empirical Study on the Family Firms Listed in the SME and GEM board
指导老师：	古志辉
中文关键字：	家族企业，亲缘关系，代理成本，治理结构
英文关键字：	Family firm，Kinship，Agency costs，Governance structure
中文摘要：	家族企业是一种世界范围内普遍存在的组织形式。随着改革开放和民营经济的发展，我国的家族企业不断壮大成熟。不管是在数量上还是在规模上都在我国当前的国民经济中占有重要地位。因此，对于家族企业的研究也在不断的深入和发展。其中，家族企业的代理问题具有其独特性，由于家族企业中监管机制和外部治理机制的不健全以及家族企业中亲缘关系的存在，家族企业中家族股东与经理人之间的代理问题成为学术界研究的热点。因此，代理相关理论因为能够很好解释家族企业亲缘关系、产权转移、继任者选择以及股东利益冲突所带来的问题而在家族企业研究中越来越受到专家学者的青睐。 本文基于委托代理理论以及利他主义等基本理论，从家族企业治理中是否存在亲缘关系为切入点，对上市家族企业的亲缘距离和代理成本进行理论和经验研究。通过研究，意图探讨家族企业中多个家族成员共同参与是否会降低代理成本。同时，从家族内部的差序格局出发，探索不同家族亲缘关系类型对代理成本的影响。 本文选择了2004-2011年在中小板和创业板上市的九百多个家族控制的上市公司作为研究样本，以亲缘关系变量为主要研究对象，同时选取股权集中度、股权制衡度、两职合一、高管薪酬等反映家族上市公司股权和治理结构的变量，建立非平衡面板数据随机效应模型对反映家族上市公司代理成本的管理费用率和总资产周转率进行了回归。从回归结果来看，多家族成员参与企业经营管理会降低上市家族企业的代理成本。另外，通过对亲缘关系进行分类后进行回归可得，核心关系型家庭比近亲关系型家庭更能降低代理成本，而远亲家庭的成员的加入无论在管理费用率还是总资产周转率模型中都没有对家族企业代理成本产生显著影响。最后，根据模型回归结果，家族企业在解决代理冲突和矛盾以及建立有效家族治理效率机制时，需要充分认识到家族成员的亲缘关系以及亲缘距离的重要作用，并且按照其所能起到的影响的不同配置到特定的控制机制中。
英文摘要：	The family enterprise has been a worldwide organization form. With the development of reform and opening up and the private economy，the family enterprises in our country have grown mature. The family enterprise has already occupied an important position in China's current national economy. Therefore，the study of family business is also developing very fast. Among them，the agency problem of family enterprise is comparably special. Because supervision mechanism and external governance mechanism in the family enterprise is not as perfect as in the nonfamily firm，the first agency problem which is the interest conflicts between family shareholders and managers in family business is a hot academic research. Therefore，because the agent theories can well explain the family business relationship，the ownership and management right transfer and shareholder interest conflict in family business research，scholars are paying more attention to them. Based on the theory of principal-agent and the altruism，this paper starts from the angle of whether the genetic relationship existing in the listed family firms and takes the theoretical and empirical research on the first kind of agency cost. Through the research，the paper aims to explore whether more family agents participating in the management and decision–making can reduce the agency cost. At the same time， based on Diversity-orderly structure theory，the paper tries to explore the arrangement of different kinship in family control and its influence on firm agency cost. This paper chooses more than 900 listing family firms from 2004 to 2011 in the SME and GEM board as the sample and takes the kinship as the main research variables. At the same time the major stockholder ratio，degree of restriction，executive compensation etc. which reflect listing family firms ownership and governance structure variables are added. And we establish the unbalanced panel data stochastic effect model to explore how the kinship influences agency cost which reflects by overhead rate and total asset turnover ratio. From the regression results， more family agents participating in the family control will reduce the agency costs of listed family firms. In addition，the model of the regression of overhead rate shows the core family type can reduce agency cost more than the close relationship family type，and lacked kinship does not have a significant impact on agency cost of family enterprises. Finally，we can conclude that the family enterprises should not only base on ability， loyalty criteria to evaluate of family members in the design to improve the mechanism of family governance efficiency，but also consider the degree of kinship family member configured into the corresponding control mechanism.
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