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论文编号：	521
作者编号：	20050707
上传时间：	2008/6/18 19:46:09
中文题目：	制度变迁、控股股东行为与上市公
英文题目：	Resarch on institutional trans
指导老师：	周晓苏
中文关键字：	制度变迁　控股股东行为　应计质
英文关键字：	Institutional transformation
中文摘要：	我国资本市场从1992年5月至2005年6月经历了整整13个春秋的股权分置时代。股权分置对资本市场的负面影响是巨大的。为了解决长期困扰中国资本市场的股权分置问题，中国证监会于2005年5月启动了股权分置改革（简称“股改”）试点，并在试点之后全面推开。截至2006年10月10日，中国A股市场股改基本完成。 与股权分置改革并行的多项制度改革已经使我国上市公司主要利益相关者的行为发生了一系列变化，尤为引人关注的就是控股股东的行为变化。本文以制度变迁为背景，以后股权分置时代控股股东可能的行为变化或者“新增”行为为主线，研究控股股东集团（包括上市公司母公司及其关联方和一致行动人）与上市公司之间的关联交易性质的变化、控股股东履行股改承诺义务和为了获得流通权收益而发生的增减持股份行为对应计质量的影响。控股股东的这些行为或者与股权分置时代不同，或者是股权分置时代没有的。这些行为变化可能会引起上市公司应计质量发生相应变化，因为组成应计质量的净利润和经营现金流是企业各种活动的综合反映。 本研究有助于资本市场监管者正确审视股改阶段性成果对于上市公司会计行为的影响，有助于加强督促控股股东贯彻“契约精神”，有助于监控控股股东的增减持行为，稳定资本市场发展。本研究有助于会计准则制订者制定与资本市场改革配套的会计准则，有利于上市公司构建良好的公司治理结构，有助于中小投资者制定正确的投资策略，进行自我保护。 本文从三个方面进行研究，主要的研究发现是： 第一，在后股权分置时代，控股股东与上市公司进行关联交易仍是控股股东行为的重要组成部分。但是由于控股股东效用函数发生了变化，监管和法律对掏空上市公司有了量刑规定，导致关联交易很可能会产生与股权分置时代不同的后果。本文用股改前后都与控股股东发生关联交易的上市公司配对样本数据验证了后股权分置时代控股股东的关联交易具有改善应计质量的作用，很可能表示控股股东的关联交易在后股权分置时代发生了变化，至少减轻了掏空程度。所以，后股权分置时代控股股东的关联交易行为可能因为制度变迁发生改变，不再以掏空上市公司为主，更可能是正常交易或者是支持性交易。 第二，在后股权分置时代，控股股东通过关联交易履行股改承诺对上市公司应计质量有显著影响。本文构建了后股权分置时代控股股东所有权通过其行为影响应计质量的模型，并在此基础上以2005年－2007年的852个观测值对假设进行了检验。研究发现，在后股权分置时代，控股股东通过关联交易履行资产注入承诺和分红承诺对应计质量有显著影响，原因主要是控股股东与上市公司和中小股东有了一致的利益基础，提高上市公司应计质量成为共同选择。研究同时发现，控股股东所有权与应计质量之间的U型关系，当控股股东股权比例大约在40%－45%之间时，应计质量最低。意义在于说明在后股权分置时代，控股股东股权比例存在盈余质量底部陷阱，减持或者增持股份要防止出现恶化应计质量的现象发生。 第三，在后股权分置时代，控股股东获得了流通权，这就产生了我国资本市场在股权分置时期少有的控股股东增减持上市公司股份的事情。本文研究了控股股东为了获取流通权收益发生的增减持股份行为对上市公司应计质量的影响。研究发现，控股股东的增持行为对应计质量没有显著影响，说明股改时期的控股股东增持有可能是“救市”或者是为了顺利完成股改而被迫采取的投资策略，并没有传递增持改善上市公司应计质量的信号。控股股东的减持行为对应计质量也没有显著影响，说明后股权分置时代的控股股东减持完全是控股股东经不住资本市场高收益的诱惑，获取短期利益的行为，并没有传递减持降低上市公司应计质量的信号。本文同时发现增持样本组应计质量高于减持样本组，这意味着被增持的公司应计质量本身就好，被减持的公司应计质量本身就不是很好。中小投资者不必过度关注控股股东的增减持行为，而应该认真审视自己手中股票的投资价值，坚持价值投资和长期投资，不应该抱着投机心态频繁调仓换股。 上述研究发现证明了后股权分置时代控股股东的“新增”行为影响上市公司应计质量。本文的研究结论有助于深刻理解后股权分置时代控股股东的行为变化，有助于找寻影响应计质量的制度原因，对证券市场监管层的监督行为、投资者的投资策略以及其他利益相关者决策均有启示意义。
英文摘要：	From May 1992 to June 2005, the dual-class shares system had been dominating China's capital market, which destructed the capital markets enormously. In order to resolve the problem of the long-standing stake in China's capital market, in May 2005 the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission built up some experimental units of share reform, and then spread their experience to all the listed companies. Up to October 10, 2006, the reform had been completed basically. And many institution reforms parallel to dual-class shares system reform have resulted in the change of stakeholders’ behavior, especially the controlling shareholder’s behavior. Based on the context of institutional transformation, and taking as the main line the controlling shareholders’ motives and behavioral change and the "new" acts after the equity reform, this paper studied how the controlling shareholders’ behavior, such as the nature of the stake transaction between controlling shareholders and the listed company, delivering the goods and gaining capital profits, affects the listed companies’ accruals quality. All the controlling shareholders’ behavior after the equity reform is different or doesn’t exist compared with those under the dual-class shares system, and behavioral change may result in the change of the listed companies’ accruals quality. Because net profit and working cash flow those compose accruals quality are a general reflection of all the transactions. The study is helpful to authorities of capital market to survey how the sectional success of the share reform affects listed companies’ accruals quality, to supervise controlling shareholders delivering the goods and purchasing shares or selling shares in order to develop capital market steadily. The study is also helpful in constituting new accounting regulations parallel to the capital market reform, and in establishing good corporate governance for listed companies. For the investors who have little capital, the study helps to invest rightly and protect selves. The paper studies from three parts and the findings are as follows: 1.　During the time of the post-dual-class shares system, the stake transaction between controlling shareholders and the listed company is still an important part of the controlling shareholders’ act. But the utility function of the controlling shareholder has changed, and supervisory and legal departments have imposed limitations on the controlling shareholders’ tunneling listed companies. As a result, the stake transaction is likely to bring about different consequences compared with those under the dual-class shares system. By using paired sample, the paper finds the interaction of institutional transformation and stake transactions significantly increase the accruals quality, which means that the stake transactions under the post-dual-class shares system indeed improve accruals quality of the listed companies. It shows that the controlling shareholders’ act is likely to change, the level of their tunneling listed companies can be reduced at least, and stake transactions may be normal or supporting. 2.　During the time of the post-dual-class shares system, the controlling shareholders’ fulfilling commitments through stake transactions affect accruals quality of listed companies. The paper creates a model and employs 852 Observations of listed companies from 2005 to 2007. It shows that after equity reform, the controlling shareholders’ fulfilling the dividend commitments and the commitment that controlling shareholders give assets to listed companies through stake transactions have significant impact on accruals quality of listed companies. The main reason is that the controlling shareholder and outside shareholders of the listed companies have the same interest and enhancing the quality of listed companies becomes their common choice. This paper also finds that there exists a U-shaped relationship between the controlling shareholders’ ownership and accruals quality. When controlling shareholders’ equity ratio is about 40% -45%, accruals quality is at its’ minimum level. It means that during the time of the post-dual-class shares system, there exists bottom traps between the controlling shareholders’ equity ratio and earnings quality, and the decrease or increase of shares should be based on the prevention of the quality deterioration. 3.　During the time of the post-dual-class shares system, the controlling shareholders have access to circulation, which causes the controlling shareholder and other major shareholders of listed companies to sell and purchase shares from the capital market. This paper studies how the change of the controlling shareholders’ shares impacts on accruals quality. This paper finds that the controlling shareholder purchasing shares has no significant impact on accruals quality, which means the shares increase is makeshift and does not signal that purchasing shares improves the companies’ accruals quality. The controlling shareholder selling shares also has no significant impact on accruals quality, which means the decrease of shares is a short-term lucrative target and does not signal that selling shares depresses the companies’ accruals quality. The paper also finds the purchasing shares sample have high accruals quality, which means accruals quality of the companies that the controlling shareholder purchases shares from the capital market is high originally and accruals quality of the companies that the controlling shareholder sells shares from the capital market is low originally. Outside investors should not be concerned about the share increase or reduction of controlling shareholders. Instead, they should research whether their holding shares have investing value and insist on the value investments and long-term investments. Don’t have speculative acts. The study finds that the controlling shareholders’ "new" acts or behavior affects the listed companies’ accruals quality. All the findings are helpful in understanding the change of the controlling shareholders’ behavior and acts, and in finding institutional reasons that affect earnings quality. They also have some implications for supervision and regulation behaviors of authorities, investment strategies of investors, and decision-making of other stakeholders.
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