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论文编号：	5199
作者编号：	2120112401
上传时间：	2013/6/5 11:47:24
中文题目：	IPO盈余管理、机构投资者识别关注与新股定价——来自中国IPO市场第三轮市场化发行改革后的证据
英文题目：	IPO Earnings Management, Recognition Ability and Concern of Institutional Investor and IPO Pricing: Evidence from after the Third Round Market-oriented Reform of China’s IPO Market
指导老师：	周宝源
中文关键字：	IPO应计盈余管理;IPO真实盈余管理;机构投资者;新股定价
英文关键字：	IPO Accrual Basis Earnings Management; Real Activity Earnings Management;Institutional Investor;IPO Pricing
中文摘要：	新股发行体制特别是股票定价制度不仅关系到发行人、投资者、中介机构等各市场主体的切身利益，而且也关系到资源的配置效率，历来是我国证券市场改革的重点。2009年6月A股启动了第三轮新股发行定价体制改革，全面放松了对于发行市盈率的影子控制，出现了“三高”发行的现象。为了抑制“三高”发行现象，2012年5月份新一轮新股发行体制改革措施推出，规定新股定价参考同行业上市公司平均市盈率，高于25%需说明，似乎回到了对于发行市盈率的影子控制的老路上。 本文以2009年6月至2012年5月初的IPO公司为样本，通过检验IPO公司盈余管理对参与网下询价、认购的机构投资者对IPO公司的认可度的影响，研究机构投资者对于IPO盈余管理的识别能力，进而从会计信息视角考察A股一级市场在没有发行市盈率控制的背景下的定价效率。 研究过程中，本文创新性地提出在中国特殊的制度背景下以网下中签率指标衡量机构投资者对于IPO公司的认可程度，直接检验机构投资者的IPO盈余管理识别能力和价值判断能力。 研究结果表明在这一期间的IPO公司存在较为普遍的盈余管理行为，既包括应计盈余管理，也存在真实盈余管理。对于IPO公司的盈余管理行为，参与网下询价、认购的机构投资者总体上可以进行有效的识别并在报价时对IPO公司的盈余管理信息加以利用，IPO公司的盈余管理行为总体上降低了机构投资者的认可度。值得注意的一点是相对于应计盈余管理，参与网下询价认购的机构投资者更加关注IPO公司的真实盈余管理行为。 但机构投资者对于IPO公司发行前盈余管理行为的关注度受到新股发行政策的影响。总体而言，第三轮新股发行体制改革第二阶段措施推出之后，伴随着投资风险的提高，询价机构对于IPO公司盈余管理行为的关注度提高。 本文的研究结论为后续的证券市场改革提供了理论依据。监管机构通过放松管制、加大新股供应，给予投行自由配售权等市场化手段有效抑制新股“三高”发行现象、提高资源配置效率是可行的。
英文摘要：	The IPO system especially the stock pricing mechanism in IPO is not only related to the vital interests of issuers, investors, intermediaries and other market players, but also related to the efficiency of resource allocation. It has always been the focus of the reform of China's securities market. In June 2009, the third round of IPO issuing and pricing reform started. It fully relaxed the shadow control of issue price and as a result, the "three high issue" phenomenon came back to China’s stock market. In order to suppress the “three high issue” phenomenon, in May 2012 a new round of IPO system reform launched, one measure of which formulates that IPO pricing should refer to the average PE ratio of listed companies of the same industry. More explanation should be given by the issuing company and its lead underwriter if the issuing PE ratio is higher than the 125% of the industry average. It seems that the regulators have returned to the old way. This paper observes IPO samples from June 2009 to early May 2012 and studies institutional investors’ ability to detect IPO earnings management and IPO pricing efficiency in the context of no shadow control of issue price from the accounting information viewpoint by inspecting the influence of IPO earnings management on the recognition of institutional investors taking part in the offline distribution. During the research, this paper innovatively put forward off-line DTOR as the measuring index of recognition of institutional investors for IPO companies considering the special institutional background of China’s stock market so that we can examine IPO earnings management detecting skills and value judgment ability of institutional investors directly. The result shows that during this period IPO companies carried out a lot of earnings management in year before IPO, both accrual basis earnings management and real activity earnings management. As for the earnings management, institutional investors taking part in the offline distribution generally can identify it and make use of it in their investing decision. The earnings management of IPO companies lowers the recognition of institutional investors for the stock as a whole. One thing to note is that institutional investors seem pay more attention to real activity earnings management than accrual basis earnings management. But institutional investors’ concern for earnings management of IPO companies is influenced by the IPO system. Generally, after the reform of May 2012, institutional investors pay closer attention to earnings management of IPO companies. The conclusion provides theoretical grounds for subsequent stock market reform. It suggests that it is feasible to suppress the “three high issue” phenomenon and improve the efficiency of resource allocation of capital market by releasing regulation, increasing supply of new stock and empowering investment banks freedom of new share distribution.
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