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论文编号：	5017
作者编号：	2220100811
上传时间：	2013/2/27 10:19:53
中文题目：	基于EVA的青安公司薪酬激励机制研究
英文题目：	The research of internal performance evaluation and incentive of the state-owned enterprise based on the EVATake QA company as an example
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	经济增加值（ EVA） 业绩评价 薪酬激励
英文关键字：	economic value added (EVA) performance evaluation salary incentive
中文摘要：	由于委托代理关系的存在，企业的所有者和经营者之间不可避免地会存在利益冲突，因此必须建立一种有效的业绩评价和薪酬激励机制，促使经营者和所有者的利益趋于一致。但是，从目前企业的业绩评价现状来看，大部分企业缺乏一套科学有效的业绩评价机制，企业实际的业绩评价过程基本上会受到经营者的操控，导致企业的绩效往往会与经营者的薪酬脱钩甚至背道而驰。另外，传统的业绩考核指标对经营者缺乏资本成本的约束，从而难以有效解决经营者自身效用最大化和股东利益最大化之间的矛盾。鉴于此，本文在分析传统激励制度缺陷的基础上，提出了以经济增加值（EVA）为核心的业绩评价及薪酬激励机制，该评价指标考虑了投资者投入资本的成本，可以促使经营者与所有者的利益相趋同。本文以国企青安公司为例，分析了该企业内部经营者业绩评价及激励制度，剖析了企业现行的内部考核激励机制的缺陷，讨论了对该企业运用EVA的现实意义，并通过企业的实际历史资料，具体计算了青安公司下属A公司历年的EVA指标值，通过与传统财务指标的对比发现EVA业绩评价指标可以更早、更真实地反映企业的经营业绩。另外，基于此，本文进一步计算了A公司经营者按照EVA奖金计划可以获得的奖金，这种将经营者的经营业绩与其薪酬直接挂钩的奖励计划，可以促使经营者注重价值创造，从而有利于企业的长期发展。
英文摘要：	Because of the existence of the principal-agent relationship, conflicts of interest will inevitably exist in owners and operators. So, it’s necessary to build a kind of effective performance evaluation and incentive mechanism to converge the interest of the owner and the operator. But, in term of the present performance evaluation, most enterprises lack of a scientific and effective performance evaluation mechanism, and the process of the enterprise actual performance evaluation will be essentially handled by the operator, leading to the performance of the enterprise often decouples with the operator’s salary and even run in opposite directions. Besides, traditional performance assessment indicators lack of capital cost constraints and then it’s difficult to effectively solve the problem of the conflict between the operator’s own effectiveness maximization and the shareholder’s interest. For this, based on the analysis of the defects of traditional incentive system, the article put forward the economic value added (EVA) as the core of performance evaluation and salary incentive mechanism. This evaluation indicator considers the cost of capital investment, allowing the benefits between owner and operator to be convergence. This paper mainly takes the state-owned enterprise QA company as an example, and it mainly contains the following four aspects. Firstly, it analyzes the enterprise present internal performance evaluation、incentive system and it’s defects; Secondly, it discusses the practical significance of the enterprise to use the EVA . Thirdly according to the enterprise’s actual historical material ,it then specifically calculates the subordinate company A’s EVA. Through comparing with the traditional performance evaluation indicators, the paper finds that the EVA performance evaluation is much earlier and more truthfully indicate the enterprise’s true operating performance than the traditional one.; Finally, based on the EVA result, the paper further calculates the A company operator’s bonus in accordance with the EVA bonus plan, which will directly connect the operator’s operating performance to their salary, so the operator has to pay attention to the value creation and this will be benefit to the long-term development of the enterprise.
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