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论文编号：	494
作者编号：	043106
上传时间：	2009/1/6 16:27:42
中文题目：	中国上市公司寻租行为研究
英文题目：	A study on rent-seeking activi
指导老师：	齐寅峰
中文关键字：	寻租，资本市场，公司金融，上市
英文关键字：	rent-seeking capital market
中文摘要：	本世纪初，随着美国网络泡沫经济的膨胀与破灭，以能源公司安然（Enron）、电信运营商世界通讯（World.com）以及复印机制造商施乐（Xerox）为代表的一系列公司财务丑闻震惊了全世界。从此，寻租这样一个原本属于政治经济学范畴的概念被逐渐纳入到财务金融学的研究之中。近年来，国际顶尖经济金融类学术期刊关于公司寻租方面的论文不断涌现，以最近五年的《金融经济学》（Journal of Financial Economics）为例，每年皆有一篇直接以政治寻租为标题的学术论文刊发。 近十多年，虽然我国的渐进式经济体制改革取得了初步成功，但是也应该注意到中国渐进式改革所付出的代价以及所面临的问题——分阶段的渐进式改革及其新旧体制的摩擦和矛盾为各种权钱交易、腐败之类的公司寻租活动留下了体制性空间。然而，当前国内财务金融学术界针对公司寻租的研究较少，尤其是理论研究更少。因此，我国制度背景下的公司寻租行为研究是一个非常值得探讨的课题。 本文采用“理论推理”和“实证分析”相结合的方法，研究了中国特有背景下上市公司的寻租行为，本文研究的主要内容及创新包括： 1. 本文首次系统、深入、全面地梳理了中国上市公司在资本市场中寻租行为的具体表现形式，并且辅以实际案例分析，详细解答了中国上市公司为什么寻租以及谁是寻租的受益主体。 基于我国资本市场曾经发生过的实际案例，本文对我国上市公司各类寻租行为的具体表现形式进行归纳总结：（1）上市公司股票市场的寻租行为主要表现为：发行市场上的股份公司为获取上市资格的寻租行为、上市公司获取权益再融资资格的寻租行为、股份公司买“壳”上市的寻租行为、上市公司股票发行定价的寻租行为；流通市场上的上市公司自我炒作本公司股票的寻租行为、上市公司合谋流通市场庄家操纵股价的寻租行为等；（2）上市公司信贷市场的寻租行为主要表现为：上市公司违规担保、上市公司信贷资金进入股市和房地产市场等。 在此基础上，本文解析了上市公司寻租行为产生的原因，概括为以下五点：政府的过度干预、上市公司主体的性质、市场监管体系缺乏有效运作、流通市场中投机者的干扰以及中介机构的合谋。而我国上市公司高管既是企业最重要的利益相关者之一，也是企业控制权的实际拥有者，其所处的内外部环境以及市场制度安排促使公司高管既具备寻租的动机，同时又具备寻租的能力，成为我国资本市场中寻租的主要受益者。 2. 本文首次直接将政府制度安排作为公司寻租决策的内生变量纳入研究范式，构建经济学图解模型解释了政府主导制度变迁下的上市公司寻租行为演化路径，并且结合动态演化博弈模型进一步分析了政府主导制度变迁下的上市公司寻租策略决策过程，该方法论的运用具有原创性。 在系统整理以往研究成果的基础上，笔者构建经济学图解模型与动态演化博弈模型，直接将政府制度安排作为上市公司寻租决策的重要影响因素纳入研究范式。此前公司财务学者们也研究政府，研究政府干预对公司寻租的影响，但那只是将政府及其行为作为一个外生变量纳入经济模型之中；而本文直接把政府干预作为内生变量纳入研究框架并着重考察政府与公司之间的互动过程。 基于上述研究思路，本文提出了经济学图解模型来诠释政府主导制度变迁下的上市公司寻租行为演化路径，结果发现：在政府主导资本市场制度建设的初期，市场规模的发展壮大会创造出更多的租金，上市公司通过寻租活动可以获得更多的收益；但是，只要长期不懈地坚持资本市场制度建设，即使随着资本市场规模不断壮大，公司寻租的净收益达到最高临界值之后便开始下降，并且租金总体规模呈现萎缩直至消失。接着，笔者采用演化博弈的方法论证实了上述观点，即随着资本市场制度安排的逐步规范和完善，有效的市场监管体系通过不断加大打击和查处上市公司寻租的力度，致使寻租成为一种较次的策略而被抑制直至消失。由此促进了上市公司逐渐迈入正常生产经营的轨迹。 3. 本文首次设置了上市地点、规制产业、国有产权、政治背景、上市时间、人均GDP、财政赤字、公司规模共八组控制变量，细致地检验了上市公司因寻租而遭到查处对其公司治理结构的影响，追溯公司治理结构演变背后的本质原因，进而有力地填补了该方面研究的缺乏。 在系统整理国内外学者研究成果的基础上，笔者发现大多数公司财务学者所关注和研究的是，当公司具备寻租能力的时候，这种能力与公司治理结构之间的关系。很少有学者研究，当公司因寻租被查处之后，这对公司治理结构又会产生什么影响？本文通过设置上市地点等八组控制变量，细致深入地解析了上述问题，研究发现：就整体而言，寻租事件查处前后，事件公司高管人数没有表现出显著变化，而事件公司高管的持股比例却有显著下降，其事后持股比例不及事前持股比例的一半。在控制变量方面，规制产业组与未规制产业组在查处前后公司高管持股比例的变化上出现显著差异，规制产业组上市公司的高管持股比例波动幅度明显弱于未规制产业组上市公司的高管持股比例波动幅度；而其他控制变量组均未出现显著性差异。在股权结构方面，事件公司因寻租而遭受查处之后，公司前五大股东持股比例之和显著地提高，但是其第一大股东的持股比例反而显著地下降。这意味着，随着监管部门的查处，事件公司第二至第五大股东持股比例提高，其监督和制衡第一大股东的实力有所增强，公司治理结构确实有所改善。 4. 本文首次从公司金融的角度研究了我国政府职能部门治理上市公司寻租的微观经济绩效，纵向对比了寻租公司遭受处罚前后的财务表现，横向对比了寻租公司与未寻租公司的财务绩效差异，由此深入地探索了治理寻租的微观传导机制。 由于寻租理论起源于公共选择选派，目前较为广泛地应用于公共选择学、国际贸易学、政府经济学等宏观经济学分支；因此传统的治理寻租研究一般侧重于经济整体的均衡分析，较为忽视微观经济基础。而本文通过收集和整理1994-2007 年我国政府职能部门对寻租上市公司进行查处的相关信息和数据，从公司金融学的角度探索治理寻租的微观传导机制，这是本文的又一个创新。研究发现：（1）通过对比寻租公司遭受处罚前后的财务表现，就整体而言，事件公司因寻租而遭受查处之后，其盈利能力显著衰退，生产能力虽有好转但不显著，长期负债比率显著下降而财务杠杆反而显著提高，公司雇员人数显著减少并且人均主营业务收入显著增长。在控制变量方面，上市地点的差异并未导致寻租查处前后深沪两市上市公司在财务绩效变化上的显著差异；相对于规制产业中的寻租上市公司，监管部门的查处对处于未规制产业中的寻租上市公司更为有效；另外，监管部门并非仅查处大公司的寻租行为或者只打击小公司的寻租行为，而是一视同仁。（2）通过进一步比较寻租公司与未寻租公司的财务绩效，笔者发现：在控制公司股权结构、财务杠杆、市净率、公司规模以及规制产业这些与公司绩效有关的统计指标之后，不论地区人均GDP 和财政赤字如何，寻租行为的查处对上市公司绩效均起到显著地消极影响。
英文摘要：	With the expansion and explosion of the network economic bubbles in the U.S in the early 21st century, financial scandals in corporate finance and accounting among world-famous companies like Enron, World.com, Xerox, Dynergy, Microsoft and Tyco International astonished the world. From then, rent-seeking, a terminology in political economics was adopted and studied gradually in corporate finance. During recent years, papers about rent-seeking were published in top economics and finance academic journals. For example, in the most recent five years, there has been at least one paper directly titled with the phrase political rent-seeking each year in Journal of Financial Economics. In the last decade, the gradual reform in the economic system has been initially successful in China. However, it deserves to be noticed that the cost of gradual reform on a step by step basis, that is, the friction and contradiction between the old and the new system has left systematic existing spaces for corporate rent-seeking activities, such as corruption. But there are few studies on rent-seeking among China's finance academy, especially theoretical studies. Thus, it became a topic deserving study in depth. This paper studies the rent-seeking activities among listed companies under the particular background in China, based on the combination of the theoretical and empirical study. The major contents and contributions are as follows: 1. This paper analyzes systematically, in depth, and thoroughly, the forms of the rent-seeking activities of China’s listed companies, with practical case studies as supplement. By doing so, the paper gives the answer to the following questions. Why do China’s listed companies conduct rent-seeking, and who benefits from the activity? Based on real cases in China’s capital market, this paper summarizes the forms of rent-seeking as follows: (1) forms of rent-seeking activities of listed companies in the stock market: rent-seeking of companies for qualification to go public or reissue shares, rent-seeking of the companies for buying a “shell”, rent-seeking for share pricing, rent-seeking of companies in buying and selling their own shares, and rent-seeking of companies which manipulate the share price with financial agency. (2) Forms of rent seeking of listed companies in the credit market: warranty of listed companies against regulations, investment of credit capital in the stock market and real estate. According to the above analysis, this paper proposes the reasons of rent-seeking activities of listed companies as follows: excessive interference of government, ownership structure of listed companies, inefficient operation of supervisory system, investors’ obstruction in the secondary market and collusion with financial intermediaries. The top management of listed companies is not only one of the most important stakeholders, but also the real controller of their companies. The institutional arrangement and context lead to the top management of listed companies possessing the ability and motivation of rent-seeking for them, so they are the main beneficiary. 2. For the first time, this paper discusses directly the government interference as an endogenous variable in the study frame, constructs an economic graphic model to explain the evolving path of the listed companies in a government dominated finance system, and then adopts an evolving game theoretical model to further analyze the rent-seeking decision of listed companies. In the theoretical study section, this paper analyzes the institutional arrangement as one of the major factors in corporate rent-seeking decisions. Though scholars studied the government interference and its influence on corporate finance, however, their studies incorporated the government and its activities in their economics model only as an exogenous variable. In this paper, government interference is discussed as an endogenous variable in the study frame. An economics graphic model is proposed to explain the evolving path of the listed companies in a government dominated finance system. The result is that the development of financial market creates more economic rents in the early stage of the government dominated financial market; thus the listed companies can obtain more net income from the rent-seeking activities. However, if the government keeps improving the financial market regulation, even while the development of the financial market is going on, net income from companies’ rent-seeking activities decreases after it reaches its critical peak. The whole scale of the rent shrinks gradually and finally disappears in this way. Then, the paper proves the above points using evolving game theory. With constant normalization and improvement of the financial market regulation, effective financial market supervision system makes rent-seeking an inferior strategy. Thus, the listed companies enter into a normal running track. 3. This paper sets up listed location, regulated industry, state-ownership, political relation, GDP per capita, financial deficit, corporate size as control variables to test the influence of financial punishment on corporate governance structure, and seeks the reasons for corporate governance structure changes. In this way, it extends the literature on corporate governance and rent seeking. The majority of corporate finance scholars focus their study on the relationship between the rent-seeking capability and the corporate governance structure, when the company has the capability. Very few scholars study the impact on the corporate governance structure after the company is punished for rent-seeking. The present paper investigates this impact. The result is that the top management size of the related companies does not change much after the punishment. But the portion of top management who holds shares decreases obviously. The share holder portion after the punishment is less than half of that before the punishment. In the control variables, there is a significant difference in the share holder portion between regulated and non-regulated industry. The share holder portion change in the regulated industry is much less than that of the non-regulated industry. In ownership structure, the share portion of the top five shareholders increases after the punishment for rent seeking. However, the portion of the largest shareholder decreases. It indicates that the share portion of the following top four shareholders increase after the punishment, and their strength of supervision and balance to the largest shareholder have improved. Thus the corporate governance structure has improved. 4. The paper compares the changes of listed companies’ financial characteristics before and after the punishment due to rent-seeking activities, and compares the difference between listed companies with rent-seeking and non-rent-seeking from the viewpoint of corporate finance. In this way, this paper originally investigates the micro impact of rent-seeking regulation transmission mechanism. Traditional study about rent-seeking focuses on equilibrium analysis of the economics as a whole, neglecting the micro economics basics. From the viewpoint of corporate finance, this paper compares the changes of listed companies’ financial characteristics before and after the punishment because of rent-seeking activities, by collecting related punishment information and arranging data from the securities regulatory commission from 1994 to 2007. Then, the performance of the rent-seeking and non-rent-seeking listed companies is compared, using the non-rent-seeking public companies as the reference. From there, the micro impact of the rent-seeking regulation transmission mechanism is explored. This is another innovation of this paper. The study found that, as a whole, after being punished, the companies’ profitability decreased. Their output changes improved, but not significantly. The long-term debt-to-equity ratio lowered, but their total debt-to-asset ratio increased. The number of their employees decreased. And, prime operating revenue per employee increased. In control variables, the financial performance of the listed companies from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange, before and after being punished, does not differ greatly. Compared with the rent-seeking listed companies in the regulated industry, the punishment of the listed companies in the non-regulated industry is more effective. The securities regulatory commissions treated the listed companies, small or large, in the same way. By comparing the performance of the rent-seeking and non-rent-seeking companies, the paper finds that the punishment of rent-seeking activities of the listed companies had significant negative impacts, no matter the size of GDP per capita and financial deficit, after controlling the financial indicators relating with the corporate performance, like ownership structure, financial leverage, market-to-book ratio, corporate size, and the regulatory industry.
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