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论文编号：	487
作者编号：	1120050769
上传时间：	2009/1/6 16:00:40
中文题目：	公司治理参与视角下股东投票出席
英文题目：	Research on Shareholder Voting
指导老师：	唐方方
中文关键字：	公司治理，股东投票，投票出席率
英文关键字：	Corporate Governance Sharehol
中文摘要：	本文以公司治理参与导向下的股东出席率为研究对象，通过借鉴政治投票文献对投票出席率影响因素的研究结果与方法，以股权分置改革投票表决为例实证研究了上市公司股东策略出席行为。进一步，借助于实验室研究方法，针对序贯投票机制下的投票，就投票成本、组间规模、团体利益冲突与投票时序各因素对投票出席率的影响进行了实验研究。旨在希望在实证与实验研究股东投票出席行为（率）的基础上为公司治理投票机制的优化设计提供政策建议与理论支持。尽管目前绝大多数投票行为研究文献针对的是政治领域中公民的投票出席行为，但其研究结果为探讨商业委员会投票特别是股东投票出席行为提供了可供借鉴的理论依据与研究框架。因此，通过与一般性政治投票出席影响因素对比以发现公司治理相关投票中股东出席行为特征，是一条便捷且可行的技术路线。 无论是已有的政治经济学投票研究文献还是本文的研究结论都表明：投票出席率受到多种因素的影响，且各因素之间存在相互作用。对投票出席率影响因素的系统分析是甄别投票机制是否有效的一个重要指标。有鉴于此，本文系统地、实证与实验相结合地勾画出了公司治理参与导向下股东出席行为的影响因素与传导机制，并在此基础上对公司治理投票最优机制的设计提供政策建议与理论支持。本文第二章首先系统的介绍了理性选择框架下的投票出席行为研究，并对投票出席影响因素相关研究进行了分类整理，为后续章节的实证分析与实验设计提供理论支持。 最优投票机制的设计有赖于对投票参与人偏好类型特征、投票成本、利益团体之间的矛盾冲突与竞争及投票信息的分布状态等因素的识别。在此基础上结合投票时序：同时投票还是序贯投票；投票结果的计算：相对多数还是绝对多数、赢家通吃还是比例代表制、投票权是否可转移等技术细节的应用条件，是设计公司治理投票最优机制的必然要求与不可逾越的理论探讨。对于目前上市公司投票的一项主要制度：累积投票制度，本文通过借鉴一般性政治投票机制，结合公司治理目的及其利益主体特性对其进行改进。本文第三章分别从两个方面提出两种改进方案：可转移的累积投票（transferable cumulative voting）与贮存式投票（storable voting）。 本文第四章以股权分置改革分类表决为例，实证研究了上市公司股东策略出席行为。股权分置改革分类表决过程中，投票人之间的利益冲突、投票机制与程序的设计、投票成本都会对参与人出席投票决策产生影响。以此为研究样本有助于分析这些影响因素及其传导机制如何影响股东投票行为。尽管网络投票手段的采用大大降低了股东参与投票的成本，然而，通过对1200余家上市公司股权分置改革投票表决数据的跟踪整理，仍然发现存在大量的流通股股东选择不出席投票（64.81%的流通股股东选择了不出席）。而且，与流通股较低出席率相伴生的是很高的赞成率，流通A股赞成票数占本次流通A股有效表决票数比例平均为88.26%。这一章试图回答：什么原因导致高通过率（赞成率）与低参与率同时存在？较低的出席率是否会导致少数派独裁，未参与投票的众多中小股东是否选择的是策略性弃权？对中国上市公司股权分置改革分类投票表决的实证研究充分体现了认识并掌握影响投票出席率的因素的必要性，而序贯投票机制下的异质偏好人出席率的实验研究则充分体现了在既定投票机制下，各影响因素如何发挥作用。 为进一步深入研究类似股权分置改革分类投票表决中投票时序、不同类型利益主体、投票成本与偏好差异对投票出席率的影响，本文在理论模型构建的基础上通过实验室实验研究了有成本序贯投票机制下参与人的策略出席行为。第六章重点是在不同组间规模、不同偏好状态分布以及不同投票成本下，通过实验分析早晚投票人的策略性出席问题，进而探讨其投票优势的来源及其如何随上述因素动态变化。实验结果表明：早晚投票组的组间规模差异对早晚投票人的出席决策具有重要的影响；具体的，当早投票人数少于晚投票人数时，早投票人倾向于选择免费搭车策略性弃权，反之亦反；投票人之间的利益冲突和竞争态势越激烈，出席率越高，但竞争态势对早晚投票人出席率的影响因投票成本差异而有不同；偏好距是影响参与人出席的另一个重要因素且偏好距越大，参与人出席投票的动机越强，即那些具有极端偏好的投票人更容易出席投票。此外，投票成本与偏好距的影响具有交叉性，投票成本对出席率的作用被偏好距的影响部分的弱化。 基于实证（第四章）与实验（第六章）研究结论，本文认为在股东投票或董事会成员选举中，如果客观存在部分人对提案或候选人质量缺乏了解，应该存在序贯机制使其能够选择晚投票。因为那些对提案（或候选人）质量缺乏了解的人，晚投票有助于收集相关提案信息并做出科学的决策，这种机制实际上起到了强制早投票人披露信息的作用。此外，对于那些有激励成为多数派一员的参与人而言，晚投票能降低不确定性并帮助使其实现这一目的。是否需要加入序贯要素，取决于在投票之初投票人之间的信息分布是否存在严重的不均衡和投票人在风险承受能力上是否存在差异显著。 在实验室中对投票问题的研究并不局限于投票问题本身（投票机制与投票行为），一个重要的有意义的扩展是：将公司治理各利益主体的特征向量，包括：不同选择下的收益、成本、信息结构、参与人之间的利益交叉点（博弈模型分析起点）与决策约束条件，然后通过是否选择投票（表达偏好）来揭示各利益主体就某一特定问题（抽象为一个提案）上的决策及其期望形成过程。例如，在投票框架下研究独立董事的行为中，需要将独立董事的利益属性刻画出来：它的利益来源、不同选择下的成本与收益、其声誉的折现、外部监督的势力与可获得信息等因素。在这一设计下将各因素抽象为一个具体的提案，通过观测其是否出席、具体的投票决策（赞成还是反对）以甄别影响其行为的主要因素。更进一步，通过不断的修改上述变量以发掘出更有利于独立董事发挥作用的一系列制度安排。
英文摘要：	Based on the results and methodology of political voting on factors of voting turnout behavior and with the example of Chinese Share Segregation Reform, shareholder voting turnout behavior under the perspective of participation in corporate governance was examined in this paper. Further, several main factors including voting costs, group sizes, conflicts of group interests and sequences were analyzed under the setting of the Board in laboratory to provide theoretical and political suggestions. A shortcut and available route on this issue is to make comparison with general political voting to find the profiles of shareholders’ turnout behavior concerned with corporate governance voting. Most of voting literatures on turnout focus on citizen voting behavior; however those results do really provide strong supports to explain, to understand and analyze business council voting or election. Most of political literatures and the results of this paper show that there exit many factors on voting turnout and there exit several kind of relationship between those factors. Systematical reviews, empirical and experimental study are included in this paper to draw the outline of mechanism and interaction among factors on shareholder voting turnout behavior under the perspective of participation in corporate governance. Based on those fundamental works and combined with the voting sequence, voting calculation, transferable and non-transferable voting method to explore best corporate governance voting mechanisms designs. For one of the fundamental voting mechanisms in Chinese publicly listed companies—cumulative voting, we make an improvement based on research of political voting methods and results and propose two betterments: transferablely cumulative voting and storable voting in Chapter III. Share Segregation Reform is the biggest and the most profound commerce voting in China. It is an approach taken by the Chinese government to enable the non-tradable shares to be traded on the stock exchanges. The separation of equity ownership and trading rights has caused conflicts between holders of non-tradable and tradable shares. The Reform is to settle the issue of the balance of interests among concerned shareholders of the A-share market. The concerned shareholders of the A-share market may, with reference to the procedure of shareholders' general meeting, convene a meeting and vote on proposals which are subject to a supermajority requirement by categories. Shareholders of the A-share can choose vote on the spot or through web. The Share Segregation Reform provides a vivid example for our study of shareholders’ voting behavior. There are 1210 listed companies have finished the voting on proposals of Share Segregation Reform till 8th May, 2007. All of the proposals are accepted with higher pass rates (97.83%) except 26 listed companies whose proposals were rejected by holders of tradable shares. On average, 88.26% of tradable shares voted in favor which is defined as a proportion of the shares voted, including the abstentions, 31.65% of tradable shares in all the shares voted participated voting through web, and 3.54% of tradable shares in all the shares voted participated voting on the spot. Apparently, the applied web voting strictly decrease the voting costs for all holders of A-shares and a much higher of turnout should be observed. However, more than half of tradable shares（64.81%）abstain. Why this happened and why high pass rate and low turnout rate coexist during the reform? Those are the questions we want to examine. In chapter IV, we investigate the factors which have effects on behavior of small shareholders and try to explain why high pass rate and low turnout rate coexist during the process of Equity Segregation Reform of the Publicly Listed Company. The empirical results show that pass rate positively correlates with the density of circulating equity, average share of voter on web and non-circulating equity; The turnout rate increases with the density of circulating equity, the average share of voter on web, and decreases with the ongoing process of Equity Segregation Reform. The coexistence of high pass rate and low turnout implies that massive current small shareholders abstain strategically. In chapter VI, shareholders’ Strategic behavior was examined in sequential voting with diverse preferences where voter’s payoff depend on his/her preference parameter and voters are separated into different size of earlier and later groups. The experimental results show that the differential of earlier and later voting group sizes has a strong impact upon the turnout of earlier and later voters. More than that, the results also illustrate that when the size of earlier group is smaller than that of later group, the earlier voters tend to choose abstention, and vice versa. The more conflicts and competition between electors, the higher turnout rates can be seen. However, this effect varies across different voting costs. Another factor is preference distance which measures the strength of individual preference. The bigger the preference distance is, the stronger motivation the voter has, and that is, the voters who bear extreme preference choose to show up frequently. Moreover, an interaction effect can be found between factor of voting cost and preference distance, the impact of voting cost on turnout is diluted by preference distance. We mainly focus on group sizes, distribution of preference and different voting costs to deter the advantage of earlier voters and later voters. Based on the empirical and experimental results, this paper argues that sequential mechanism should be encouraged if there exit some uninformed participants in voting and election. For those who lack of information related to the quality of proposals or candidates, voting later can help them to collect information and make decision. More than that, for those who have strong incentive to be member of majority, the sequential voting mechanism can help them to fulfill. The sequential mechanism should be included in corporate governance voting upon whether there exit high unbalanced information before vote and whether the ability of risk tolerance are significantly differ among voters. Voting study in laboratory should not only include voting mechanism and voting behavior. One important and meaningful extending is to incorporate the information structures, preference differences and conflicts of participants in corporate governance into voting context to disclose behavioral characteristics of voters under specific restrict. For example, to examine the behavior strategy of independent directors under voting paradigm, the first important thing is to depict the interest profile of independent directors, including the origin of benefit from, cost and benefit under different choices, discount rate of its reputation, and influence of outside supervisory, etc. Under voting paradigm, one can abstract all those elements into a specific proposal to observe whether they would choose to turn out, what choices they would select (Yes or No) to find all the factors which have impacts on voting turnout. More important, one can revise those parameters step by step to produce new treatments to design a better mechanism on how to make the independent directors more independent.
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