联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	4533
作者编号：	1120080733
上传时间：	2012/6/14 15:37:48
中文题目：	政治关联对中国民营企业融资能力影响研究
英文题目：	The Study on the Impact on Financing Capacity of Chinese POEs from Political Connection
指导老师：	李莉
中文关键字：	中国民营企业 政治关联 融资约束 市场进入
英文关键字：	Chinese POEs; political connection; financial constraint; market entrance
中文摘要：	民营企业已成为推动中国经济发展的重要动力，但在无形政治壁垒的阻碍下，我国民营企业融资难题仍未得到根本解决。特别是对经营于政府管制行业内和注册于信贷资金分配市场化程度低地区的民营企业来说，政府的行政管制仍是限制其融资能力提升的主要障碍。为能提升融资能力，中国民营企业家积极参政议政，并已形成了一批具有政治背景的民营企业家团队，企业家的政治背景为民营企业带来政治关联。那么，政治关联会对民营企业融资能力产生怎样影响？政治关联对民营企业融资能力影响的内在机制是什么？行业管制和地区差异在上述影响过程中起到怎样的调节作用？这些问题的回答能够解释我国政企关系的内在运作机制，合理提升我国民营企业融资能力，因此具有重要的理论价值和实践意义。本文以我国民营企业为研究对象，分别使用融资约束和长期财务指标来代理民营企业的短期和长期融资能力，应用信息不对称理论和寻租理论，探讨政治关联对民营企业融资能力的影响机理，并考察行业管制和地区差异在上述影响过程中的调节作用。对该课题的研究有助于我国民营企业合理利用政治关联提升融资能力，也有助于政府加强管理，在改善民营企业融资环境的同时避免寻租和腐败。因此，本课题的研究既是一个重大的理论问题，又是我国经济制度改革过程中的实践问题。本文的基本逻辑是政治关联或是通过信息不对称机制，或是通过寻租机制对民营企业融资能力产生影响；且民营企业融资能力有短期和长期之分，短期融资能力可用融资约束代理，而长期融资能力则表现为公司成长性和资本结构的不同；在政治关联对民营企业融资能力影响的过程中行业管制和地区差异起到重要的调节作用。本文共分八章：第一章引言，用来介绍本文研究背景、意义、内容、方法、创新之处，并对本文核心概念做界定；第二章理论文献综述，从政治关联、融资约束和市场进入三个方面进行理论文献综述，找出现有理论研究中的可完善之处，为本文理论创新提供支持；第三章制度背景分析和理论模型构建，以制度经济学为基础，分析伴随着中国制度变迁的民营企业成长历程，结合中国的融资环境，分析中国民营企业政治关联形成机制，并将理论与现实相结合提出本文的理论模型框架；第四章政治关联影响民营企业融资能力的博弈模型分析，分别以信息不对称理论和寻租理论为基础构建政治关联对民营企业融资能力影响博弈模型，分析上述影响的内在机理；第五章政治关联对民营企业融资约束影响实证分析，选择合适变量代理政治关联、融资约束、行业管制、地区差异等核心概念，构建回归模型，并收集整理数据进行实证检验；第六章实证结果稳定性分析，从政治关联、行业管制和地区差异三个核心概念出发，对存在争议的代理变量选取问题作深入讨论，以实证检验的形式验证本文理论的稳定性；第七章政治关联影响民营企业融资能力的长期作用结果，政治关联短期影响的长期积累造成民营企业成长性和资本结构的差异，本章用实证方法对上述差异的显著性作验证；第八章结论与展望，在对全文进行总结的基础上得出主要结论，并总结本文研究不足对未来研究做出展望。本文主要采用了规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法，在规范研究方面主要综述了政治关联理论、融资约束理论和市场进入理论，并在信息不对称理论和寻租理论的基础上构建了政治关联对中国民营企业融资能力影响的博弈模型。在实证研究方面使用了描述性统计、多元回归和逻辑回归等数量分析方法，对本文理论模型进行验证。本文经过研究分析得出主要结论如下：①在中国转型经济的制度背景下，政治因素和民营企业自身因素共同导致了民营企业融资困难。②政治关联可能通过降低信息不对称程度机制和寻租机制对民营企业融资能力产生影响。③从短期作用效果来看，政治关联企业所受融资约束程度较弱。且这种影响受到企业所在行业，所在地区的调节，一般来说，在管制行业内，信贷资源分配市场化程度较低地区经营的民营企业中，政治关联对融资约束的作用效果更明显。④从长期作用效果来看，具有政治关联的民营企业资产成长速度更快，资产负债率更高，且长期负债比率更高。本文的创新之处在于：①将政治因素引入企业投融资分析，构建了一个政治关联对企业融资能力影响的分析框架，从信息不对称和寻租两个视角，运用博弈论模型分析了政治关联对企业融资能力影响的内在逻辑，在一定程度上弥补了学术界在政治关联影响企业资源获取能力问题研究中的理论研究不足；②综合分析了政治关联对企业短期融资约束的影响和这种影响的长期积累效果，丰富了政治关联对民营企业融资能力影响的研究内涵；③基于市场进入理论，分析了由行业管制和地区差异带来的政府管制力量不同，并由此考察了行业管制和地区差异在政治关联影响民营企业融资能力过程中的调节作用，深化了政治关联对民营企业融资能力影响的研究。
英文摘要：	Private owned Enterprises (POEs) have became an important engine to push Chinese economy keep developing, however, with intangible political blocks, the financing trouble for POEs still not be resolved. Especially, for POEs, who are running in regulated industries and registered in area where marketization of credit resource distribution is low, the political regulation still is a main block to forbid POES to get financing resources. For equipped their companies with financial resources, the entrepreneurs attend political event and give suggestion to government actively, and right now there is a strong team who is consisted of entrepreneurs with political background who own POEs, and their political relationships make their POEs become companies with political connection. How political connection influence on financing capacity of POEs? What is the internal mechanism of that influence? And how factors that industrial regulation and regional variation adjust that influence? The answers for questions can not only give reasonable explanation for internal mechanism of relationship between government and POEs, but also give suggestions to POEs for increasing financing capacity reasonable. So there are significances from both theory and practice points of views. In this dissertation POEs are main research objectives, the financial constraint and long term financial variances are proxies for financing capacity , the information asymmetry and rent-seeking theories are employed for exploring internal mechanism of influence on financial capacity from political connection, and adjusting impact on that influence from industrial regulation and regional variation. There are benefits of research to this issue: in one aspect, POEs can take political connection as a measure to increase their financing capacity; in another aspect, government should reinforce management ability to make balance both improving financing environment for POEs and avoiding rent-seeking and corruption. So not only this subject is an important theory issue, but it is a practice issue in progress of Chinese economic reform. The basic logic of this dissertation is that, the political connection impact on financing capacity of POEs through information asymmetry mechanism or rent-seeking mechanism; there are both long term and short term financing capacities of POEs, the short term financing capacity can be proxies by financial constraint, and the long term financing capacity can be proxies by growth rate and capital structure; industrial regulation and regional variation are two important adjusting factors in above influence progress. There are eight chapters in this dissertation: the first chapter is introduction, there are many issues are introduced in this chapter such as research backgrounds, significances, Constance, methods, innovations, core concepts. The second chapter is summarization of theories, the main theories motioned in this dissertation are political connection, financial constraint, and market entrance, and through summarization the theoretical points that can be improved are found. The third chapter is analysis to institutional background and construction of theory model, in this chapter, based on institutional economics, the growth progress of POEs accompanied by institution transaction is discussed, with Chinese financial environment, the embodied mechanism of political connection is analyzed, and then combined theories and practices, the theoretic system of this dissertation is given. The fourth chapter is game model analysis of influence on financial constraint from political connection, in this chapter, both information asymmetry and rent-seeking theories are employed to construct game models which are taken to explain the influence on financial capacity of POEs from political connection. The fifth chapter is empirical study of influence on financial constraint from political connection, in this chapter, the proxies of political connection, financial constraint, industrial regulation and regional variation are selected, then the regression models are build, data are employed for empirical test. The sixth chapter is robust analysis, the controversial core concepts that political connection, industrial regulation and regional variation are discussed deeply, the substituted variables are taken to test the robust of theories proposed in this dissertation. The seventh chapter is the long term effect of political connection to financing capacity of POEs, the accumulation of short term influence leads the discrepancies in growth rate and capital structure aspects, in this chapter, the significant of above discrepancies are empirical tested. The chapter eight is conclusion and prospect, based on summarization of whole dissertation, the conclusions are presented, then the defects are given and prospects are made. Both normative study and empirical study methods are taken: in normative study aspect, the political connection, financial constraint, and market entrance theories are summarized, then based on information asymmetry and rent-seeking theories, the game model that political connection influence to financial capacity of POEs are build. In empirical study aspect, the theories are tested with descriptive statistics, multiple regression and quantitative analysis methods. Through research following conclusions are made: (I) with background of Chinese transition economy, the financing dilemma are leaded by both political factors and self factors of POEs. (II) the mechanisms that political connection impact on financial constraint of POEs are decreasing information asymmetry and rent-seeking. (III) from short term point of view, the financial constraint degree of POEs with political connection is lower, and this influence is adjusted by both industrial regulation and regional variation factors, in generally, the effect will be more significant for POEs running in regulated industries and low level marketization region. (IV) from long term point of view, the growth rate, leverage rate and long term debt rate are higher for political connected POEs. The main innovations are as follow: (I) import political factor in to analysis to investment and financing of POEs; Build analysis frame of political connection to financing capacity of POEs; based on information asymmetry and rent-seeking theories, discuss internal logic of influence from political connection on financial capacity. (II) analyze to both short term impact and long term accumulation result from political connection to financial capacity of POEs, based on that the lineament of influence from political connection to financial capacity is got into shape. (III) based on market entrance theory, analyze the difference of regulation power of government, then analyze the adjusting effect to influence of political connection on financial capacity of POEs from both industrial regulation and regional variance factors.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)