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论文编号：	45
作者编号：	2120051897
上传时间：	2007/6/21 9:52:59
中文题目：	上市公司高管报酬业绩敏感度的影
英文题目：	the research of pay-for-perfor
指导老师：	周宝源
中文关键字：	代理理论 高管报酬 公司治理
英文关键字：	Agency Theory Managerial Comp
中文摘要：	按照代理理论，由于股东和高管之间的信息不对称将会引发高管的道德风险和逆向选择问题，这会产生较高的代理成本。为了解决这一问题，股东就必须对高管进行两类有效的激励：努力增进激励和风险追求激励。而这两类激励的目的都是为了提高报酬业绩敏感度，使公司绩效与高管报酬紧密地结合起来。 为对高管进行有效的激励就必须设计合理的报酬合约，但由于高管行动的不可观察性，根据代理理论，高管报酬合约的制定依据是公司的经营绩效。代理理论同时还预测高管报酬的业绩敏感度与风险呈负向相关关系。 本文通过对中国上市公司的相关数据进行统计分析发现上市公司高管报酬和公司的经营绩效之间存在着较为显著的正向相关关系，这说明上市公司在设计高管报酬时，净利润是很重要的一个依据。 另外，研究结果显示上市公司高管报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间存在着显著的负向相关关系，这符合经典代理理论的预测。在此基础上，本文进一步挖掘高管报酬业绩敏感度的影响因素，研究发现盈余的可靠性，高管持股，股权集中度，公司规模都显著的影响高管报酬业绩敏感度；资产负债率，公司增长机会对高管报酬业绩敏感度有较为显著的影响；高管年龄对报酬业绩敏感度有微弱的影响；而独立董事比率没有对报酬业绩敏感度产生影响。 最后，本文依据相关的研究结果，从公司治理等角度为中国上市公司高管激励提出了一些政策性建议，目的希望上市公司建立完善的高管激励约束机制，产生较为合适的报酬业绩敏感度，从而促进上市公司健康、持续发展。
英文摘要：	According to the agency theory, it is the information asymmetry between shareholder and top management that causes the problem of morality risk and opposite selection which will lead to producing relative high agency cost. In order to solve the problem, shareholder must provide two kinds of effective incentives for the top management: effort-enhancing-incentive and risk-seeding –incentive. Normally this will produce two different kinds of pay-for-performance sensitivity. So in the purpose of realizing the effective incentive, the reasonable incentive contract is becoming more and more important. Shareholder design the contract based the enterprise operating performance. The agency theory predicts that the pay-for-performance sensitivity has negative relation with risk. This thesis find top managerial compensation has positive relation with operating performance based on the statistical analysis of the data about Chinese listed companies. In addition to this, the research find pay-for-performance sensitivity is negatively related with risk which accord with the prediction. This thesis will find other effecting factor of pay-for performance sensitivity of managerial compensation further. The research shows that surplus reliability, shares held by the managerial, concentration extent of equity, firm scale strong effect the pay-for-performance sensitivity. Asset-liability ratio, development opportunity are the relative effecting factors. Age of managerial have small effect on the pay-for-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation, while the dependent director ratio has no effect. Financially, the thesis gives some political suggestions from the aspect of corporate governance and others. The goal is to advise Chinese listed companies to establish perfect monitor-incentive system so as to leading to the high pay-for-performance sensitivity which will promote the development of Chinese listed companies.
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