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论文编号：	4495
作者编号：	1120080751
上传时间：	2012/6/11 23:24:54
中文题目：	中国独立董事的隐性激励机制研究
英文题目：	Implicit Incentive Mechanism of Chinese Independent directors
指导老师：	童道驰
中文关键字：	独立董事；隐性激励；信息成本；声誉；机制设计
英文关键字：	independent director; implicit incentive; information cost; reputation; mechanism design
中文摘要：	独立董事在公司治理中扮演着重要角色，而独立董事作为经济人，在其履行职务时一样需要激励。独立董事的显性激励，很多学者都进行了大量研究，但隐性激励的研究为学者所忽视，相关文献较少。独立董事的隐性激励方式多种多样，本论文着重选择了关系董事、信息成本、声誉三个激励因素进行了研究，其中关系董事为负向激励，能加剧掏空，而低的信息成本和好的声誉则能对独立董事形成正向激励，从而能降低公司的代理成本，增进绩效。在理论分析部分，本论文设计了一个防御监督者合谋的机制，并将上述的三个隐性激励因素，嵌入机制设计的模型进行探讨，从理论上推出隐性激励发挥作用的原因与结论，之后分别予以实证研究。研究的主要发现和结论如下： 1．关系董事的存在会影响独立董事的决策行为如果独立董事和董事长是关系董事，那么这种关系会使得独立董事有激励放弃自己的私人信息或决策方案，而采取与董事长一致的决策，并在群体决策中引发羊群行为，使得其他董事也放弃自己的私人信息，削弱了董事会的独立性，从而使得一些不利于公司发展的决策被通过，能加剧公司的掏空。其他关系董事的存在也会引发的羊群行为，对独立董事产生隐性激励。 2．信息成本对独立董事存在显著的隐性激励作用本论文的研究表明只有在信息成本低的情况下增加独立董事比例才能降低代理成本，增进公司绩效。在信息成本高的公司，独立董事会因为获取信息付出的成本高，而削弱其获取信息的动机。在缺乏足够信息的情况下，独立董事不能较好地履行其监督职能和决策职能。这时，增加独立董事则不能改善公司治理。 3．独立董事声誉在信息成本的调节作用下能影响公司绩效在信息成本高的公司，外部劳务市场难以认知公司绩效变差的真实原因，对独立董事声誉的影响较弱。而在信息成本低的公司，外部劳务市场能较好地观察到独立董事的工作态度和能力，如果公司绩效变差，会对独立董事声誉产生直接影响。因此，只有在信息成本的调节作用下，声誉的隐性激励才能发挥作用。实证结果表明：公司的信息成本越低，且独立董事声誉越好，才能降低公司的代理成本，改善公司绩效。本论文的结构安排如下：第一章绪论部分交待了研究的背景、研究意义和研究方法等，对论文的总体框架体系做了介绍。第二章文献综述部分回顾了独立董事的有关研究，梳理了合谋理论的有关文献，之后从信息成本和声誉的角度回顾了现有独立董事的隐性激励研究，并在最后对有关文献做了总体述评。第三章为理论分析部分。该章首先用博弈模型分析了公司治理变迁的背景。之后，设计出防御独立董事参与合谋的激励机制，并将各种隐性激励因素嵌入激励机制，从理论上推出独立董事隐性激励的效用。实证部分有三章。第四章研究了关系董事对独立董事的隐性激励与掏空。第五章在控制独立董事内生性后，研究了信息成本对独立董事的隐性激励，激励效果的测度采用代理成本和公司绩效两个维度。第六章研究了独立董事声誉的隐性激励，激励效果也采用代理成本和公司绩效，并将信息成本的调节作用纳入了研究。本研究存在的创新如下： 1．本论文沿着Laffont的激励理论，将审计合谋的部分研究纳入统一的研究框架，研究了中国公司治理中的监督者激励问题。本论文设计了委托人主导型和监督者主导型两个合谋防御机制。本论文的机制可以使得委托人能操纵监督者和代理人之间的信息不对称，在满足监督者和代理人参与约束和激励相容的情况下，寻求信息不对称与交易费用之间平衡点，使得博弈各方没有激励去进行合谋。研究为中国公司治理防御监督者合谋提供一些理论上的均衡解。并将关系董事、信息成本和声誉等隐性激励变量代入了机制中的激励相容条件和均衡解，剖析了独立董事隐性激励的作用机理。 2．研究了董事会内的关系董事对独立董事的隐性激励问题，并将群体决策中的羊群行为纳入了研究。关系董事影响掏空的机制为：关系董事影响独立董事的独立性，并通过羊群行为影响其他董事的决策行为，削弱董事会独立性，从而加剧掏空。 3．采用了新的声誉代理变量，并将信息成本对声誉机制的调节作用纳入研究。传统声誉模型关注博弈参与人对未来重复博弈的预期收益，而中国的独立董事有可能更关注其已经拥有的声誉，本文认为以独立董事的总社会兼职数量作为声誉的代理变量更符合中国的实际情况。并在研究中将信息成本引入到独立董事声誉的研究领域，研究了独立董事声誉与信息成本的交互作用对代理成本和公司绩效的影响。
英文摘要：	Independent director plays an important role in corporate governance. As an economic man, independent director needs incentives to work effectively. Many scholars have researched the explicit incentives of independent directors, but the implicit incentives have been ignored by the scholars. There are a few relevant literatures for such topic. There are a variety of ways to realize the implicit incentives of independent directors. This paper mainly studies three implicit factors, which are Guanxi director, information cost, and reputation. The relationship preference is negative incentive, which could exacerbate tunneling. The other two are positive, which can improve the corporate performance. In the part of theoretical analysis, this paper designed a collusion-proof mechanism for supervisors, where the three implicit incentive factors are embedded. From the theoretical analysis, the paper deduces the possible conclusions, which respectively are empirically studied in the following chapters. Main findings and conclusions are as follows: Firstly, the decision-making of independent director is influenced by the pattern of the relationship in the board of directors to increasing tunneling. If there are some kinds of relationships between independent director and the charman of board, the independent director would be motivated by relation to give up their own private information or decisions, then taking consensus decision with the chairman. This will induce the herd behavior in group decision making, which would make the other directors to give up their own private information, and then weaken the independence of the board to make some decisions passed that are not conducive to the development of the company. It will aggravate the tunneling. Other relations may also trigger the herd behavior, which will be implicit incentive for independent directors. Secondly, the cost of information has significant implicit incentive on independent director. The empirical results show that to increase the proportion of independent directors can reduce agency cost and improve corporate performance only in the situation with low information cost. In those companies with high information costs, the costs of obtaining information for the independent directors are high. It will weaken motivation of obtaining information for independent directors to information. In the absence of sufficient information, independent directors can not fulfill the functions of supervision and decision-making. In this case, to increase the number of independent director can not improve corporate governance. Thirdly, the reputation of independent director could improve corporate performance under the regulatory effects of information costs. In a company with high information costs, the external labor market can not recognize the real reason for the decline of performance. It would only influence the reputation of independent director weakly. In a company with low information costs, the external labor market can observe the work attitude and ability of independent directors. If the company performance declines, it would directly impact on the reputation of independent directors. The empirical results show that: the low a company's information costs are, and the better the reputations of independent directors are, the lower the agency costs are and the better the company performance is. The structure of the study is showed as follows: Chapter one makes a review about the research background, research significance and research methods, and introduces the systematic frame. Chapter two is the part of literature review and shows the relevant literature review of the independent directors, the collusion theory, and the existing research of implicit incentives about independent directors from the points of information costs and the reputation. Chapter three is the theoretical part. The chapter analyzes the evolution of corporate governance in china with game theory, designs a collusion-proof mechanism for independent directors, and embeds a variety of implicit incentive factors in the incentive mechanism, then deduces the possible results of implicit incentives. The following three chapters are empirical studies. Chapter four studies the relationship between the implicit incentives of independent directors from the relation preference and tunneling. After controlling the endogeneity of independent directors, chapter five studies the implicit incentives of information costs for independent directors. We use agency cost and performance as dependent variables. Chapter six studies the implicit incentives of reputaion for independent directors. Dependent variables also are agency cost and performance. The regulatory effects of information cost also are researched. The innovations of this study are as follows: Firstly, along the incentive theory created by Laffont, the paper constructs a unified framework by combining with the collusion theory in audit field, by which we design a mechanism to solve the incentive problem of supervisor in Chinese corporate governance. The paper designs a mechanism dominated by principal and a mechanism dominated by supervisor. The mechanisms can make the principal have the ability to monitor the asymmetry of information between the supervisor and the agent, when meeting the participation constraint and incentive compatibility condition. It would find the equilibrium point between asymmetric information and the transaction cost. The supervisor would have no incentive to collude. The research provides an equilibrium point for the game. The paper also puts some implicit incentive variables into the incentive compatibility conditions or equilibrium solutions to analyze the internal mechanism about how the implicit incentives of independent directors act. The implicit incentive variables include relationship, information costs and reputation. Secondly, this paper studies the implicit incentives of Guanxi directors to independent director which come from the relation pattern in boards and also studies the herd behavior in group decision making. The path of relationship effecting tunneling is showed as follow: the relation preference could trigger the herd behavior to affect the independence of the board, and then aggravate tunneling. Thirdly, we use a new proxy variable of the reputation of independent director, and research how information costs affect the reputation of independent director. Future expected returns in repeated games are concerned in the traditional reputation model, while China's independent directors are likely to pay more attention to his existed reputation. So this paper uses the total number of social part-time jobs as a proxy for the reputation of independent director, and introduces the information costs into the study of reputation. We research the correlation between the reputation of independent director and corporate performance. We also research how the interaction between the information costs and the reputation of independent director affects agency cost and corporate performance.
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