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论文编号：	4453
作者编号：	2120102295
上传时间：	2012/6/9 20:05:00
中文题目：	控制权与现金流权偏离对国有上市公司负债融资影响的实证研究
英文题目：	Empirical Study on the Effect of the Separation of Control and Cash Flow Right to Debt of State-owned Listed Company: A Comparison Analysis of before and after Share Reform
指导老师：	王全喜
中文关键字：	股权分置改革，控制权与现金流权偏离，负债融资，国有上市公司
英文关键字：	Share reform, Separation of control and cash flow right, Debt financing, Listed company
中文摘要：	股权分置的问题是中国在发展经济的过程中出现的特有历史问题。我国资本市场成立和发展的初期阶段，股权分置在上市公司转换经营机制、筹集资金、推动经济体制改革等方面起到了重要的作用，但是也带来了一系列的严重问题。2005年开始进行的股权分置改革试图解决这一制度引发的问题。股权分置改革使非流通股能够上市流通，也改变了终极控股股东对于上市公司的持股比例，对终极控制权发生了影响。La Porta等人对终极控制权问题以及终极控制权和现金流权偏离方面作出了重要研究。此后，国内外很多学者纷纷对终极控制权问题做出了深入的研究。终极控股股东通过金字塔持股、交叉持股等方式控制上市公司，可以用较少的现金流获取较大的控制权，容易产生利用控股股东的地位获得超过其现金流权应得利益的超额收益，由此可能发生终极控股股股东侵占上市公司资产，侵害中小股东权益的问题。本文首先回顾了国内外学者对于终极控制权及其与现金流权的偏离对债务融资影响的研究成果，然后回顾了国内对于股权分置改革的相关研究，随后对于论文中的相关概念进行界定。本文的主要研究目的是以实证研究的方式，探讨中国上市公司的终极控股股东的控制权和现金流权偏离对于公司债务融资的影响，并分析这种影响在股权分置改革前后的变化情况。以沪深两市的国有制造业上市公司为样本，经过一定的标准筛选之后保留217家上市公司作为最终样本，收集其2001年至2010年的相关财务数据作为研究对象。通过分析样本上市公司的面板数据，发现在终极控制权逐年下降的同时，与现金流权的偏离程度逐年上升。本文建立模型对控制权和两权偏离程度对债务融资的影响进行了实证研究，发现控制权和现金流权偏离对上市公司的负债融资以及债务期限结构产生了显著影响。为了分析股权分置改革前后，控制权与现金流权的偏离程度对于上市公司债务融资影响的变化情况，将数据样本以股权分置改革为界划分为两个面板数据分别进行回归，发现控制权与现金流权偏离程度对于上市公司的负债融资以及债务期限结构的影响发生了变化。
英文摘要：	Non-tradable shares are a unique history problem of China happened in the process of economic development. In the early stage of the establishment and development of China’s capital market, the non-tradable shares had played an important role in helping the listed companies to transform operational mechanisms, raise funds, promote economic reform and so on, but it also brought a series of serious problems. The reform of non-tradable shares began in 2005 tried to resolve the problem caused by it. This reform made the non-tradable shares traded, and it also changed the ownership of the ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies, which had an impact on ultimate control right. The research of La Porta, Shleifer and Lopez-de-Silanes in 1999 was a important research of ultimate control right and the deviation of it from cash flow right. Since then, many scholars at home and abroad try to make further research on ultimate control right, and more and more valuable results gotten from empirical researches. The ultimate controlling shares can control the listed companies by complex controlling chain, such as pyramid shareholding, dual-class equity and cross-holding. This makes them obtain greater controlling right of the listed company with less cash flow, which means that the control right is separated from the cash flow right. The separation makes the ultimate controlling shareholders prone to use of their status to get more benefits excess their cash flow right deserves. They encroach the assets of the listed companies, which against the interests of minority shareholders. This dissertation attempts to analyze the impact of ultimate control right on the listed company and the change of it before and after the reform of non-tradable shares. This dissertation first reviews the research achievement of the divergence of control right and cash flow right, then the researches of the reform of non-tradable shares. The important conceptions in this dissertation are also defined. The main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of ultimate control right over the debt financing of listed companies in China by means of empirical research, and analyze the changes of it. 217 listed companies are selected from state-owned manufacturing listed companies as the sample, and their data from 2001 to 2010 are collected to form a panel data. According to the study of the data, the author finds that control right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling shareholders decline while their divergence increases. The author designs a regression model to analyze the impact of the divergence of control right and cash flow right on debt financing of Chinese listed companies, and finds that it has a significant impact. The author separates data to two panel data and finds that the impact of divergence between control right and cash flow right on listed companies had a significant change after the reform of non-tradable shares.
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