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论文编号：	4428
作者编号：	2120102302
上传时间：	2012/6/8 17:05:39
中文题目：	中国创业企业股权结构与企业绩效的关系研究
英文题目：	Study of Relationship between Ownership Structure and Enterprise Performance in Start-ups: The Moderation of Internal Corporate Governance Mechanism
指导老师：	张玉利
中文关键字：	创业板上市公司；股权集中度；股权制衡；企业绩效；公司内部治理机制
英文关键字：	Listed companies on Second Board; Ownership Concentration; Equity Balance; Enterprise Performance; Internal Corporate Governance Mechanism
中文摘要：	注重企业成长且收入与盈利要求比主板低的创业板，能够将股票的增值效应与创业的活力结合到一起，使得缺乏初始资金的创新创业企业通过上市融得充足资金，将在推动中国经济又好又快发展方面发挥重要作用。无论制度如何安排，企业主体之间权利配置的目的仍然是在合理界定相互利益的基础上实现企业资源的竞争效率，对于企业权利关系的研究可以为研究企业资源的有效配置和利用提供基础，在影响企业效率的制度安排中，股权的分配是最核心的，直接作用于资源的利用。针对这一问题，本文结合以往文献的研究，采用SPSS16.0对研究样本进行了描述性统计分析、相关分析、线性回归与层级回归等方法，探究了创业板上市公司股权结构与企业绩效的关系，以及公司内部治理机制的调节作用。最后，针对研究过程的结果，得出了主要结论。 文章首先对研究背景、研究目的、研究思路和论文框架进行了交代，然后对公司治理及内部治理机制、股权集中度、股权制衡、董事会结构以及创业企业等相关理论进行了回顾，在此基础上提出了研究假设和研究模型。接着，对国泰安数据服务中心的相关数据进行了细致的实证分析与探究。最后，得出了以下几个主要结论：（1）创业企业的股权集中度与企业绩效呈非线性关系；（2）创业企业的股权制衡与企业会计绩效呈正相关关系；（3）董事会独立性反向调节创业企业股权集中度与企业绩效的关系；（4）两职合一一定程度反向调节创业企业股权集中度与企业市场绩效的关系，并反向调节创业企业股权制衡与企业绩效的关系；（5）两权分离度反向调节创业企业股权集中度与股权制衡与企业绩效的关系。创业企业需要首先在股权结构上进行合理的分配，适中的股权集中能够促进绩效提高，同时，一定的制衡措施也是非常必要的。在股权的基础上，控制权的分配也十分重要，一定的控制权能够带来高绩效，但是控制权与所有权的过大差距也让实际控制人攫取私利，损害公司利益。
英文摘要：	The Second Board focusing on business growth and requiring less than the Main Board on profit can combine the multiplier effect of stock market and the vitality of entrepreneurship together, enabling nascent firms lacking start-up capital to finance themselves with sufficient funds by being listed, which is to play an important role in enhancing a good and fast development of China’s economy. However the institution is arranged, the main purpose of allocating the right among enterprise subjects is still to achieve the competitive efficiency of enterprise resources on the basis of a reasonable definition of mutual interests. Studies of the relations of corporate power can provide a foundation for studying the efficient allocation and utilization of enterprise resources, while among the institutional arrangements that affect business efficiency the allocation of ownership is the core, which has direct effect on the use of resources. To further study this issue, this article employed SPSS 16.0 to conduct descriptive statistics, correlation, linear regression and hierarchical regression for samples, integrating previous researches in literature, and explored the relationship between the ownership structure and enterprise performance as well as the moderating effect of corporate governance mechanism. Finally, according to the results, main conclusions are drawn. Above all, this article states the background, purpose, ideas of research and framework, and reviews relative theories concerning corporate governance and its mechanism, ownership concentration, equity balance, board structure and start-ups, proposing hypotheses and models. Then, relative data from CSMar are analyzed and explored empirically. Following are in conclusion: (i) the ownership concentration and enterprise performance are nonlinearly correlated; (ii) the equity balance and accounting performance are positively correlated; (iii) the independence of board negatively moderates the relationship between ownership concentration and enterprise performance; (iv) CEO duality negatively moderates the relationship between ownership concentration and market performance to a certain extent and negatively the relationship between equity balance and enterprise performance; (v) separation ratio negatively moderates the relationship between ownership concentration and enterprise performance. Attention should be paid to the rational allocation of ownership structure in the first place, since moderate concentration of ownership promotes performance. In the meanwhile, certain balance is necessary as well. Besides ownership structure, the allocation of control rights is of essential importance, as certain control rights bring good performance but larger gap between control rights and voting rights lures actual controllers into grabbing interests and sabotaging enterprises.
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