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| 论文编号: | 4414 | |
| 作者编号: | 2120102224 | |
| 上传时间: | 2012/6/8 13:01:25 | |
| 中文题目: | 企业战略联盟的利益分配机制研究 | |
| 英文题目: | Research on The Benefit Distribution in An Enterprise Alliance | |
| 指导老师: | 侯文华 | |
| 中文关键字: | 战略联盟,利益分配,激励机制,纳什均衡 | |
| 英文关键字: | Strategic alliances, distribution of benefits, incentive mechanism, Nash equilibrium | |
| 中文摘要: | 在科学技术迅速发展的今天,技术能力成为企业竞争中制胜的关键因素。企业都希望能够占领技术创新的制高点、成为引领市场的弄潮儿。然而,任何技术力量雄厚的企业都不可能拥有创新所需的全部资源和技术,创新对外部资源的依赖性越来越强,独立的进行创新将更加困难。因此,引入战略联盟策略,整合创新资源,将成为企业抢占市场机会的一个关键。利益分配是影响战略联盟稳定持续发展的一个重要因素。本文将在前人研究的基础上进一步讨论战略联盟的利益分配过程,期望能全面研究战略联盟利益分配体系,尝试完善战略联盟中一个盟主和多个盟员间不同分配模式下的利益协调的博弈模型,为战略联盟的运作管理提供一定的理论借鉴。首先,本文通过概述战略联盟的概念和特点及运行原理,提出了战略联盟的核心问题--利益分配。其次,对现有的多成员战略联盟利益分配方法进行了总结,分析了各种方法的优点和不足,从中选择了四种方法中较优的“基于满意度的纳什均衡方法”来解决多成员战略联盟利益分配问题。最后,进一步讨论了利益分配的过程,提出了利益分配的两阶段模型。模型通过分析三个企业的联盟过程回答了两个问题。第一个问题是,什么是战略联盟的最优利益分配系数。 第二个问题是,在这个利益分配系数下,结盟成员会采取怎样的行动。然而,此时的期望利润只是达到了纳什均衡而非帕累托最优,无法真正的实现集体利益最大化。文章接下来在模型中引入了激励机制。此时,由于企业间产生了具有约束力的协议,成员会在联盟中选择合作,从而使战略联盟企业实现了帕累托最优。通过分析模型,可以看出企业选择合作策略得到的期望收益大于企业选择不合作策略得到的期望收益。但是,不是所有的激励机制都会使得联盟成员选择合作策略,提高自己的努力水平。只有当额外的边际收益大于正常的边际收益时,企业才会考虑增加投入。 | |
| 英文摘要: | With the high development of technology, technical competence has become the key element for success. Every company wants to become the leader of technological innovation. However, any enterprise with strong technical force cannot have all the resources and technology needed for innovation, innovation is becoming increasingly dependent on external resources and independent innovation will be more difficult. Therefore, strategic alliance strategy, with the integration of innovation resources, will become one of the key factors for enterprises to seize the market opportunities. The distribution of benefits is an important factor for the stable and sustainable development of strategic alliances. This article will discuss the process of profit distribution in strategic alliances on the basis of previous research and will try to improve the profit distribution game model. Firstly, the article put forwards the core issue of the strategic alliance - the distribution of benefits with an overview of the strategic alliance concept and characteristics. Then, summarizes different methods for profit distribution and analyze the strengths and weaknesses of them, choosing the Nash equilibrium method to solve the profit distribution problem in multi-members alliance. Finally, the article put forwards a two-stage model for the distribution of benefits by further discussing the process of distribution of benefits. The model has answered two questions. The first question is, what is the optimal distribution ratio of interest for strategic alliances. The second problem is that, what action the members will take under this distribution ratio. However, the expected profit has only reached the Nash equilibrium rather than Pareto optimal , it is not the maximum benefits for collaboration. Next, the article has introduced incentive mechanism to the model. This way, members will choose to cooperate in the alliance due to inter-enterprise agreement, so the strategic alliance enterprise will achieve a Pareto optimal. By analyzing the model, we can see that the companies choosing to cooperate will gain more benefits than the companies choosing the non-cooperative strategy. However, not all incentive mechanisms are efficient. Only when the additional marginal revenue is greater than the normal marginal revenue, the company will consider increasing investment. | |
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