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论文编号：	4368
作者编号：	2120102306
上传时间：	2012/6/7 16:01:05
中文题目：	在股东和地方政府共同干预下的企业决策模型研究
英文题目：	Research of Decision-making Model of the Enterprises
指导老师：	古志辉
中文关键字：	股东，地方政府，企业决策
英文关键字：	Shareholder, Local governments, Business Decisions
中文摘要：	在我国经济转轨时期，国有企业在经济层面的改革取得不错的进展，而行政层面的改革进展依然缓慢，政企未能完全分离。而且由于地方政府手中依然握有土地、资金等稀缺资源的配置权及行政决策权，对私有企业决策行为也产生一定影响。地方政府出于社会目标动机和政治业绩动机，通常会利用其手中掌握的资源配置权和行政垄断特权来干预企业的决策，将其承担的政治目标转嫁到企业身上，要求企业追求产出最大化。而股东作为企业的所有人，追求企业利润最大化。因此，企业决策者在股东和地方政府的共同干预下，面临增加利润抑或是增加企业产出的权衡。本文将股东对企业的影响抽象化为“对企业利润目标的影响”，将地方政府对企业的影响抽象化为“对企业产出目标的影响”，将地方政府对土地、资金、行业政策等政治资源的控制能力抽象化为“企业对政治资源要素的投入量”，建立了在股东和地方政府共同干预下的企业决策模型。通过对模型分析，探讨模型背后的经济意义，得出以下结论：（1）由于地方政府对企业产出目标的影响，导致企业存在“低效率”现象，而股东对企业利润目标的影响将提高企业效率；（2）随着地方政府对企业产出目标影响程度的加深，在实现地方GDP增长的同时，容易引起投资过热，而且还会增加对政治资源的投入量；（3）随着股东对企业利润目标影响程度增加，企业负债比重减小，偿债风险小；随着地方政府对企业产出目标影响程度增加，企业负债比重增加，偿债风险高；（4）劳动力雇佣方面，随着地方政府对企业产出目标影响程度的增加，企业雇员增加，单位劳动成本上升；（5）政治资源方面，随着地方政府对企业影响能力的增加，企业对政治资源要素的的投入量增加，单位政治资源成本上升。另外，本文还引入杜邦分析模型，分别探讨了股东和地方政府对企业销售净利率、资产周转率和杠杆率这三个重要财务指标的影响，得到以下结论：（1）随着股东对企业利润目标影响程度的增加，企业倾向于提高销售净利率、资产周转率、降低杠杆率；（2）随着地方政府对企业产出目标影响程度的增加，企业倾向于降低资产周转率和销售净利率，提高杠杆率；（3）随着地方政府对政治资源控制能力的增强，企业倾向于提高杠杆率，降低销售净利率和资产周转率。最后，本文利用Simulink软件进行仿真模拟，对上述结论进行验证，并进一步探讨了股东“对企业利润目标的影响能力”和地方政府“对政治资源控制能力”这两个变量在内生的情况下，如何实现动态平衡，为企业在正常生产经营过程中，企业决策者面临两方共同干预下如何决策提供建议：当股东影响能力较大时，为实现企业效用最大化，决策者应减少劳动力和政治资源要素投入，降低负债比率；当地方政府影响能力较大时，决策者应增加劳动力、资本和政治资源要素投入，提高负债比率。
英文摘要：	During the economic transition period in China, the economic reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has made great progress, while the administrative reform is still rather slow. In fact, the relationship between the government and SOEs hasn’t been fully cut off. The local government still holds the right to allocate scarce resources, such as the land, the capital, and so on, which it can uses to influence the private firms. In order to realize local economic growth and to create jobs opportunities, the local governments usually use their privilege to intervene the enterprises’ decision making progress. On the other hand, as the owner of the enterprise, the shareholder’s main objective is profit maximization. As a result, the enterprises have to weigh the options between output maximization and profit maximization. This paper abstracts the influence which the shareholder puts on the enterprises as “the influence on the aim of the enterprises’ profit”, and which the local governments put on the enterprises as “the influence on the aim of the enterprises’ output”. Furthermore, this paper abstracts the control, which local governments have over the political resources such as the land, the capital and the trade policies, as “the input which the enterprises have exert on the political resources”. Based on those prepositions, this paper makes a decision-making model of the enterprises which are under the dual control of the shareholder and the local government. This paper tries to explore the economic significance behind the model. By analysis, it reaches the conclusions as follows: (1) The influence which the local governments put on the output goals of the enterprises, brings about the low-efficient result of the enterprises, and the influence which the shareholder puts on the profit goals of the enterprises enhance their business efficiency; (2) With the increasing influence which local governments put on the enterprises’ output goals, there are the phenomenon of both the local GDP growth and the overheated investment at the same time;(3) With the increasing influence which local governments put on the enterprises’ profit goals, the firms tend to use equity for the bulk of their capital, reducing the the proportion of corporate liabilities and the debt risk, and vice versa;(4) Regarding to the labor employment, with the increasing influence which local governments put on the enterprises’ output goals, the firms tend to hire more people, and the cost of per labor rises;(5)Regarding to thepolitical resources,with the increasing influence of local governments,the firms tendto increase political resources inputs, and the cost of per political resource rises. In addition, this paper uses the Dupont analysis model to study the influence which the shareholder and local governments put on enterprises’ net interest rate of sale, turnover rate of capital and leverage ratio respectively, and we drew the following conclusions: (1) With the increasing influence which local governments put on the enterprises’ profit goals, the enterprises tend to raise the net interest rate of sale and the turnover rate of capital, and reduce the leverage ratio; (2) With the increasing influence which local governments put on the enterprises’ output goals, the enterprises tend to reduce the net interest rate of sale and the turnover rate of capital, and raise the leverage ratio; (3) With the increasing control which the local governments have over the political resources, the enterprises tend to raise the leverage ratio and the turnover rate of capital, and reduce the net interest rate of sale. In the end, this paper uses the Simulink software for simulation and verification of the conclusions above, and tries to get a better understanding of how the enterprises achieve the dynamic balance on the condition that the shareholder has influence on the enterprises’ profit goals and the local governments have the control over the political recourses. Based on those conclusions, this paper gives advices for the enterprises to make business decisions.
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