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论文编号：	4315
作者编号：	2120102231
上传时间：	2012/6/6 23:41:23
中文题目：	基金会计业绩、声誉机制与开放式基金规模变动
英文题目：	Accounting performance,Reputation Mechanism and the Variation of Mutual Fund Size
指导老师：	姚颐
中文关键字：	基金会计业绩，声誉机制，开放式基金，赎回
英文关键字：	Accounting performance, Reputation mechanism, Open-end funds,Redemption
中文摘要：	我国基金业的发展经历了从封闭式基金向开放式基金发展的过程。开放式基金既为投资者提供了灵活的申购赎回场所以及方式，又为基金管理公司提供了良好的激励约束机制，自问世以来，理论界就对之青睐有加。对于开放式基金赎回问题的探讨一直都是开放式基金的一个热门话题，本文试图从基金的声誉机制给开放式基金的赎回带来的影响这个角度来完善这一问题。本文对声誉机制的研究是从基金本身的声誉和基金经理的声誉两个角度而展开的。Sirri和Tufano早在他们1998年的文章中就提出了同一基金家族（funds family）的基金成员之间不应被孤立看待，应该考虑彼此之间产生的影响，即基金之间的溢出效应(spillover effect)。而国内对这方面的研究并不完善。本文首先通过以基金的会计业绩进行排名选出声誉好的基金以及基金经理，定义出明星基金和明星基金经理，所要研究的第一个问题是：中国的开放式基金市场是否存在明星基金的溢出效应,即明星基金是否可以抑制自己以及同家族的其他基金的赎回；此外，好的基金经理一般在基金行业有着良好的声誉，他们所管理的基金业绩都能获得较好较稳定的收益，因此本文研究的第二个问题是：明星基金经理的声誉是否能够得到投资者的认可并减少证券市场上的非理性赎回。本文采用实证的方法对中国证券市场从2004年年初至2010年年底共28期股票型开放式基金的数据进行研究。为了更好的考察本文的模型，研究每个问题时都是先进行季度回归后进行年度回归。本文发现明星基金的声誉确实能够对其本身的赎回起到抑制作用，但是并不能够为同明星基金同家族的其他基金成员的赎回带来显著抑制作用；而明星基金经理的确能够依靠其声誉显著抑制其手下基金的赎回率；针对这一现象本文在结论部分给出了解释，并在本文的结尾部分提出了建议。
英文摘要：	The development of Chinese fund industry has experienced the process of development from closed-end funds to open-end funds. Open-end funds not only provide investors with a flexible subscription and redemption of places and ways, but also provide fund management companies with good incentive and restraint mechanisms, Since they appeared in the world, the theoretical circles has paid much attention to them. Discussing about the change of size has always been a hot topic about open-end funds. This article attempts to improve this subject from the perspective of the impact of the reputation mechanism on the change of size of Open-end funds. To discuss the reputation mechanism of the open-end funds, I divide this subject into two part: the funds’ reputation and the managers’ reputation. Sirri and Tufano put forward that the fund members in the same funds family should not be treated in isolation early in their 1998 article, but should consider the impact between each fund, that is, the spillover effects. This paper defines the star funds and star managers by ranking funds by their accounting performance, so that I can pick up the reputable funds and managers. The first question I am going to talking about is that whether there are spillover effects in Chinese funds market, that is, can star funds inhibit the redemption of their own and other funds in their family? Otherwise, good managers generally have good reputations in funds industry, the funds they manage generally have a better and more stable performance than other funds. So the second question I am going to talking about is that if the star manager's reputation can be recognized by investors and reduce the irrational redemption in the funds market. Using the empirical method, this paper studied the data of equity open-end fund from the beginning of 2004 to the end of 2010, 28 seasons,4 years in total. For better research, each model is regressed first quarterly then annually. This paper finds that the reputation of the star funds can really play an important role in inhibiting the redemption of their own, but have little help to the redemption of the funds in the star family; relying on their reputation, star managers are able to significantly inhibit the funds’ rate of redemption they managed. Conclusion is given to explain this phenomenon in this article in the latter part. And In the end of this paper, some suggestions are given to improve this subject.
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