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论文编号：	431
作者编号：	2120062001
上传时间：	2008/6/21 22:17:03
中文题目：	高管持股对多元化战略实施效果的
英文题目：	The empirical study on Diversi
指导老师：	薛有志
中文关键字：	多元化战略;高管持股;股权特征;<
英文关键字：	Diversification Strategy ; Man
中文摘要：	20世纪50年代美国的“高管持股计划”把全球带入股权激励的浪潮中，关于高管持股对企业战略的影响的研究一直以来是管理学领域的研究重点。公司高管持股的核心目标是解决上市公司高管和股东之间目标函数不一致所产生的委托—代理问题，促进公司高管和股东之间形成利益共同体，激励公司高管为股东和公司创造更多的价值。以往的研究大多将高管持股比例作为因变量考察其对企业绩效的影响，并且也没有将其纳入多元化战略的研究领域。 本研究将通过股权激励强度来考察作为长期激励机制的高管持股如何影响多元化战略的实施，同时将深入探讨股权结构、第一大股东持股性质以及其他股东的制衡状态对高管持股效应的影响。 本文选择2006年沪深两市396家上市公司样本，考察高管持股对多元化战略实施效果的调节作用，以及股权特征对高管持股效应发挥的影响。研究得出，总体而言，我国上市多元化经营损害公司绩效。当最终控制人为国有股东时，对管理人员实行股权激励，可以促使其利益与企业趋同，从而降低代理成本，改善多元化战略的实施效果。而当最终控制人为非国有股时，其对高管持股的激励对多元化战略改善效果不明显甚至有恶化的可能。另外，由于我国“一股独大”现象严重，其他股东的股权制衡并不能显著改善多元化战略实施效果。 实证研究结果表明，提高高管激励强度能够改善企业多元化战略的实施效果，证实了“利益趋同”效应假说，进一步研究发现高管持股的分布状态能够更大程度地影响高管持股效应的发挥。其他高管持股产生的“利益趋同”效应可以替代CEO，而且研究结果同时表明CEO与其他高管同时持股并不能产生“互补效应”，公司治理效率的强弱是影响不同高管持股分布状态下“利益趋同”效应发挥的关键因素。
英文摘要：	“ Management Ownership Plan ”in the States has draged the whole world into the tides of management incentives since 1950s. Management ownership influence on the enterprise’s strategy has been the important research topic of management fields. The goal of the management ownership is to solve the principle-agent problems that caused by the differences between the interests of management and shareholders and to align the interests of them. However, the former research mostly take the scale of the management as the dependent variable to inspect its influence on firm performance, didn’t take it into the field of diversification strategy. The thesis analyzes the influence of management ownership—a long-term incentive mechanism—on firm performance with the inspection of incentive intensity of management ownership. Further, the thesis also discuss the influence of the ownership structure, the biggest stockholder’s shareholding ratio and other shareholders on management ownership effect. With 396 company samples in 2006, the thesis analyzes the relationship between the incentive intensity of management ownership and the effect of diversification strategy’s, and the influence of ownership characteristic on management ownership effect. The results of the thesis show that listed corporation diversification in our country has negative influence on firm performance. The state-owned enterprise shows controlable affect on the effectivity of management ownership, and ownership incentive can drive the management of state-owned enterprise to work harder and it is helpful to decrease agency cost .But in the none-state-owned enterprise, the effect isn’t significantly or even have negative influence on the firm performance. In addition, as the phenomenon of “domination of a single shareholder” is common, the other shareholders couldn’t obviously improve the implement effect of diversification operation. The empirical results indicate that promoting incentive intensity of management ownership could improve the implement result of diversification strategy operation, which proved the “benefit convergence” effect hypothesis. The further research finds that the distribution situation of management ownership has a greater impact on the management ownership effect. “Benefit convergence” produced by other management holdings could replace CEO. Moreover, the research indicates that CEO and other management share holdings in the same time couldn’t produce “complementary action”, and the efficiency of cooperate governance is the major factor that influences the “benefit convergence” under different management ownership distribution situations.
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