联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	4308
作者编号：	2120102263
上传时间：	2012/6/6 22:22:28
中文题目：	定向增发与盈余管理——基于我国A股上市公司的实证研究
英文题目：	Private Placement and Earning Management——An empirical Study on the basis of Chinese A-Share Listed Companies
指导老师：	陈国欣
中文关键字：	定向增发;盈余管理;经济后果
英文关键字：	Private Placement;Earning management;Economic consequences
中文摘要：	资本市场的功能之一即是实现资源的有效配置，上市融资是公司在资本市场上获取资源的主要途径。投资者、债权人、政府、员工等利益相关者如何做出自己的经济决策将会直接影响一个公司的融资情况，而上市公司的会计信息则是决定这些利益相关群体做出经济决策的主要依据。如果上市公司的披露的会计信息可以真实的反应公司的经营状况，那么它的披露将会减少上市公司与利益相关者的信息不对称程度，促进资本市场上公司股票的合理定价和资源的有效配置。然而，纵观国内外的研究发现，上市公司为了达到自己的经济目的都存在一定的盈余管理行为，这种对盈余信息的管理行为将会误导利益相关群体做出错误决策，从而影响资本市场上资源的有效配置。 基于资本市场动机而进行的盈余管理行为一直是学术界关注的重点，近年来日趋成为主流权益性融资方式的定向增发前后的盈余管理问题逐渐进入公众和学者们的视野，由于定向增发的条件、对象等不同于一般的融资方式，其盈余管理的动机、方式及带来的经济后果也与之前的研究有所不同。鉴于研究样本的时间限制，现有研究或者仅对定向增发前后盈余管理的存在性进行了检验，或者基于某个视角对定向增发中的盈余管理行为进行了探讨，或者对定向增发后的中短期股价效应进行了研究，缺乏对盈余管理与定向增发的系统分析。 基于此研究背景，论文以我国A股市场进行定向增发的上市公司为对象，采用实证研究的分析方法，对样本公司在定向增发中的盈余管理程度、影响因素及经济后果等问题进行了深入的分析，从而为政府监管部门规范和治理上市公司的定向增发前后的盈余管理行为提供了政策依据。 通过实证研究发现：1.我国A股上市公司存在盈余管理行为，并且盈余管理的方式与发行对象的类型有关；2.上市公司的盈余管理程度与公司规模、资本结构、股权集中度和资本支出正相关；3.短期内投资者无法识别公司的盈余管理行为，长期内实施定向增发的上市公司业绩下滑，定向增发并不能带来公司财务业绩的提高；4. 定向增发后上市公司长期业绩与盈余管理程度呈反向相关关系，非关联型定向增发的样本公司业绩要优于关联型定向增发的样本公司。
英文摘要：	One of the functions of the capital market is to realize the effective resources allocation,while the listing financing is the main way to obtain resources in capital market. How investors,debters,government,and staff-sort of stakeholders make their own economic decisions will influence a firm’s financing situation directly,and listed companies’ accounting information are chief references when these stakeholders make their economic decisions.If the accounting information disclosure can reflect operation state truly,it can decrease the information asymmetry,and promote the listed companies’ reasonable stocks pricing and resources allocation.Nonetheless,across the domestic and foreign research findings,there are existing some earnings management behavior to realize their respective economic goals in the listed companies which will mislead the stakeholders to make false decisions,and thus disturb the effective resources allocating in capital markets. Earnings management behavior based on the capital market motivation is always what the academia focuses on,in recent years,earnings management problems before and after orientation program which have become the main equity financing method day by day,is entering the public and scholars’ horizon.As the conditions and objects of orientation program are different from general financing ways,consequently,its earnings management motivations,ways and relative economic consequences are also diverse from those researched before.Given study sample’s time restriction,now available researches only either test the existence of earnings management before and after orientation program or discuss the earnings management behavior in some perspective or research the medium or short term stock price effect after the orientation program,which are all lack of systematic analysis of earnings management and orientation program. On the basis of this research background,the article takes our country’s listed companies in A market which makes private palacement as an object and adopts empirical research methods to conduct a profound analysis of sampled company’s problems with private palcement such as earnings management degree,influential factors and economic consequences,thereby providing the policy foundation for the government supervision departments to regulate and manage the listed companies’ earnings management behavior before and after the private placement. Through empirical research findings:1.Our country’s A share market does have earnings management behaviors which is related with the issued object types.2.Listed company’s scales,capital structures,stock equity concentration ratio,capital expenditure have positive correlation with companies’ earnings management extents.3.Listed company’s long-run operating performance slides obviously after the orientation program,besides,sampled non-relation-associated issue company perform better than relation-associated issue company.4 In short duration,investors cannot recognize the earnings management behaviors;however,in the long-run,although sampled company’s excess stock revenue ratio declines gradually,it is still above 0.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)