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论文编号：	4305
作者编号：	2120102258
上传时间：	2012/6/6 21:54:36
中文题目：	我国创业板上市公司高管离职的市场反应
英文题目：	The Market Reaction of Listed Companies'' Executives Resigning on China''s Growth Enterprises Market
指导老师：	程新生
中文关键字：	高管离职;减持套现;财富效应
英文关键字：	Management Resignation;Holdings Reduction;Fortune Effect
中文摘要：	我国创业板市场自2009年10月30日推出以来，短短两年多的时间里取得了巨大的发展，不管是从上市公司数量、募集股本和募集金额方面都取得了令人赞叹的成就。与此同时，创业板市场的各种问题也在一步步显现出来，比如“三高”、业绩包装、高管辞职、成长能力下降等，这些现象一直为社会公众所诟病，并日益成为影响创业板市场健康发展的问题。而目前针对创业板市场的研究很少，也鲜有高管离职的市场反应这方面的研究，笔者抓住创业板高管离职潮的事件进行研究，意在将创业板市场的问题引入学术界，开启创业板市场研究的思路和方向。本文选取创业板上市公司高管离职这一研究视角，首先分析了“三高”所引起的股价泡沫及低成长能力诱使高管不惜离职以求早日套现这一真正动机，然后用事件研究的方法研究了市场对高管请辞这一事件的看法即高管离职所产生的市场反应。最后根据本文的研究结果提出了一些规范创业板市场、促进创业板市场健康发展的积极建议。 本文首先分析了当前我国创业板市场的发展水平及存在的问题，重点阐述了创业板高管“离职潮”这一现象，以及市场对“离职潮”的普遍看法，指出了该课题研究的意义所在。并在此基础上对国内外关于高管离职以及市场反应这两个课题的研究文献分别进行回顾与梳理。通过梳理，提出本文的研究思路及研究创新。 其次是对高管离职事件的理论分析。本文采用了委托代理理论和“经济人假设”、市场有效假说理论对高管离职进行理论研究，并从法律法规和市场现状的角度进行了高管离职原因及现状分析。 接着根据前面理论梳理，提出了本文的研究假设，即创业板高管离职公告后会产生负的财富效应。在确定样本、搜集相关数据的基础上，运用事件研究方法，对市场反应的代表变量即平均超额收益率与累计平均超额收益率进行了独立样本t检验。统计结果显示，高管离职公告日前样本公司的平均超额收益率与累计平均超额收益率未呈现明显的负值或者正值，而公告当日及公告日后样本公司的平均超额收益率与累计平均超额收益率呈现了明显的负值，说明高管离职后存在负的财富效应。最后是研究结论和政策建议。在这部分，笔者提出了加强对上市公司公开发行上市及高管离职的监管、加强投资者教育和投资者保护力度、提高投资者风险意识、上市公司加强高管激励政策等措施。
英文摘要：	Since launched in October 30, 2009, China's Growth Enterprises Market (GEM) has experienced a rapid development in the past two years, as we can see from the number of listed companies, the quantity of raising share and raising amount.At the same time, however, various problems of the GEM, such as the "three high", performance packaging, executives resign, growth ability declining, have been criticized by public, and become the major restrictions to the healthy development of GEM.There are few researches on the Growth Enterprise Market as well as the reaction on management resign, consequently, I take the perspective of management resign events, and intent to begin a new research subject about the Growth Enterprise Market, and provide some ideas and directions. This paper selects a Growth Enterprise Market listed company management resign for research perspective, firstly analyze the stock price bubble caused by the "three highs" and management resign at an early date to sell their holdings because of low growth capacity (the real motivation). Secondly, I use the event-study-methodology to study the market reaction to the news of management resign. Finally, I give some positive recommendations on regulating and promoting the healthy development of the Growth Enterprise Market. This article first gives an overall discussion about the level of development and problems on China’s Growth Enterprise Market, especially the particular phenomenon of management resign wave and public attitude towards it, and pointed out the significance of the research lies. Based on this, the article takes a review on home and abroad historic research on both the management resign and market reaction, and then works out the research idea and innovation. The second section is the theoretical analysis of management resign. The article use the principal-agent theory, economic man assumption and the efficient market hypothesis theory, and from the perspective of the laws and regulations and the market situation to study the real reason. Based on the previous theoretical analysis, the article states the study hypothesis that the announcement can generate a negative wealth effect. After sample determining and collecting, the article use independent samples t test approach to test the dependent variable, the average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return. According to the statistical results, we cannot see apparent abnormal return before management resigning. However, both the average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return are significantly below zero after the listed company announcing management resign. This tells us management resign has a negative market reaction. The last section is about research findings and policy recommendations. In this section, the author proposes to strengthen the public offering and executives leaving the supervision of listed companies, to enhance investor education and investor protection efforts, increase investors' risk awareness, and improve the management incentive policies, etc.
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