联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	4299
作者编号：	2120102299
上传时间：	2012/6/6 20:32:55
中文题目：	公司治理对上市公司过度投资行为的影响路径研究
英文题目：	Research on Influence Path of Corporate Governance to Over-investment Behavior of Listed Companies
指导老师：	李莉
中文关键字：	过度投资行为；公司治理；管理者过度自信
英文关键字：	Over-investment Behavior; Corporate Governance; Managerial Overconfidence
中文摘要：	大量研究表明，中国企业存在过度投资。企业是经济运行的主体，研究其过度投资问题，分析抑制企业过度投资的因素，以及因素发生作用的路径，对于提高企业的资本配置效率，保证国家宏观经济的持续健康发展具有重要作用。 国内外学者普遍认为委托代理问题是造成企业过度投资的重要原因（Jensen、Meckling等）。相应，对公司治理与过度投资之间关系的研究逐渐被学术界关注，而基于理性人假设的委托代理理论便成为这一关系的内在机理（Lewnlen，1985；Masulis，2009等）。然而，从委托代理理论视角来分析两者之间关系，忽略了造成企业非科学决策的另一个重要原因，即管理者认知偏差。随着认知心理学发展，理性人的假设受到质疑（Leibenstein，1987），管理者过度自信这一认知偏差对过度投资的影响成为行为金融学的重要研究内容（Roll，1986；Malmendier、Tate，2005）。这不仅对公司治理的研究提出了新的挑战，也对基于委托代理理论的公司治理对过度投资的直接影响路径提出了质疑，即这一直接影响路径是否能够抑制由管理者过度自信引发的过度投资？换句话说，公司治理内部监督机制是否能对管理者过度自信的心理偏差产生影响？控制幻觉作为产生管理者过度自信的原因之一，为本文的研究提供了依据。相关文献指出，是否拥有决策权力与控制能力是决定人们是否出现控制幻觉程度的重要因素（周杰、薛有志，2011；Burger，1979；Presson，1996）。而公司治理内部监督机制恰恰降低了管理者决策的自由程度（程立，2008），从而有助于抑制管理者出现控制幻觉的倾向。因此，本文认为公司治理对过度投资存在一条间接影响路径，即公司治理会通过抑制管理者的控制幻觉，进而影响管理者过度自信，最终影响企业的过度投资。本文将在分析公司治理对过度投资的直接和间接影响路径的基础上，通过实证的研究方法，一方面检验管理者过度自信对过度投资的影响；另一方面检验公司治理的内部监督机制对管理者过度自信的影响。最后，根据上述两个方面，检验公司治理的内部监督机制对过度投资的直接影响和间接影响，构建公司治理内部监督机制对过度投资的间接影响路径。本文的研究深化了公司治理相关理论，有助于提高上市公司资本配置效率。
英文摘要：	Numerous studies show that Chinese enterprises have over-investment problem (Hao Ying et al, 2005; Jiang Fuxiu, 2009, etc.). Enterprise is the main body of economic operation. Research its over-investment play an important role for inhibiting over-investment, improving the efficiency of capital allocation, ensuring the sustained and healthy development of the country's macroeconomic. Domestic and foreign scholars generally agree that the principal-agent problem cause over-investment (Jensen and Meckling, etc.). Accordingly, the study of the relationship between corporate governance and over-investment gradually academia, and the principal-agent theory based on rational assumptions become the internal mechanism of this relationship (Lewnlen, 1985; Masulis, 2009, etc.). However, from this perspective to analyze the relationship, ignoring the cognitive biases of managers, this is another important reason for non-scientific decision-making of enterprises. With the development of cognitive psychology, the assumption of rational people was questioned (Leibenstein, 1987), managerial overconfident become the main part of the behavioral finance research (Roll, 1986; Malmendier, Tate, 2005). This is a new challenge to the research on corporate governance. This also questioned whether this directly affect path based on agent problem can inhibit over-investment caused by managerial overconfident? Whether internal oversight mechanisms of corporate governance can have an effect on managerial overconfident? The illusion of control theory provides valued basis. Literature shows that decision-making power and control determine the illusion of control level (Zhou Jie, Xue Youzhi, 2011; Burger, 1979; Presson, 1996;). Internal oversight mechanisms of corporate governance is precisely to reduce the free degree of decision-making of managers (Cheng Li, 2008), thus contributing to the inhibition of managers’ illusion of control. Therefore, we believe that there exists an indirect path, it is corporate governance inhibit the illusion of control of managers, thereby affecting managerial overconfident and ultimately affect the over-investment. This article analyzes the direct and indirect effect between corporate governance and over-investment, on the one hand, test the impact of managerial overconfident to over-investment; the other hand, test the impact of corporate governance internal oversight mechanisms to managerial overconfident. Finally, according to the above two aspects, test the direct and indirect impact of the internal oversight mechanism of Corporate Governance to over-investment, and build the indirect path. This study deepens the corporate governance theory, help to improve the efficiency of capital allocation of listed companies.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)