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论文编号：	4281
作者编号：	2120102246
上传时间：	2012/6/6 16:29:12
中文题目：	股票期权激励：基于“最优契约论”和“管理层权力论”的研究
英文题目：	Executive Stock Option (ESO): The Research based on “Best Contract Theory” and “Managerial Power Theory”
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	股票期权；独立董事会；外部市场约束；政府监管
英文关键字：	Executive Stock Option (ESO); Independent Board of Directors; Constraint from External Market; Governmental regulation
中文摘要：	2006年1月1日中国证监会发布的《上市公司股权激励管理办法（试行）》开始正式施实，股权分置改革之后，股票期权激励（Executive Stock Option，ESO），作为一种高管人员激励机制，得到了较大发展。不可否认，股权激励的放行使得一些优秀公司的合理的股票期权激励计划得以施行，并确实起到了促进业绩增长的作用。但另一方面，我们也确实看到类似伊利股份3亿元天价期权“激励”方案的出现。这让我们不禁怀疑，对某些公司而言，股票期权激励制度被设计成了变相的向管理层输送利益的通道。通过制定单一的行权条件、易实现的业绩指标、以及缩短期权有效期等方式，这些上市公司推出的股权激励计划不仅没有起到“激励”管理层的作用，反而成为管理层权力寻租、进行“自利”的机会主义行为的隐蔽途径。在这样的背景下，本文试图从股权激励制度的根源理论“最优契约论”（将股权激励视为解决代理冲突的途径）、以及创新理论“管理层权力论”（将股权激励视为另类代理问题的表现）的角度，来论述这些方案背后的真实动机；并且从“最优契约论”成立的三个理论前提（独立的董事会、有效的外部市场、以及健全的法制）出发，以其作为制衡管理层权力的三重保护措施，从而验证对管理层权力的约束是否有助于真正“激励型”股票期权方案的产生。如果基于这三重保护指定的假设成立，那么对于如何更好的制约管理层权力，进而制定真正意义的股票期权激励计划，就有了重要的理论和现实意义。
英文摘要：	Since The Regulation of Equity Incentive in Listed Companies (Trial Implementation) was carried out by China Securities Regulatory Commission in January 1, 2006, Executive Stock Option (ESO) has being working as one of the Incentive Mechanism for Senior Executive formally in China. Undeniably, the implement of relative acts makes it possible to carry out several effective ESO plans to stimulate the hard-working of managers. However, we can also found such ESO plans which was worth abnormal trading values, just like the 300-million ESO plan carried out by Yili Group. These make us doubtable that, ESO plan may have being designed as a hidden channel to transport interest to Senior Executives. By using less complicated executive conditions, easier performance conditions, and shorter term of validity, some ESO plan violate its initial purpose which is stimulating managers, but change to help get the rent of senior executives’ power. In this background, this paper tries to find the real incentives behind the ESO plans, in the view of both “Best Contract Theory” and “Managerial Power Theory”. Then in the framework of “Triple Protection”, which is the theoretical premise of “Best Contract Theory”, namely, independent board of directors, effective external market, and strict legal environment, we want to find the evidence that the restrict of Managerial Power can lead to the real incentive-orient ESO plan. Based on the “Triple Protection”, we put forward three hypotheses. By collecting samples and building models, we want to prove that these hypotheses are tenable. If so, it is meaningful in both theory and practice that we refine the “Three Triple” to impose restrictions on the managerial power in order to carry out real incentive-orient ESO plan.
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