联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	4260
作者编号：	2120102240
上传时间：	2012/6/6 11:33:55
中文题目：	股权激励、研发投资与公司绩效研究
英文题目：	The Research Among the Stockholder’s Rights Inspiring、the Investment in R & D and the Company Performance
指导老师：	周宝源
中文关键字：	高管持股比例，研发费用投资强度，第一大股东持股比例，高管薪酬，托宾Q值
英文关键字：	The shareholding percentage of executives, R&D investment intensity, the shareholding percentage of the first major stockholder, Executive compensation, Tobin''''s Q
中文摘要：	现在企业制度条件下，管理层与股东之间存在严重代理问题，而有效的激励方案是解决代理问题的有效途径，股权激励使高管与股东共同承担风险和享受收益。我国处于经济转型期，逐渐完善的市场经济，为衡量高管持股价值提供了有利平台，从2006年开始，我国先后出台了《上市公司股权激励管理办法》(试行)、《股权激励有关事项备忘录》等一系列政策，来规范企业对高管的激励行为。 创新是企业追求可持续发展的重要途径,企业一方面可以通过创新获得超额利润，另一方面,可以通过创新产生知识外溢效应，增强企业的学习能力。股权激励能够使高管追求个人利益最大化与企业追求股东价值最大化的目标一致,那么股权激励政策是否能促使高管加大对研发项目的投入力度呢？本文主要借鉴前人的研究，选择高管持股比例和股权激励作为自变量进行研究；本文选取了沪深两市2008-2010年的上市公司为研究样本，研究了高管持股与研发费用投资的关系及分别研究了公司内部第一大股东持股比例与高管薪酬对高管持股比例与研发投资之间关系的调节作用；同时研究了高管持股比例对研发投资与公司绩效之间的关系的影响情况。实证得出高管持股比例与研发投资显著正相关；国有企业与民营企业相比，高管持股比例与研发投资的正相关性更强；第一大股东持股比例及高管薪酬对高管持股比例与研发投资之间的关系有显著调减作用；高管持股比例对研发投资与企业绩效之间的关系有显著的正向调节作用。
英文摘要：	Under modern enterprise system, the relationship between management and shareholders exist agency problems, while an effective incentive program is a wonderful way to solve the agency problems, Stockholder’s rights inspiring leads the executives and the shareholders bear the risks and enjoy the benefits together. China's economy is in transition, the market economic continues to mature and improve, it provides a favorable platform to measure of the value of managerial ownership, since 2006, our country introduced “Listed Company Administration of Equity Incentive Measures” (Trial) and “Matters Related to Equity Incentive Memorandum”, this regulations are used to regulate the behavior of executives incentives. The innovation is an important way for the enterprises to pursuit of sustainable development, on the one hand, the enterprise can reap excessive profits, on the other hand, they can through innovation to generate knowledge spillovers, and enhance their learning ability. Stockholder’s rights inspiring leads the executives to pursuit the maximization of individual interests with the long-term goal of the enterprise, so are they lead the executives to increase to invest in R&D projects? This thesis uses the 2008 to 2010 in Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies as a sample, The mayor research question is the relationship between the strength of the executives shareholding percentage and R&D investment、the shareholding percentage of the first major stockholder and executive compensation regulation role，in addition to, empirical analysis how executives shareholding percentage influence the relationship between R&D and company performance. The conclusions are that the executives shareholding percentage with R&D investment significant positive correlation; Compared the state-owned enterprise with private enterprise, the positive relationship between executives shareholding percentage and R&D investment is more stronger; The shareholding percentage of the largest stockholder has negative influence on the relationship between executives shareholding percentage and R&D investment，So does the executive compensation; Executives’ shareholding percentage has positive influence on the relationship between R&D investment and enterprise performance.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)