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论文编号：	4259
作者编号：	2120102255
上传时间：	2012/6/6 11:18:49
中文题目：	内部控制与我国上市公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性
英文题目：	Internal Control and Executive Pay-performance Sensitivity of Listed Companies in China
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	内部控制，实际控制人类型，高管薪酬业绩敏感性
英文关键字：	Internal control, actual controller type, pay- performance sensitivity
中文摘要：	根据委托代理理论，公司股东与高管之间由于存在利益的不一致和信息的不对称，使得公司高管追求私利而损害公司股东利益的行为难以被公司股东察觉，从而产生了委托代理问题，而委托代理问题的出现则降低了公司运营的效率。如何更好地解决委托代理问题，减少企业的委托代理成本，一直是学术界研究的热点。通过好的薪酬激励契约使公司经营者的薪酬与股东的收益相挂钩无疑是解决这一问题最佳的途径。而要使公司高管的报酬与股东利益趋于一致就是要使高管的薪酬函数与公司收益挂钩，而高管薪酬业绩敏感度则是度量之一目标的重要指标，成为国内外学者研究的重要领域。国外学者经过研究发现，董事会规模与构成，股权结构，产权等特征对高管薪酬业绩敏感度均有显著影响，国内对于高管薪酬业绩敏感度的研究起步相对较晚，但也发现了与国外相似的研究结果。然而无论是国外的学者还是国内学者对于内部控制与薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系则较少研究。本文认为内部控制作为一种贯穿公司内部几乎所有控制流程的监督约束机制，必然对高管的自利行为产生了一定的约束，在一定程度上减弱了信息不对称的问题。同时良好的内部控制机制有助于提升公司业绩，作为理性的高管必然会主动要求将其薪酬与公司业绩更加紧密的挂钩，即提高薪酬业绩敏感度，从而实现自身利益的最大化。鉴于此，本文以沪深两市上市公司2007年至2008年的年报数据为样本，通过阅读从证监会网站披露的上市公司自我评估与整改报告评价上市公司内部控制质量，构建实证模型检验两者之间是否存在显著的相关性。同时鉴于我国国有上市公司占据上市公司半壁江山的特殊国情，本文对总体样本按照实际控制人类型进行分组，又分组检验了内部控制与高管薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系。通过回归分析，发现我国上市公司内部控制与高管薪酬业绩敏感性之间存在协同性，两者呈现正相关的关系，即不存在内部控制重大缺陷的公司，其高管薪酬业绩敏感度也相对较高，而且，与非国有上市公司相比，国有上市公司内部控制质量与高管薪酬业绩敏感性之间的协同性更强，提高内部控制质量将会显著提高高管薪酬业绩敏感性。因此，鉴于本文的研究结果，提出以下建议：首先，重视提高我国上市公司内部控制的质量和公司治理机制的完善，不能将两者分开来看，应结合两者之间存在协同性这一关系的情况，注重两者之间的有效链接。鉴于实际控制人类型对于两者之间关系的影响，应注重区分对待。再次，继续改革高管的薪酬激励制度，使高管报酬与公司业绩挂钩。 本文采用了实证研究的方法实证检验了上市公司内部控制质量与高管薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系，研究方法较为新颖，同时对于内部控制与公司治理之间关系的研究提供了更多的证据。然而由于数据的局限性，本文的研究仅横跨两个年度，对研究结果的稳健性产生了一定的影响，同时采用上市公司自查报告对内部控制质量进行评估存在一定的风险，同样不利于研究结论的稳健。
英文摘要：	According to Principal-agent theory, due to the inconsistency of interest and information asymmetry between shareholders and executives, it is difficult for the shareholders to detect the behaviors of managers who do damage to the interest of the whole company in the pursuit of his own interest, resulting in the a principal-agent problem, while the emergence of principal-agent problem will reduce the efficiency of company operations. How to solve the principal-agent problem better and reduce the cost of principal agent has been the focus of research for a long time. The modern principal-agent theory suggests that only through good contract design which can make the interests of managers in line with the interests of shareholder can solve the principal-agent problem. Make company managers’ remuneration in line with shareholders' interests to make the managers’ pay function with earnings linked to the performance of the company, while the payment-performance sensitivity has always been an important index in this field which has been studied by scholars both at home and scholars abroad. Through their study, foreign scholars has found that board size and composition, ownership structure, actual controller type and other characteristics have an significant effect on executives pay performance sensitivity. Though domestic scholars studied pay performance sensitivity relatively later than foreign scholars, they also found similar results. However, research on the relationship between internal control and pay performance sensitivity by both foreign scholars and domestic scholars is merely seen. Since internal control, as a supervision and restraint mechanisms, which involves almost all the control processes throughout the company, will absolutely constraint the inevitable self-serving behavior of managers, weakening the problem of asymmetric information to a certain extent. Good internal control mechanisms also help to improve the performance of the company. As rational persons, managers will certainly require their remuneration to be more closely linked to the company performance to maximize their own interests, increasing the pay performance sensitivity. In view of this, this article choose samples from the annual reports of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen security markets from 2007 to 2008, make use of the internal self-assessment report written by the listed companies themselves to determine the quality of internal control and then test the relationship between the quality of internal control and the pay performance sensitivity empirically. Since the state-owned companies in China account for more than half of the total list companies in China, we group the total samples into small samples in accordance to the actual controller of the list company in order to study better under the special circumstances of China. According to the results of the empirical test, there are synergies between the quality of internal controls and pay performance sensitivity of managers, the better the quality of internal control, the higher the pay performance sensitivity of managers. Also, compared with non-state-owned list companies, state-owned list companies have better coordination between the quality of internal control and pay performance sensitivity, which means that improving the quality of internal control will significantly improve the pay performance sensitivity of executive pay. Therefore, in view of the findings of this article, I make the following suggestions: First, continue to improve internal control mechanisms to strengthen the link and interaction between internal control and corporate governance. Since the coherence between internal control and corporate governance of state-owned listed companies is stronger than that of non-state-owned companies, we should pay attention to strengthening the improvement of the quality of internal control of state-owned listed companies. Once again, continue to reform executive compensation incentives, making the executive compensation more closely linked to the performance of the companies. This article empirically examines the relationship between the quality of internal control and pay performance sensitivity, which is innovative in the field of internal control. Also, the study of relationship between the quality of internal control and pay performance sensitivity is rare, which gives more evidence to the study of internal control and corporate governance. However, due to data limitations, this study only across two years, the robustness of the results will be affected, while making use of the self-examination report on internal control written by the listed companies themselves to determine the quality of internal controls will be risky, which will also do damage to the robustness of the results.
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