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论文编号：	4215
作者编号：	2120102239
上传时间：	2012/6/5 18:45:10
中文题目：	企业政治关联、社会责任及预算软约束——基于我国民营上市公司的实证研究
英文题目：	Political relationship, Corporate social responsibility and the Soft budget constraint——An Empirical Study Based on China''''''''s Private Listed Companies
指导老师：	李姝 教授
中文关键字：	企业社会责任，政治关联，预算软约束，民营上市公司
英文关键字：	corporate social responsibility, politics relationship, soft budget constraint, private listed companies
中文摘要：	随着经济的发展，我国民营经济已经成为国民经济的重要组成部分。但是一方面，民营企业负面新闻频出，要求其注重社会责任的履行已经成为政府及社会公众的强烈诉求；另一方面民营企业由于发展的特殊性，社会对其的“歧视”现象仍有存在，融资难等问题由来已久。在市场信息不对称的情况下，利益相关者倾向于进行逆向选择，从2011年爆出的温州民营企业资金链断裂，老板失踪的事件中，就可见一斑。 本文基于资源依赖理论、利益相关者理论和信号传递理论，对我国民营企业的发展现状进行了分析，认为政治关联是我国民营企业在经济法律制度不完善的市场机制下建立的替代性机制，通过政治关联可以向利益相关者传递良好的信息以弥补市场信息的不对称，规避利益相关者的逆向选择行为。同时从企业社会责任战略性履行的角度，解释了政治关联这个替代机制的建立以及由此产生的在企业预算软约束方面的影响。 在对2008年-2010年沪深两市A股民营上市公司的实证研究后，发现我国民营企业中政治关联的确广泛存在，其中企业高管担任地方性政协委员、人大代表是建立政治关联的主要方式；政治关联能给企业带来贷款、特别是长期贷款的融资便利，存在中央性政治关联的企业更容易获得税收优惠；雇员平均工资方面的社会责任履行度越高，企业越容易获得银行贷款和税收优惠，而捐赠却和预算软约束关系不大；雇员平均工资和捐赠的履行度越高越能帮助企业建立政治关联；在企业社会责任对政治关联和预算软约束关系的作用上：雇员平均工资方面的社会责任的履行能够增强政治关联与银行贷款方面的预算软约束的正向关系，帮助有政治关联的企业获得更多的银行贷款，而捐赠方面的社会责任却对该关系起到了负向调节的作用。由于法规制度的影响大于替代性机制的间接作用，企业社会责任的战略性运用对政治关联与实际所得税率的负向关系没有增强的作用。
英文摘要：	With the development of economy, China's private sector has become an important part of the market. On one hand, the negative news of private enterprises is frequently exposed, which attract people's attention to corporate social responsibility. On the other hand, due to the special nature of private enterprise in China, the "discrimination" against private enterprises still exists .Stakeholders tend to make adverse selection because of the asymmetric information in the market. We can get some information in the event that bosses of private enterprises in Wenzhou escaped due to funding strand broken. This paper makes a research on the current situation of private enterprise in China which based on resource dependence theory，stakeholder theory and signaling theory, presenting the idea that because of the imperfect economic and legal system, China’s private enterprises usually chose political relationship as an alternative mechanism. Stakeholders can get more information through the political relationship as a compensation of asymmetric information to avoid adverse selection. What’s more, this paper explains how the alternative mechanism established and what kind of soft budget constraints caused by the alternative mechanism in the perspective of strategic usage of corporate social responsibility. After an empirical research with the data of companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2010 ,this paper have some conclusions as follows: Political relationship in the private enterprise is popular, the main way to establish a political relationship is that the corporate board members and managers of the private enterprise try to become local CPPCC members and local representatives of the people; political relationship can provide financing facility, especially the long-term loan; the enterprise which have central political relationship will be easier to get tax incentives then others; the more the enterprise do on raising average wage , the easier for them to get bank loans and tax incentives, but the donation index of CSR has no such influence; the enterprise can establish political relationship by shoulder more social responsibility ,such as raising the average wage level and having more donation; The average wage index of CSR can enhance the influence of political relationship on the soft budget constraint, then enterprise will get more bank loans ; however, the donation index of CSR shows a negative regulatory role in the relationship between political relationship and bank loans .The impact of law is greater than the indirect effects of alternative mechanisms, so the strategic usage of corporate social responsibility can not enhance relationship between political relationship and income tax rate.
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