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论文编号：	4206
作者编号：	1120080746
上传时间：	2012/6/5 16:53:09
中文题目：	企业战略的性质及治理效应
英文题目：	The Nature of Firm Strategy and Its Governance Effects
指导老师：	薛有志
中文关键字：	企业战略，组织理性，可靠承诺，公司治理，治理效应
英文关键字：	Firm Strategy, Organizational Rationality, Credible Commitment, Corporate Governance, Governance Effects
中文摘要：	企业战略和战略管理理论经过半个多世纪的发展，已经形成了战略理论丛林。然而，企业战略理论在近些年似乎遇到了瓶颈，其以人格化企业为基本分析单位的研究范式难以准确回答诸如企业战略为什么会存在，企业战略的根本性质是什么这样的问题。本文遵循主流企业理论的研究范式，将企业看作是各种生产要素投入者之间的契约束，以交易或契约为基本分析单位，探讨了企业战略的基本问题。本论文的研究目的是，以交易或契约为基本分析单位，根据企业理论、交易成本经济学、代理理论以及其他相关理论，结合传统的企业战略及战略管理理论的研究结论，概括出企业战略的内涵，探明企业战略存在的原因，掌握企业战略的根本性质，探寻出企业战略的治理效应；在为企业战略理论做出贡献的同时，最终指导企业战略管理和公司治理的实践活动。 本论文以理论研究为主，实证研究为辅。在理论研究的过程中，第三章是本文逻辑框架的核心，这一章结合第一章的研究背景和第二章的理论回顾及对企业战略内涵的界定着重论证了企业战略的起源问题，提出企业战略的两个根本性质：组织理性和可靠承诺，并初步探讨了企业战略的治理效应。在第三章的基础上，本文的第四章和第五章分别论证了企业战略的组织理性和可靠承诺的性质；第六章则从战略制定和战略实施两个方面论述了企业战略过程的治理效应。本文的实证研究目的是为了进一步检验理论研究归纳和演绎的结论。在第七章，本文首先用内容分析法分析了研究样本的正式战略陈述的内容，证实了企业战略陈述确实体现了组织理性和可靠承诺的根本性质；其次，本文用统计分析法和回归分析法检验了企业战略对企业代理成本及经理与股东的激励相容的影响，以及企业战略实施结果对企业价值及经理离职的影响。通过实证研究，本文进一步证实了理论研究的大部分结论。 本文的第一个研究结论解释了企业战略存在原因。以交易或契约为基本分析单位，本文认为企业的中心签约人或经理在事前考虑自身及其他签约人的理性确定未来资源配置的决策、目标和计划并作出承诺，能够在企业之内形成共同目标，产生理性预期并促进信息传递，从而减少经理的卸责或敲竹杠行为，降低管理成本。所以，本文认为企业出现之后，企业战略之所以会出现的原因是，企业战略能够节省管理成本（在企业内部组织资源所花费的成本）。 根据对企业战略起源的分析，本文第二个结论认为企业战略的根本性质是组织理性和可靠承诺。在现代公司中，由于企业战略在事前形成，所以在战略形成过程中经理不得不接受来自股东、董事会和其他利益相关者的影响，公司各利益相关主体会达成战略共识。战略共识的达成源于企业各相关利益主体之间不仅仅存在利益分歧，更重要的是存在利益一致性，战略共识体现了组织理性的性质。企业的组织理性代表了企业组织中各种相关利益主体理性利益的协调和折衷。虽然企业各利益主体因为组织理性而达成了战略共识，但资源配置的实际权威仍然掌握在经理手中，所以要保证组织理性的达成，还需要经理对未来资源配置的决策、目标和计划作出承诺。由于对经理的激励机制和监督机制的存在，增大了经理违约的成本，强化了对违约的惩罚，所以战略承诺具有可靠性，可靠承诺是企业战略的另一根本性质。 本文的第三个结论认为，公司治理是确保股东获得满意的剩余收益，维护经理和其他利益相关者的正常利益，促进公司核心机构内外部契约达成的机制。企业战略的组织理性能够提高经理与股东的激励相容程度，减少剩余损失；企业战略的可靠承诺，能够为董事会提供监督经理的工具，降低监督费用和保障支出；因此，企业战略能够降低代理成本，促进契约达成，发挥治理效应。具体来说，企业战略过程的治理效应可以体现在战略制定和战略实施两阶段的过程中，表现在战略过程可以促进股东权益保护、提高董事会效率、（在一定程度上）替代激励机制、引入利益相关者关系治理以及强化外部治理机制等方面。 本文的创新体现在三个方面：第一，突破了传统企业战略理论以企业为基本分析单位，假设企业人格化的研究范式，而以交易或契约为基本分析单位，探讨企业的战略问题，因此很容易深入探讨企业战略的起源、企业战略的根本性质等基本问题；第二，突破了传统企业战略理论以竞争优势解释企业战略起源的做法，把企业看作是契约束，以节省管理成本来解释企业战略的产生原因，显然能够摆脱传统战略理论在解释战略起源方面的困境；第三，突破了传统企业战略与公司治理关系的论述中片面强调公司治理影响战略的观点，提出企业战略能够发挥治理效应的观点。
英文摘要：	After more than half a century’s development, a jungle of strategic theories has been formed with regard to firm strategy and strategic management. However, in recent years, the firm strategy theories seem to have encountered a bottleneck—the traditional paradigm which takes a personified firm as the basic analytical unit seem to be incapable of giving a satisfying answer to such questions as why firm strategy exists and what its nature is. This thesis follows the mainstream paradigm of the theory of the firm, viewing the firm as a bundle of contracts among various investors who input production factors; and taking not a personified firm but transaction or contract as the basic analytical unit it explores the basic issues of firm strategy. Therefore, this thesis, taking transaction or contract as the basic analytical unit, and based on the Theory of the Firm, Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory and other relevant theories, together with findings from the firm strategy and strategic management theories, aims to summarize the concept of firm strategy, seek evidence for its existence, grasp its nature and investigate its governance effects; and ultimately to guide the practice of strategic management and corporate governance as well as to contribute to the theory of firm strategy. This thesis is mainly a theoretical research supplemented by an empirical research. In the theoretical research, Chapter 3 is the core of the logical framework. By combining the research background in Chapter 1 and the literature review and definition of firm strategy in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 focuses on exploring the origin of firm strategy, proposing two aspects of its nature—organizational rationality and credible commitment, and investigating the governance effects of firm strategy. On the basis of Chapter 3, the two aspects of nature of firm strategy—organizational rationality and credible commitment are demonstrated respectively in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5; while in Chapter 6, the governance effects of the firm strategy process are discussed from the two stages of strategy formulation and strategy implementation. The empirical research of this thesis is to further test the inductive and deductive conclusions from the theoretical research. In Chapter 7, firstly, by analyzing the official statement of the strategy in the study samples by means of content analysis, this thesis confirms that the statement of firm strategy indeed reflects the nature of organizational rationality and credible commitment; secondly, statistical analysis and regression analysis are used to examine the impact of firm strategy on the agency costs in companies and on the incentive alignment between managers and shareholders, and the impact of the outcome of strategy implementation on corporate value and managers' turnover. Through empirical study, this thesis further confirms most conclusions of the theoretical research. The first conclusion of this thesis explains the reason to the existence of firm strategy. By taking transaction or contract as the basic analytical unit, this thesis believes that the central party to the contracts or the managers of the firm will ex ante consider the rationality of their own and other contractors' to determine the future decisions, objectives and plans regarding resource allocation and make commitments subsequently, which helps form a common goal and a rational expectation within the firm, and facilitates the transmission of information, thereby reducing managers' shirking and holdup behaviors and decreasing the management costs. Therefore, this thesis believes, after the appearance of the firm, the reason to the existence of firm strategy lies in the saving of management costs—costs spent on organizing resources within the firm. Based on analysis about the origin of firm strategy, the second conclusion of this thesis is—the nature of firm strategy lies in organizational rationality and credible commitment. In modern corporations, since a firm's strategy is formulated ex ante, managers have to accept influence from shareholders, the board of directors and other stakeholders in formulating the strategy, thus the final strategy would be a consensus among all corporate stakeholders. The reason to the realization of such a consensus lies in the fact that among all types of stakeholders, there is not only interest divergence, there is also and more importantly, interest consistency, therefore a strategic consensus reflects the organizational rationality. The organizational rationality implies coordination and compromise of rational interest among all stakeholders of the firm. Although the strategic consensus is reached among all stakeholders under the dynamism of organizational rationality, the actual authority of resource allocation is still rested in the managers; therefore, to guarantee the realization of organizational rationality managers still need to make commitments to future decisions, objectives and plans regarding resources allocation. Since the presence of the incentive and supervision mechanism on managers can increase their default cost and strengthen penalties for their breach of the contracts, the strategic commitment is credible; therefore credible commitment constitutes another aspect of the nature of firm strategy. The third conclusion of this thesis believes that corporate governance is the mechanisms that ensure shareholders get satisfying residual earnings, managers and other stakeholders get normal interests and the contracts inside and outside the corporate core structure can be reached. The organizational rationality aspect of firm strategy can improve the extent of incentive alignment between managers and shareholders and then reduce the residual loss; the credible commitment aspect of firm strategy, on the other hand, can provide the board of directors a tool to supervise managers, thus reducing both the monitoring expenditures and the bonding expenditures; therefore, the firm strategy can reduce agency costs, promote the realization of the contract , and exert governance effects. Specifically, the governance effects of the firm strategy process can be reflected in two stages—strategy formulation and strategy implementation, which shows that the firm strategy process can promote the protection of shareholders' interests, improve the efficiency of the board of directors, substitute the incentive mechanisms (to a certain extent), introduce the governance of stakeholders' relationship, and strengthen the external governance mechanisms. The innovations of this thesis lie in three aspects: First, this thesis breaks through the paradigm of traditional firm strategy theory which takes the firm as the basic analytical unit by assuming a personified firm, but discusses the strategic issues of firms by taking transaction or contract as the basic analytical unit, making it easy to profoundly study such basic issues as the origin of firm strategy as well as its nature. Second, this thesis breaks through the practice of traditional firm strategy theory which attributes the origin of firm strategy to competitive advantage, but views the firm as a contract bundle and attributes the existence of firm strategy to saving of management costs, thus apparently get out of the plight of traditional theories in this regard. Third, this thesis breaks through the traditional perspective in discussing the relationship between firm strategy and corporate governance which places one-sided emphasis on impact of corporate governance on firm strategy, arguing that firm strategy can also exert governance effcets.
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