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论文编号：	4165
作者编号：	1120080744
上传时间：	2012/6/4 22:33:40
中文题目：	行政型治理与公司绩效的实证研究
英文题目：	An Empirical Research on Administrative Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance
指导老师：	程秀生/李维安
中文关键字：	终极所有权；行政型治理行为；公司绩效
英文关键字：	ultimate ownership；administrative governance behavior；corporate performance
中文摘要：	中国国企改革始于1978年，首先在控制权方面进行了改革，包括扩大企业自主权、推行经济责任制、两步利改税、大中型企业承包经营责任制、小型企业租赁制、转化经营机制，随后在所有权方面进行了改革，包括建立股份制、股权分置、股权分置改革。国企所有权和控制权的变革必然伴随着国企公司治理的转型。改革前计划经济时期国企公司治理属于典型行政型治理模式，采取党委领导下的厂长负责制。上世纪80年代改革初期商品经济时期，公司治理属于转轨行政型治理模式，采取厂长负责制。上世纪90年代市场经济时期，公司治理步入从政府控制下的行政型向企业自主治理的经济型转型期。2008年从美国引发的世界金融危机表明，以英美模式为代表的典型经济型治理并不是最优模式，完全没有政府参与仅依靠公司自主治理的治理模式必定会造成治理风险的累积和泛滥。后危机时代在典型行政型治理与典型经济型治理之间探索一种稳定的治理模式则显得尤为重要。本文研究目标包括：（1）在理论方面探索行政型治理与经济型治理的最优组合；（2）在指标设定上探索行政型治理方面的量化研究；（3）在实证方面探索所有权安排通过行政型治理行为对公司绩效的影响。本文研究创新如下：（1）从动态博弈演化视角解释行政型治理向经济型治理的转型；（2）引入转轨经济型治理、稳定经济型治理、典型经济型治理的概念，认为中国公司治理的演进路径是典型行政型治理、转轨行政型治理、转轨经济型治理、稳定经济型治理；（3）引入行政型治理行为、行政型治理行为指数的概念，把企业协助政府承担部分社会目标的行为界定为行政型治理行为，通过对各类行政型治理行为进行赋值，构建出了行政型治理行为指数。本文研究对象是中国国有和民营控股上市公司，研究方法是分层聚类分析、理论归纳与规范分析、描述性统计与实证检验分析方法、对比分析法。本文研究框架如下：第一章是绪论，第二章是文献回顾，第三章是行政型治理博弈演化分析，第四章是终极所有权与行政型治理行为的实证研究，第五章是行政型治理行为与公司绩效的实证研究，第六章是研究结论与展望。通过理论与实证研究，本文得到以下主要结论：（1）理论研究结论：国有企业从“典型行政型治理”演进到“转轨经济型治理”阶段，但还有相当一部分国有企业依然采用较强的“行政型治理”模式，国有企业完全实现“稳定经济型治理”模式还需要很长的时间。（2）终极所有权与行政型治理行为实证研究结论：①国有控股上市公司终极所有权对社会捐赠、支付工资福利有显著的正向影响，对解决就业、政府退税的影响不显著；②国有控股上市公司终极控制权对社会捐赠、支付工资福利有显著的负向影响，对解决就业、政府退税的影响不显著；③国有控股上市公司董事长行政联系对社会捐赠、解决就业、支付工资福利有显著的正向影响，对政府退税的影响不显著；④国有控股上市公司总经理行政联系对政府退税有显著的正向影响，对社会捐赠、解决就业、支付工资福利影响不显著；⑤国有控股上市公司终极所有权、董事长行政联系对行政型治理行为指数有显著的正向影响。终极控制权对行政型治理行为指数有显著的负向影响。总经理行政联系对行政型治理行为指数影响不显著；⑥民营控股上市公司除终极所有权对支付工资福利有显著正向影响外，未发现上述结论。以上结论证明国有控股上市公司比民营控股上市公司承担了更多的社会责任，履行了更多的行政型治理行为。（3）行政型治理行为与公司绩效实证研究结论：①国有控股上市公司社会捐赠、解决就业、支付工资福利对公司绩效有显著的负向影响；②国有控股上市公司政府退税对公司绩效有显著的正向影响；③国有控股上市公司行政型治理行为指数对公司绩效有显著的负向影响，这表明虽然行政型治理行为某些方面能够显著正向影响公司绩效，但行政型治理行为的综合效果却显著负向影响公司绩效；④民营控股上市公司未发现上述结论。以上结论证明国有控股上市公司的行政型治理行为较少考虑经济上的投入与产出，而民营控股上市公司的行政型治理行为要考虑经济上的投入与产出。 结合上述结论，本文提出以下建议：（1）进一步分离国有控股公司的社会职能，强化企业的经济目标，同时完善社会保障体系，保障员工群体的根本利益，快速实现 “稳定经济型治理”模式；（2）降低政府对国有控股上市公司的终极所有权，从而降低行政型治理行为指数，进而提高上市公司财务绩效；（3）在政府终极所有权不发生变化情况下，降低政府对直接控制公司的持股比例，提高政府对间接控制的上市公司的持股比例，也能够有效降低行政型治理行为指数，进而提高上市公司财务绩效；（4）降低上市公司董事长的行政联系，选聘非政府背景的人员担当董事长，能够有效降低行政型治理行为指数，进而提高上市公司财务绩效。
英文摘要：	Chinese SOEs reform began in 1978, the first carried on aspect of control right, including the expansion of enterprise autonomy, the implementation of economic responsibility, two-step turning profits, medium and large enterprise contract responsibility system, small businesses leasing system, transforming business mechanism. The second carried on aspect of the ownership, including the establishment of joint-stock, stock split, the split share structure reform. The reform of SOEs’ ownership and control right must be accompanied changed in corporate governance of SOEs. SOEs corporate governance under pre-reform planned economy was a typical administrative governance, managers took responsibility under the leadership of the party. In the early 1980s, under commodity economy SOEs corporate governance was transitional administrative governance and manager took all responsibility. In 1990s under the market economy SOEs corporate governance changed from administrative governance controlled by government to economic governance implemented by SOEs itself. In 2008, the global financial crisis shew that the Anglo-American corporate governance model that represented the economic governance was not the best model. Corporate self-governance without government involved will result in the risk accumulation. In post-crisis era it is especially important to explore a new corporate governance model between typical administrative governance and typical economic governance. This research goals include:(1) in the theoretical aspects, explore optimal combination between administrative governance and economic governance;(2) conduct quantitative research on administrative governance;(3) in the empirical aspects, explore the ownership arrangements impact on company performance through administrative governance. This research innovation is as follows:(1) explain the evolution from administrative governance to economic governance by dynamic game model;(2) introduce the concept which are transitional economic governance, stable economic governance and the typical economic governance. The evolution path of corporate governance in China experiences the type administrative governance, transitional administrative governance, transitional economic governance and stable economic governance;(3) introduce the concept which are administrative governance behavior and administrative governance behavior index.The behavior that assists the government to bear part of the social goals is defined as administrative governance behavior, then build the administrative governance behavior index by all kinds of behavior.This research objects are Chinese state-owned and private holding companies. The research methodologies are hierarchical cluster analysis, the theory of induction and specification analysis, descriptive statistics and empirical test analysis, and method of comparative analysis.The framework of this research is as follows: The first chapter is introduction. The second chapter is literature review. The third chapter is the game evolution of the administrative governance. The fourth chapter is the empirical research between ultimate ownership and administrative governance behavior. The fifth chapter is empirical research between administrative governance behavior and corporate performance. The sixth chapter is the conclusion and prospects. Through theoretical and empirical research, this paper obtaines the following main conclusions: (1)Theoretical research findings: the SOEs corporate governance has changed from the typical administrative governance to transitional economic governance, but there are a considerable number of SOEs still using a strong administrative governance model.The full realization of stable economic governancel also requires very long time. (2)Research findings between ultimate ownership and administrative governance behavior:①State-controlled listed company ultimate ownership has a significant positive impact on public donations and solving the employment;②State-controlled listed company ultimate control has a significant negative impact on public donations and solving the employment;③State-controlled listed company chairman administrative contact has a significant positive impact on public donations, solving the employment and paying off welfare.④State-controlled list company general manager administrative contact has a significant positive impact on the tax rebate;⑤ State-controlled listed company ultimate ownership and chairman administrative contact have significant positive impacts on administrative governance behavior index. Ultimate control has a significant negative impact on administrative governance behavior index;⑥Private holding companies do not have these conclusions except the ultimate ownership has a significant positive on paying off welfare. These conclusions prove that the state-controlled listed companies assume more social responsibilities and more administrative governance behavior than private holding companies. (3)Research findings between administrative governance behavior and corporate performance:①State-controlled listed companies public donations, solving the employment and paying off welfare have significant negative impacts on corporate performance;②Sate-controlled listed companies tax rebate has a significant positive impact on corporate performance;③State-controlled listed companies administravive governance behavior index has a significant negative impact on corporate performance. This shows that some aspects of administrative governance behavior can significantly positively affect the company performance, but the combined effects of the administrative governance behavior have a significant negative impact on corporate performance;④Private holding companies do not have these conclusions. All conclusions prove that state-controlled listed companies consider less input and output on the administrative governance behavior, while the private holding companies are just the other way. Summary of the above conclusions, this paper gives the following recommendations:(1) Further separating the social function of the state-owned list companies and strengthening its economic goals can quickly achieve "stable economic governance" model;(2) Reducing the government ultimate ownership of state-owned list companies can reduce the administrative governance index, and thus improve the financial performance;(3) Under the case that the government ultimate ownership does not change , reducing the government direct control and improving indirect control also can effectively reduce the administrative governance index, thereby increase its financial performance;(4)Reducing chairman administrative contact and selecting non-governmental backgrounds chairman can effectively reduce the administrative governance index, and thus improve its financial performance.
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