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论文编号:4117 
作者编号:2120102356 
上传时间:2012/5/30 13:40:55 
中文题目:我国上市公司主动设立独立董事的动因研究——合法性先行,还是效率先行? 
英文题目:Study on the Motive of Voluntarily Establishing the Independent Board Director by Chinese Listed Companies——Legitimacy First, Efficiency First? 
指导老师:武立东 
中文关键字:主动设立独立董事,技术环境,制度环境,效率机制,合法性机制 
英文关键字:establishing the independent board director voluntarily, technological environment, institutional environment, efficiency mechanism, legitimacy mechanism 
中文摘要:自2001年8月《指导意见》发布以来,我国上市公司的独立董事制度经过了10多年的发展与变迁。《指导意见》中要求上市公司董事会中独立董事的比例不得低于三分之一,但一个有趣的现象是,自其发布以来,越来越多的上市公司中独立董事都超过了法定比例。本研究便聚焦于这一有趣的现象,试图揭示出上市公司实行这一制度创新的动因。在已有研究基础上,本研究将公司看作一个开放系统,从公司整体的角度探讨上市公司如何通过主动设立独立董事应对外部技术环境和制度环境的作用机理,并进一步揭示我国上市公司独立董事制度的变迁过程。为了揭示上市公司主动设立独立董事的动因,本研究将定性分析方法与定量分析方法进行了有机结合。在具体的研究过程中,我们首先对已有关于独立董事的研究、关于组织与环境关系的研究进行了回顾与梳理,在此基础上,我们对相关理论进行阐释与分析,逻辑推理出技术环境和制度环境对上市公司主动设立独立董事行为的影响机理,并提出相应的假设。随后,我们采用定量分析的方法对假设进行检验。我们首先采用logit回归方法检验了哪些因素决定着上市公司是否主动设立独立董事;由于2004年后绝大多数上市公司都采纳了这一制度创新形式,我们又用面板数据的随机效应模型对这些主动设立的独立董事是否已内生出一定效率进行了检验。另外,我们还对4家上市公司进行了具体分析,以进一步佐证所得结论。实证分析的结果表明,上市公司主动设立独立董事最初是为了模仿和向外界传递信号,而随后上市公司采取这一行为的动因则主要是为了获取资源,即合法性机制先发挥作用,接着效率机制再发挥作用。进一步分析独立董事制度的变迁过程可以发现,我国上市公司的独立董事制度开始由强制性变迁转变为诱致性变迁,即上市公司在引入独立董事时开始考虑自身特征。本研究将组织社会学中的新制度理论引入到我国的公司治理研究中,有力地丰富了新制度理论;同时,本研究对合法性先行的独立董事制度变迁过程的揭示呼应了关于效率机制与合法性机制之间关系的研究,补充了已有认为效率机制先于合法性机制发挥作用的研究,具有重要的理论意义。另一方面,本研究所揭示的我国上市公司独立董事制度的变迁过程表明借鉴自发达国家的独立董事制度开始出现本土化的迹象,识别这种由强制性变迁向诱致性变迁的转变无论对相关部门制定政策,还是对上市公司完善自身治理状况,都具有一定的实践意义。 
英文摘要:Since August, 2001, when SFC (Securities Regulatory Commission) issued Guidance on the establishment of independent director system in listed companies, the independent director system of Chinese listed companies has gone through over ten years’ development and transition. The Guidance requires that the proportion of independent directors in board of listed companies should not be under 1/3. However, what is interesting is that the proportion in more and more listed companies has exceeded the statutory proportion since the issue of the Guidance. This study focuses on this phenomenon, and tries to reveal the motives of adopting the institutional innovation in listed companies. Based on existing studies, this study regards the company as an open system, treats it as a whole and explores the mechanism about how listed companies response to external technological and institutional environment through the establishment of independent directors. And further, this study uncovers the transition process of independent director system of Chinese listed companies. To reveal the motives of voluntarily establishing the independent board director by listed companies, this study takes the combination approach of qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. Specifically, we firstly review and organize the existing studies on independent director and the relationship between organization and environment. On that basis, we interpret and analysis relevant theory, and reason logically the mechanism of the influence of technological and institutional environment on voluntarily establishing the independent board director by listed companies. Then, we put forward the corresponding assumptions. Next, we use quantitative analysis methods to test above assumptions. We examine which factors determine listed companies to voluntarily establish the independent board director by logit regression method; as the majority of listed companies have adopted the institutional innovation form since 2004, we then apply the random effects model of panel data to examine whether the independent directors established voluntarily have generated certain efficiency endogenously. Additionally, we have a detailed analysis of four listed companies to further corroborate the conclusion. The result of empirical analysis indicates that, listed companies initially establish the independent board director voluntarily in order to imitate and deliver signal outside. But later, the motive of this behavior of listed companies is mainly for obtaining resources. That is, legitimacy mechanism plays a role first, and then does efficiency mechanism. By further analyzing the transition process of independent director system, we find that the transition of independent director system of Chinese listed companies is from imposing to inducing, namely, listed companies begin to consider their own characteristics when establishing the independent board director. This study applies neoinstitutional theory to the study on Chinese corporate governance, enriches neoinstitutional theory powerfully; meanwhile, the uncovering of transition process of independent director system in which legitimacy mechanism plays a role first works in concert with the study on the relationship between efficiency mechanism and legitimacy mechanism, it supplements the existing studies which considers that efficiency mechanism plays a role first, thus has theoretical significance. On the other hand, the transition process of independent director system of Chinese listed companies uncovered by this study indicates that the independent director system taken example from developed countries has begun to localization. Identifying the change from imposing transition to inducing transition is important for both making policies by relevant authorities and consummating governance condition by listed companies.  
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