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论文编号：	4115
作者编号：	2120102346
上传时间：	2012/5/28 16:25:23
中文题目：	高管激励、公司治理结构与经营绩效—基于我国上市金融机构的研究
英文题目：	Executive Incentive, Corporate Governance and Operating Performance --A Research for the Listed Financial Institutions in China
指导老师：	张国萍
中文关键字：	上市金融机构，高管激励，公司治理结构，经营绩效
英文关键字：	listed financial institution, executive incentive, corporate governance, operating performance
中文摘要：	20世纪70年代后期，在经济全球化、金融自由化和金融创新的大趋势下，人们更多的去关注金融机构的盈利情况，对其风险控制却逐渐放松。由于风险意识的淡薄和风险管理经验的缺乏，金融机构的经营不稳定性大大增加，整个金融体系的风险也不断积聚，最终导致金融危机的大爆发。金融危机对全球经济造成巨大的冲击，其所暴露出的过度金融创新、监管缺位、以及金融机构管理者的薪酬问题，引起了社会的广泛关注。金融危机频繁发生的原因主要在于金融机构公司治理结构的不完善、高管人员激励的短期性以及监管的缺位。 本文探讨中国金融机构高管激励、公司治理结构与绩效的关系，并从盈利和风险两个角度来阐述绩效的概念，探讨何种激励方式、公司治理结构能够平衡金融机构盈利性和稳健性要求，对于现实中维持金融机构的稳健经营，保证国民经济健康发展、维护民众的信心和社会的安定，具有良好的助益。 文章选取2002年至2010年中国上市金融机构的财务和公司治理数据，运用实证方法研究高管激励、公司治理结构和经营绩效之间的相关关系。研究发现，目前我国上市金融机构高管薪酬总额与盈利能力和风险控制水平均呈正向关系，薪酬对高管经营决策的选择产生了积极影响，高薪激励提升了金融机构的盈利能力并降低了风险水平。但是从相对激励强度方面，高管与员工薪酬差距、以及高管内部薪酬差距对盈利均产生负向影响，说明高薪所带来的不公平感不利于提升员工的士气和维持高管团队的和谐。公司治理结构方面，股权集中能有效降低风险但也降低了盈利水平，境外机构投资者对盈利有助益但是却提高了经营风险，因此金融机构应有选择的引入境外机构投资者并加强对风险的控制。国家股东的存在使得机构盈利水平下降但同时降低了金融机构的风险。单纯提高独立董事比例、专业委员会个数和监事人数不能促进监督作用的提升，而需要从内在因素方面进行完善，通过明确独立董事和监事的职责、合理激励、过失问责等方面加以改进，才能更好地发挥监督作用。 基于实证研究的结果，文章对全文进行了总结，并就如何改善我国金融机构的高管激励和公司治理结构提出一些建议。
英文摘要：	The late 1970s, with the trend of economic globalization, financial liberalization and financial innovation, people were more concerned with the profitability of financial institutions, while ignored its risk-controlling. Lacking of risk awareness and the experience of risk management, the risk of the entire financial system continued to accumulate, and then financial crisis occurred and had a huge impact on the global economy. The problem of excessive financial innovation, the absence of regulatory, as well as the compensation of managers has attracted widespread attention. The frequent occurrence of financial crisis is mainly due to the imperfections of the corporate governance structure, executive incentives as well as the absence of regulatory of the financial institutions. This paper researches the relationship between executive incentives as well as corporate governance and the performance of financial institutions in China, and the performance concerns two directions -profitability and risk. The research wishes to explore which kind of incentives structure, corporate governance structure can balance the profitability and soundness of financial institution. This conclusion will help to maintain the sound operation of financial institutions, to ensure sound economic growth, as well as to maintain the invitation faith and social stability. Based on the financial and corporate data of listed financial institutions in china, from 2002 to 2010, this paper studies the relationship of executive incentive, corporate governance structure and operating performance through empirical research. The thesis found that executive compensation shows a positive correlation with both profitability and risk-controlling , this means executive compensation has a good effect on the decision making of executives, helping to improve the profitability and reduce the risk of financial institution. As to relative incentive intensity, the wage dispersion between executives and employees, as well as the wage dispersion between executives both have negative effect on profitability, the wage dispersion between executives and employees help reduce the risk, this means that the injustice sense of employees and some executives has negative impact on the operation of financial institutions. As for the corporate governance structure, our study has some findings. To increase the level of ownership concentration can effectively reduce the operating risk but also reduces the profitability, foreign institutional investors have positive effect on the profitability, but our study show that it will increase the risk of operation, so the financial institutions need to carefully select foreign institution investors and pay more attention to controlling the operation risk. If the state-owned shareholders are the largest shareholder, the profitability of financial institution will decrease, but state-owned shareholders can help to decrease the level of risk. Increasing the proportion of independent directors, the number of board committees and supervisory can not get positive results, so we should explicit the responsibility of independent directors and supervisory, provide reasonable incentive to them, and punish their improper conduct at the same time. Based on the study results, the paper gives some suggestions as to how to improve the executive incentive and corporate governance.
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